WITH THE CONTRAS A REPORTER IN THE WILDS OF NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000403660003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 19, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

D P90-00965 R000403660003-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-R
ON PAGE _Q... 19 January 1986
BOOKS.
WITH THE CONTRAS
A Reporter in the Wilds of
Nicaragua
By Christopher Dickey. Simon
& Schuster. 327 pp. $18.95.
Illustrated.
By Walter LaFeber
On May 30. 1983, at Xally's Ho-
tel in Danli, Honduras, the whores
backed away as two top field com-
manders of the Nicaraguan Demo-
cratic Front (the FDN, or contras.
as they are best known to North
Americans), lurched into a fight.
The struggle erupted "because of a
girl, or a remark, or maybe a look
in the eye," Christopher Dickey re-
calls in this riveting account. One
contra pulled out a Browning auto-
matic pistol and blew the other
man away. A contra simply ex-
plained to Dickey that the war
among the FDN leaders sometimes
resembled the Wild West with
submachine guns and AK-47s."
Earlier, another contra leader had
dispatched troops on a suicide mis-
sion against the skilled Nicaraguan
government forces the contras are
trying to overthrow. He ordered the
mission because he lusted after the
wife of one of those troops. "That
son of a bitch Krill ambushed his
own troops, just to get rid of them,"
an associate observed with both
wonderment and hatred.
These murderers, Dickey writes,
were the contra commanders
whom Ronald Reagasi later com-
pared with the US Founding Fa-
thers. Such ignorance is not limit-
ed to the president. After evidence
mounted that one contra leader
lone had murdered more than 30
contra commandos. prisoners an
civilians. CIA director William Ca-
sey mane a quick trip to Honduras.
twhere the contras and their CIA
sponsors share facilities). "held
court" at the US Embassy and
eve e m ression that eve -
thin was fine. Reagan began to
call the FDN "freedom fighters."
News soon leaked, however.
that the contras needlessly massa-
cred civilians (as well as each oth-
er) and that top leaders. including
Enrique Bermudez, a former officer
under the Somoza dictatorship
who had been cleaned and pressed
by the CIA for US congressional
and television audiences, were
pocketing large amounts of CIA-
provided funds. The CIA and Ber-
mudez agreed that Hugo Villagra
should be brought In to clean up
the mess. Vlllagra. Dickey drily
notes, was a protege of the Somo-
zas, an associate of the Salvadoran
death-squad leader Roberto D'Au-
buisson and a former terrorist in
Costa Rica. Viliagra rounded up
four of the contra murderers and
convicted them before a tribunal of
old Somoza followers especially
flown down from Miami for the oc-
casion. Rumor has it that several
of the convicted were executed at a
huge US airbase in Honduras.
But the executions produced an
odd result. They eliminated some of
the contras' ablest field command-
ers. The FDN has never been able
to carry out a successful, sustained
campaign against the Sandinistas,
but in 1983-84 the Front's units
virtually stopped fighting. The
anti-Sandinista cause became to-
tally dependent on CIA operatives
and their "unilaterally controlled
Latino assets" - Washington bur-
eaucratise for CIA-hired killers
from other Latin American coun-
tries. Meanwhile, the Reagan ad-
ministration told Congress and
other North American audiences
that the contras were "our broth-
ers."
Dickey relates many of these
stories from firsthand experience.
A widely respected Washington
Post reporter who has spent many
years in Latin America. he moved
with contra guerrillas inside Nica-
ragua as well as exploited his
sources In the CIA and FDN lead-
ership. His account of how he
barely survived a Sandinista at-
tack and then a nonstop trek over
mountains to the safety of Hondu-
ras is harrowing, but it is also in-
structive about the contras' talent
at fighting and surviving, even if
they seem to be fighting more for
the thrill of killing than for any
conscious political ideology.
Dickeys analysis is balanced.
lie sketches the process whereby
the triumphant Sandinistas of
1979 became a Nicaragua depen-
dent on Soviet supplies and Cu-
ban advisers by 1986. He regrets
that the revolution parted com-
pany with its more moderate
members, but he also carefully
notes how US actions since 1979,
and especially 1981, left the San-
dinistas little choice. Dickey's his-
tory is sometimes shaky. He
misses the Carter administra-
tion's determination to abort the
Sandinista victory in 1979, even
to the point of working for a joint
intervention with Latin American
governments to prevent the tri-
umph. He also neglects the evi-
dence uncovered by Roy Gutman
that as early as 1981-82 the Rea-
gan administration publicly
claimed that It wanted to negoti-
ate with the Sandinistas while pri-
vately setting terms that made
talks impossible.
But these are minor criticisms
of a work that will become a stan-
dard account of how Reagan's
Centrai American policy was con-
ducted by the CIA and Its contra
associates. 'fhe story is well-docu-
mented, grippingly told and care-
fully argued. The CIA certainh'
plays the pivotal role, but Dickey
seems to hold special contempt for
the US Congress. From the start of
the Reagan policy in 1981. Con-
gress could see that the real objec-
tive was not to interdict arms sup-
posedly moving from the Sandin-
istas to the Salvadoran revolution-
aries, or simply to pressure the
Sandinistas into negotiations, but
to use the CIA to overthrow a sov-
ereign Nicaraguan government.
When the contras' atrocities came
to light in 1983, the administra-
tion's explanation to Congress
was "a minuet of hypocrisy.''
Dickey writes. Few seemed to care.
Reagan and Casey sold their
policy with abstractions ("democ-
racy." "freedom") that had no re-
lationship to Central American
realities but further dulled the
mind of those in Congress and te-
levisionland. When a stupidly
written CIA manual advocated
breaking US law by "neutraliz-
ing" Sandinista officials, a top
CIA operative. Duane R. Clarridge
(alias "Dewey"), stilled criticism
by telling a congressional commit-
tee that only the killing of heads of
state should be counted as assas-
sination. After presiding over var-
ious contra fiascoes and murders.
Dewey, as Dickey records, received
a promotion and the CIA's "high-
est bonus of 1983.'.' The lawmak-
ers finally mustered the courage to
cut off aid in 1984. only to have
Dewey's s ucr_e_Qanrc and Reagan
convince them to reopen the sup-
nlv line for "non-lethal" aid in
1985. Dickey's story graphically
Jntinfied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403660003-3