HOW TO ADMINISTER COVERT OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000403640067-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 67
• Publication Date: November 17, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403640067-5
ON `A6E`- .1. NEW YORK TIMES
17 November 1986
How to Administer
Covert Operations
By Edward N. Luttwak
WASHINGTON - If nothing else,
recent events - particularly the air
intrusion into Nicaragua that left Eu-
gene Hasenfus a prisoner, and the
still obscure Iran arms deal - show
by implication that the "rogue ele-
phant" C.I.A. of the 1960's is now well
and truly tamed. The White House
has declared that C.I.A. operatives
were involved in the Iranian mission,
but it was current or retired employ-
ees of the National Security Council
who were reportedly in charge of
both operations.
What we have now learned is that
there is something even worse than a
"rogue elephant" Central Intelligence
Agency - and that is the present
situation, in which the delicate busi-
ness of conducting secret operations is
left to White House officials and the
volunteer helpers they enlist.
The resulting lack of professional
expertise was evident in the Nicara-
guan case. If the C.I.A. had been in-
volved, the C-123 aircraft that
crashed north of Managua would not
have been carrying compromising
documents: a careful search for any
identifying papers and labels is a rou-
tine part of pre-flight preparations
for clandestine C.I.A. missions. In the
Iranian case, the problem was not so
much amateurism as a failure to
coordinate the venture with key allied
governments; the C.I.A. would have
done that, while preserving secrecy,
by relying on its contacts with offi-
cials in foreign governments. As it
was, the handful of overburdened in-
dividuals who conducted the Iranian
operation lacked both the required
contacts and the ability to minimize
the damage when word got out - as it
always will sooner or later.
Past experience shows that secrecy
can be combined with coordination
with our allies. The French kept a se-
Edward N. Luttwak is a senior fellow
at the Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies.
cret of Henry A. Kissinger's talks
with Vietnamese envoys in Paris;
Pakistan helped to mediate his talks
with the Chinese; the British have
kept secrets many times, and so have
the Israelis and the Saudis. But indi-
viduals operating on their own from
an office in the White House base-
ment will inevitably find it difficult to
manage a delicate initiative like the
Iranian mission and at the same time
to maintain liaison with allied capi-
tals. The result is certain to be a se-
vere loss of confidence when the
inevitable disclosure follows.
Why then was the C.I.A. not in
charge of the Iranian affair? Because
as matters now stand the C.I.A. sim-
ply cannot carry out genuinely secret
operations - as opposed to pseudo-
secret "covert" actions, such as the
supply of arms to the Afghans, which
was a matter of public knowledge al-
most from the start.
The problem is twofold: the C.I.A.
will not now act without permission
from Congressional intelligence com-
mittees, and Congress has failed to
develop practicable oversight proce-
dures and safeguards. The result is
paralysis. No official of the C.I.A. in
his senses would knowingly partici-
pate in a secret operation unless duly
authorized by Congress, lest he find
himself answering charges and possi-
bly going to jail as a result of future
investigations. On the other hand, no
professional would risk taking part in
a supposedly secret operation over-
seas if the details had been communi-
cated - as they must be - to Con-
gressional committees. There are
simply' too many people involved,
with too many reasons of their own
for leaking to the press.
It was this paralysis that the Presi-
dent's volunteers tried to overcome
in the Iranian and Nicaraguan cases,
no doubt out of a sense of responsibil-
ity as well as sheer frustration.
So long as the United States re-
mains engaged all over the world,
each Administration will face the
need to act secretly in delicate mat-
ters large and small, often entirely
uncontroversial. If we are to do so at
all competently, Congress must pro-
vide proper oversight. The most ef-
fective arrangement would include a
single joint committee, with a small,
stable staff, operating under strict
rules (along the lines of the Joint
Atomic Energy Commission, which
kept the most sensitive secrets quite
intact for decades). Policy would still
be disputed, of course, and restric-
tions would no doubt continue to be
imposed, but at least the C.I.A. could
resume its proper function - and we
would be spared the embarrassments
and real diplomatic damage caused
by unprofessional and uncoordinated
secret operations.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403640067-5
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