THE SPY WAR- INSIDE STORY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000403330001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 17, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000403330001-1
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The Spy War
Rr-O;
Inside Story
Behind the bizarre case of the alleged Walker-family
espionage ring is a tale of ever expanding KGB operations
in the U.S.-and an attempt by the FBI to counterattack.
A widening dragnet for spies in the
Walker-family case has generated fears
of the worst American security breach
since the Rosenbergs gave atomic se-
crets to Moscow four decades ago.
Intelligence forces scrambled in ear-
ly June to determine if espionage by at
least four accused spies-operating on
both Atlantic and Pacific coasts-has
thrown into jeopardy the U.S. fleet's
command of the seas.
Beyond that worst possible scenario,
the case is taken as one more sign of a
disturbing trend: The rise of a new
generation of spies ready to sell out
their country for cash. At the same
time. it underscores the intensity of a
worldwide war between superpower
spy and counterspy.
Ripples spread. The Walker case,
which rang alarm bells in the Pentagon
when it first surfaced, took an even
more ominous turn when the FBI dis-
closed on June 3 the arrest of a fourth
suspect-Jerry Whitworth, a former
communications specialist aboard Pacif-
ic-based aircraft carriers. That meant
those charged in the ring were privy to
secrets affecting Navy missions in the
Pacific as well as the Atlantic.
Whitworth is described as a close
friend of the accused boss of the alleged
ring John Walker, Jr., also a cornstcnti-
cations expert who left the Navy in 1976
as a chief warrant officer with top-secret
security clearance. First to be Jailed, he
is accused of collecting secrets from his
son. Michael. a U.S.S. Nimitz crewman,
his brother, Arthur. a retired Na'' lieu-
tenant commander, and Whitworth,
and selling them to the KGB.
Authorities now face the possibility
that John Walker may have actively
recruited young sailors as Soviet spies
when he and Whitworth served as in-
structors at the Navy's Radioman
School in San Diego in the early 1970s.
By that time, according to court re-
cords, Walker already had been a paid
agent for the KGB for many years.
The FBI sans that Arthur Walker has
admitted that John paid 812.000 for
documents from the Virginia firm
where Arthur worked. John Walker is
accused of making frequent overseas
trips to obtain secret material from ei-
ther his son or Whitworth.
In 1978, for example, the U.S.S. Ni-
agara Falls. a ship to which Whitworth
was assigned, made a port call in the
Philippines December 11-15. An FBI
affidavit adds: "Notes recovered in
John Walker's residence disclose that
Walker was in the Philippines on De-
cember 15, 1978, and that he met with
an agent of the Soviet government on
December 16, 1978."
The affair is compared by some to
the atom-bomb case of the 1940s in
which Julius and Ethel Rosenberg
were executed. Not until now has an
alleged spy ring been so bound by ties
of family and friendship. Nor has there
been such clear potential for damage.
Found in Whitworth's home:"Annex
K"-a secret Navy contingency plan for
dealing with war in the Mideast. A major
concern is whether Moscow got Annex
K or information that would compro-
mise the U.S. system for detecting Sovi-
et subs, including an ocean-floor net-
work of sound detectors.
Moscow already may have modified
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rives are now being discounted by na-
val experts.
A broader concern is that Soviet
agents in \avy communications rooms
would have access to a whole array of
information about tactics used by U.S.
Accused spies John Walker and his son, Michael,
at right, appear in court with lawyers.
its submarine operations as a result of
stolen secrets. Some Navy experts be-
lieve this is the reason the Soviets have
moved missile-launching subs from
open seas to heavily protected posi-
tions near their home ports in the Ba-
rents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk.
Early fears that the Soviets may have
learned how to find American subma-
aircraft carriers and oth-
er ships as well as sub-
marines. "There are no
better targets for human
intelligence collection
than communicators,"
says Bobby Ray Inman,
retired admiral and for-
mer deputy director of
the Central Intelligence
Agency. "When you get
several people in several
locations, it has potential
for great harm."
