SOVIETS SEEK WIDER ACCEPTANCE OF REGIME IN KABUL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000403740007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 16, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000403740007-0
ON PA-,GCZ!X rv t+O n l IN U I U 1N r U 3 1
16 January 1986
Soviets Seek Wider Acceptance of Regime in Kabul
Campaign Vbuld Burnish Babrak's Image, Press Him to Broaden His Political Base
By Gary Lee
WeeMieMee Par Forew Service
MOSCOW, Jan. 15-The Soviet Union is or-
chestrating a campaign to widen international
recognition of the regime it imposed in Afghan-
istan, according to western and Asian diplomats
here. Thy campaign involves stepping yip pres-
sure on Afghan leader Babrak Karmal to broaden
his political bale and to advertise his will for po-
litical compromise through the international
news media.
The efforts have resulted in the inclusion of a
prominent noncommunist in the Babrak govern-
ment and a well-advertised appeal from Kabul,
quickly seconded by Moscow, for dissenting Af-
ghan groups to return to the fold.
Eleven noncommunists were added to the Af-
ghan government early this year-a deputy
prime minister, five ministers and five deputy
ministers-according to a Jan. 3 article in
Pravda, the Soviet Communist Party newspaper.
Afghanistan needs "an atmosphere conducive
to positive dialogue between various sociopolit-
ical forces, including the ones who have so far
felt negative about the April revolution," Pravda
said.
In their pitch to groups opposing the Afghan
government from abroad and within the country,
Babrak and various Soviet officials have begun
admitting with unusual candor the mistakes they
say were made after the Afghan leader was in-
stalled in December 1979.
In addition, the Afghan government seems to be
mounting a public relations campaign abroad. Last
week, Babrak gave a rare interview to Asahi, Ja-
pan's leading newspaper. Yesterday Afghanistan's
envoy here invited about 20 Moscow-based re-
porters from western, Asian and neutral countries
on a week-long trip to Afg*i tan.
Visas for western journalists to visit Afghan-
istan usually take months to process and are sel-
dom approved.
The increased contact between Afghans and
foreign journalists coincides with greatly in-
creased coverage of the Afghan war in the Soviet
press in recent months.
The purposes of the concerted efforts, accord-
ing to the analyses of western and Asian diplo-
mats here, are:
^ To redress the tactical mistakes made during
the first few years of Soviet occupation, when
the opposition to rebel forces was rock-hard,
western coverage of the fighting was mostly
clandestine and there was virtually no Soviet
reporting;
is To pave the way for improved relations be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United States,
China and other countries for which the war is
proving a stumbling block;
? To strengthen Moscow's hand for eventual
negotiations for a political solution in the six-
year-old war.
Many western analysts in the Soviet capital in-
terpret the efforts to expand the political base of
the Babrak-led government as a clear-cut signal
that a Kremlin-backed political solution would in-
volve a continuation of the present Afghan regime.
The Soviet leadership is indicating that it
might agree to "some changes in the composition
of the Afghan government," according to one
senior western diplomat in Moscow, "but that
the regime there now is the one it expects to
stay-with or without a political solution."
During the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in
November, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev im-
pressed some senior U.S. officials with his open
support of a political solution to the war in Af-
ghanistan.
However, since the summit. Soviet officials
have repeated the Kremlin policy that cites "out-
side interference"-including U.S. and Pakistani-
backed rebel forces-as the reason for the pro?
longation of the war.
[Afghanistan's U.N. Ambassador Farid Zarif
said today that his government is ready to reveal
the timetable for Soviet troop withdrawal from
his country if Pakistan agrees to hold direct ne-
gotiations about a border dispute, United Press
International reported.
[Zarif told a news conference: "Pakistan will
be pleasantly surprised by the timetable. We are
ready to trade our last card (the timetable) any.
time Pakistan wants to see it on condition that
Pakistan talks directly to us."].
At the Afghan communist party meeting in
mid-November, Babrak appealed for a political
dialogue with Afghan groups that had opposed
his government.
Pravda said Dec. 21, "Reconciliation presup-
poses known compromises." The Babrak govern-
ment, it added, has declared "its readiness to ad-
mit representatives of various strata and groups
into the leading bodies of state authority."
The editorial, published a week before the
sixth anniversary of the Soviet invasion on Dec.
27, 1979, also specified with unusual frankness
Moscow's view of the mistakes made in the early
years of Babrak's rule. "A considerable number
of people fell for mendacious counterrevolu-
tionary propaganda," Pravda said.
"Errors of the first stage of revolution-pas-
sion for revolutionary phrases, enforcement of
social reforms without due account for the real
situation, social and national specifics of the
country-had a negative effect.too," it said.
But neither the Soviet officials nor Babrak
have indicated publicly whether their outreach to
opponents of the revolution would include com-
promises with the Islamic guerrillas who form
the bulwark of resistance. They firmly oppose
recognition of the government and any form of
negotiation with Babrak.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000403740007-0