SOME CONTRA LEADERS ARE THEIR OWN WORST ENEMIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000403790061-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 61
• Publication Date: March 24, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403790061-5
NEW YORK TIMES
24 March, 1985
Some Contra Leaders Are Their
Own Worst Enemies
By JAMES LeMOYNE
TEGUCIGALPA, Honduras - Less than a year after
the Sandinistas seized power in Nicaragua in 1979, 60
exiled officers of the defeated National Guard met in
Guatemala. With little hope of success, some of them re-
call, they vowed to drive out the Sandinistas.
Toda more than 12,000 errillas are involved in
the battle. Most of them march under the banner of the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force, which has received most
ai the sap million reportedly provided to insurgents by
the Central Intelligence Agency. While their foot soldiers
are mainly peasants angered by Sandinista policies, al-
most all the top commanders are former National Guard
officers. Their influence and unclear political aims have
become issues in the Congressional debate on continuing
aid. Last week, vigorously supporting the guerrillas'
struggle, President Reagan asserted that Congress must
decide whether the United States would keep "trying to
help people who had a Communist tyranny imposed on
them by force, deception and fraud."
Originally trained by American Marines, the Na-
tional Guard defended the ruling Somoza family for more
than 40 years. By 1979 and the Sandinista-led revolution,
many Nicaraguans identified the Guard with corruption
and brutality. Now, as rebel leaders, some former
guardsmen have proved capable. Others, however: have
been accused of crimes including murder and stealing
.from thef~ I.A. A rival guerrilla leader. Aden Pastora,
refuses to loin forces because he a_avs_ the National
Guardsmen could not win popular s ,nnnrt at home.
Their supreme military commander. Col. Enrique
Bermudez, was the Som za Gov
attache in Washington where, a former assoeisit`sayis_
he cemented ties to the C.I.A. At his base on the How
ran-Nicaraguan border, new recruits drill awkwardly in
ill-fitting boots. Colonel Bermudez said in an interview
that he was fighting the "Sandinocommunist system," to
create a pluralistic democracy. But rebel fighters ap-
pear to receive little political instruction and say their
only goal is to destroy the Sandinistas in a war that Colo-
nel Bermudez depicts as part of the struggle between
Moscow and Washington. Critics argue that the National
Guard officers' experience in defending the Somozas
casts doubt-on their commitments now. These officers,
Colonel Bermudez replies, make up only 1 percent of the
rebel army and have been unfairly stigmatized. "I don't
think you can judge all by the sins of the few," he said.
Their numbers may be small, but their influence ap-
pears to be great. Under Colonel Bermudez, the heads of
logistics, intelligence, trainin o rations s i
forces and most of the largest combat units are Guard
veterans. ManY company commanders are former a-
tional Guard enlisted men. And two influential rebel
civilian officials, Enrique and Aristides Sanchez, were
large landowners who backed the Somozas. .
After a rebel command shakeup in 1983, several for-
mer Guard officers departed under a cloud. Honduran
military officials say they suspect Col. Ricardo Lau, until
recently the head of rebel counterintelligence. of involve-
ment in the disc ce or killing of at least 18 Hondu-
ar2E rans and go oran a ists since 1981. According to
Edgar Chamorro Coronel, who was dismissed as a civil-
ian director of the Nicaragua Demo-
cratic Force five months ago for pub-
licly criticizing the rebels, other com-
manders threatened to kill Colonel
Lau at a meeting in December 1983.
The C.I.A. station chief was called in
to miate. Mr. hamorro said. Mr.
Lau could not be
ment. The C.I.A. has declined to com-
ment on reports of its operations in .
Central America. Mr. Bermudez said
he 8 heard many charges against
Mr. Lau, once a close aides. but had
seen no evidence to support them,
Last week, Col. Roberto SantivAhez
a former director of intellistence in El
Salvador, said he had seen docu-
ments indicating that Colonel Lau
had "received payment of $120,000
for arranging" the assassination in
19M of El Saiv.dor's Archbishop,
Oscar Arnulto Romero. Colonel
Santivanez was dismissed as Salva-
doran consul in New Orleans; some
members of Congress and 'other
Americans raised about $35,000 for his expenses.
The rebel chief of staff, Emilio Echaverry, retired
last year. He was accused of stealing large amounts o
C.I.A. money according to Mr. Chamorro and Capt. Ar-
mando Lopez, head of logistics C.I.A. agents seeking
missing money forced several rebels to take he detertnr
tests. Mr. Chamorro said. A former National Guard ser-
geant who became a top combat com-
mander, using. the nom de guerre
"Suicide," was executed in 1983
along with two other Guard alumni.
Mr. Bermudez said they had "mis-
treated civilians;" Another rebel offi-
cial said they had been accused of,.
robbery, rape and murder.
Worried about the guardsmen's"'
reputation the C.I.A. appointed a
new seven-meinoer National Direc-
torate in late 1982, prima ri v to meet.'
journalists ana Congressmen, ac--
cording to Mr. namorro ananother "
senior re 1 o icia . Colonel errnuw'-
den and his aides continu to run t e '
military, Mr. Chamorro added. "we
used the Ar en tines. the C.I.A. anth e uarne said. "How do you
create a democratic army out of
that?" Other rebel officials reply that
National Guard officers have the
same right to fight as any other Nica-
raguan exile and that their military
.
experience is needed. However, a?
Western official said that at first, the former officers
relied unsuccessfully on conventional military tactics,
which they had learned as cadets. Now, threatened with
the loss of American assistance, the. Guard officers face
the challenge of waging guerrilla war, which requires
broad popular support. On present evidence, it is not
clear if they can make the transition.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000403790061-5