Naval experts take
some comfort from the
fact that modern com-
puters and encryption
techniques make it vir-
tually impossible for
Moscow to have learned
enough to actually break
U.S. codes and read se-
cret naval messages. -
Just how Walker end-
ed up a spy, if that is the
case, is unclear. But in the normal
course of events, overtures are first
made by the Soviets.
A rare glimpse into how the Soviet
Union actually recruits foreign agents
came in recent congressional testimo-
ny unconnected to the Walker affair.
A U.S. Army sergeant recounted
how a man called Tori befriended him
Officials fear that the Soviet Union may have learned from a spy aboard the U.S.S. Nimitz
how specialists in the radar room protect the carri*r from hostile submarines.
over a chess table in Bangkok and en-
tertained him with visits to bars and
brothels, all the while subtly enlisting
him as a KGB spy. "Tori never intro-
duced himself as a Russian or a Soviet
operative.... Requests for material
evolved gradually from simply unclas-
sified information to finally the most
sensitive classified information I could
get my hands on," said the sergeant,
whose name was kept secret.
Over a period of 10 years, he had
more than 100 contacts with KGB offi-
cers on four continents. What they did
not know was that tie was actually
working for U.S. counterintelligence.
The Soviets today are believed to
have nearly 500 well-trained intelli-
gence officers in this country holding
cover jobs at the Soviet Embassy in
Washington, the United Nations in
New York and the Soviet consulate in
San Francisco. Also known to be active
in the U.S. are some 1,000 other spies
from Soviet allies, China and hostile
Third World states such as Libya.
Of all these operatives, the Soviets
are the ones working hardest to culti-
vate friendships with Americans who
have access to secrets. The process of
seduction, say U.S. officials, often takes
months or even years. But when suc-
cess comes, as it may have with Walk-
er, the results can be a bonanza.
Money factor. The Walker case
would be worrisome enough in its own
right. But what makes it even more
troubling is that it is only one of many in
which Americans have been accused
recently of dealing in secrets for cash. In
the spy wars, the days of Westerners
going over to the Communist side for
ideological reasons seem to be long past.
The FBI. in fact, has found that in 12
recent cases, money figured in half.
Not only is money an increasing factor,
but the sheer number of espionage acts
coming to light also is growing rapidly.
Thirty-seven cases have been tried
since 1975, about half of them involv-
ing the Soviet Union or its allies. In
contrast, not a single spy was prosecut-
ed in the U.S. in the preceding decade.
Among the most notable of the latest
spying-for-cash cases is that of an engi-
neer who tried to sell Stealth-bomber
secrets to Moscow but ended up ped-
dling them to FBI undercover agents.
Another involves a New Yorker ac-
cused of penetrating the CIA and pass-
ing secrets to the Czechs.
When the dust from the Walker case
finally settles, it may produce more
than an expected naval-security crack-
down. It already has touched off a
clamor for more counterintelligence
activity like the FBI's "contact pro-
gram," in which platoons of agents
watch Soviet offices in the U.S. and
`tntled
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Russians suspected of
being spies.
While Walker was
arrested on a tip from
his angry ex-wife, the
contact program earli-
er paid off handsomely
in the case of Thomas
Cavanaugh. a Nor-
throp engineer who
decided to get rich
quick by selling Stealth
secrets. When he
called the Soviet Em-
bassy in Washington
and the consulate in
San Francisco to solicit
bids, the FBI
was eavesdropping. Result: He drew a
life sentence in late May.
But keeping tabs on spies is becom-
ing increasingly difficult. Lately, the
problem has been compounded by
.Moscow's expanding use of operatives
in "deep cover." unknown to all but a
spymaster. These now include Viet-
namese and Cuban refugees, even
Jews permitted to leave the Soviet
Union. All can blend into the American
melting pot, unhindered by rules re-
stricting travel by embassy employes.
In the battle between U.S. and Sovi-
et intelligence agencies, the human
struggle dramatized by the latest ar-
rests is only part of the story. Both are
heavily involved in electronic snooping
that uses high-flying satellites in place
of human eyes and ears. But, damaging
as technological espionage may be, the
Walker case suggests that devastating
spy-war blows are still being struck by
human hands. ^
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000403330001-1