INSIDE THE PHILIPPINE INSURGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000503910001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 3, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000503910001-6
NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
ARTICLE APPEARED 3 November 1985 '
~
_
Insidethe
P ~ pp~e ~n~Y
By Ste~re Lolr
T WAS ABOUT 6:30 IN THE MORNING WHEN THE
shooting started. On a jungle ridge dotted with coconut
palms, more than 50 members of the New People's Army,
the Communist rebels in the Philippines, were getting
ready for breakfast at a makeshift camp in Sorsogon
Province, some 290 miles southeast of Manila (map, page
42). They had finished ahalf-hour of calisthenics and
drills, and [he morning meat, wild cabbage stewed in
coconut milk, and rice, was cooking. Here and there, the
young guerrillas - an army without uniforms, wearing
sneakers or barefoot -were attending to chores, clean-
ing weapons, drying laundry and washing in a nearby
stream.
At the sound of gunfire, the piercing, staccato report of
automatic rifles, the rebels took up their weapons and
supplies, breaking camp hurriedly but without panic.
The Government troops, apparently marine and army
units, were getting closer. There were several brief exchanges of
fire, with the guerrillas firing bursts from their M-16 assault rifles
and then pulling back. Atone point, the military shot from as close as
150 yards, and bullets creased a tree a few feet away.
Then the rebels, hugging the ground and crouching behind palms,
returned the fire in ear-splitting bursts. They fired their M-79 gre-
nade launchers as well. The explosions sent the,Government troops
scurrying for cover. The guemllas then broke into two groups and
fled into the jungle, with the military in pursuit.
A couple of days before, a New People's Army officer conceded
rat mvu
??~`-'
-
Steve Lohr recently completed afour-year assignment in East Asia
for The New York Times, as a correspondent based first in Tokyo,
then in Manila.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000503910001-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/03 :CIA-RDP9O-009658000503910001-6
that the Philippine armed forces had some well trained and profi-
cient lighters, especially the marines and the army scout rangers.
"But in the local areas, they are foreigners compared to us," he said.
"So they are deaf and blind."
His claim was put to the test that morning and afternoon, as the de-
tachment of about two dozen rebels played acat-and-mouse game for
the next six hours with the pursuing military. The escape traced a
circuitous route over jungle terrain and across rivers and streams.
Guerrilla scouts, equipped with hand-held radios, monitored the
movements of the Government troops.
Eventually, the rebels found a gap in the military's encircling
maneuver and slipped through undetected. When one group of guer-
rillas came upon the isolated bamboo-and-thatch but of a local farm-
er, they found a welcome reception. There was water, handfuls of
rice, and shelter for as long as the fleeing rebels wanted it. After the
early exchanges, amounting to about 200 rounds, there was no more
gunfire. In the N.P.A. unit I accompanied, there were no casualties
that day.
HE SHOOTOUT AND CHASE IN SOUTHEAST-
ern Luzon was but one minor skirmish in the esca-
lating warfare between Communist insurgents and
the Government of Ferdinand E. Marcos, the en-
during strongman of Southeast Asia who has ruled
the Philippines for two decades. As recently as two
years ago, the New People's Army was generally
dismissed by the Philippine Government and for-
eign analysts alike as nothing more than the latest
version of the insurgent groups that, under various
banners and ideologies, have come and gone for al-
most four centuries on this 7,000-island archipela-
go. But that complacency has been replaced by
alarm as the Communist rebellion has grown rap-
idly in the last couple of years, aided immeasura-
bly by political and economic developments that
have amplified the appeal of the radical alternative
the guerrillas espouse.
The August 1983 murder of the opposition leader Benigno S. Aquino
Jr. at the Manila International Airport, as he returned from three
years of self-imposed exile in the United States, seriously under-
mined the credibility of the Marcos Government and the Philippine
military, which has been implicated in the killing. Since then, the
economy has plummeted, law and order have deteriorated and mili-
taryabuses have continued.
Washington, international lenders and the domestic opposition
have all pressed Marcos to allow a revival of democratic institutions
and to relax his strong hold on the nation's political and economic
life. This message was reintorced in late October, when President
Reagan sent Senator Paul Laxalt of Nevada to meet with President
Marcos in Manila. According to United States officials, Laxalt ex-
pressed Reagan's "serious" concern over the situation in the coun-
try, and urged Marcos to undertake urgent reforms.
The 68-year-old president, however, still retains most of his
powers, including the authority to make laws by personal decree. His
political opposition, weakened by internal rivalries, seems powerless
to change that. And skepticism is widespread as to whether most op-
position politicians genuinely want to change Philippine politics from
being an exercise in personal enrichment or, as one businessman
puu it, they just want to take "their turn at the trough." Today, it
isn't unusual to hear lawyers, doctors and corporate executives
admit privately that they are sympathizers of the N.P.A. because
they regard it as "the only real alternative."
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/03 :CIA-RDP9O-009658000503910001-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000503910001-6
violence, often amounting to the simple murder of government of-
ficialsand other perceived enemies, is a central part of the N.P.A. al-
ternative. Yet the use of such tactics seems to have gained increas-
ing acceptance, even among many affluent Filipinos. "The violence
is against my conscience," said a 42-year-old businessman who is a
rebel sympathizer. "But in our circumstances, it is a way, a neces-
saryevil, to reach a better end for this country."
During the first half of this year, insurgency-related clashes left an
average of 14 people killed every day, including soldiers, guerrillas,
targeted government officials and innocent civilians caught in the
crossfire. Once limited to small raids on isolated outposts, the rebels
now regularly mount company-size and some battalion-scale opera-
tions against fortified military facilities, usually to seize weapons,
ammunition and equipment.
The strength of the New People's Army is difficult to measure pre-
cisely. Yet by all accounts it has thrived and expanded its activities
considerably in the aftermath of the Aquino assassination. The Phi-
lippine Government now places the rebel force ac 10,000 to 12,000 -
about twice the estimate just a year ago. The Communists say they
have more than 20,000 armed fighters.
"The N.P.A. is winning -it's that simple," one Western military
analyst said. "They aren't about to overthrow the Government now.
But if the tide isn't turned over the next three to five years, the Com-
munistscould be unstoppable."
The growth of the N.P.A. insurgency represents the most serious
challenge to American foreign policy in Southeast Asia since the mid-
1970's. "The Philippines could become another Vietnam," warns Ste-
phen J. Solari, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian and
Pacific Affairs: "I doubt it would be another Vietnam in the sense of
committing large numbers of American troops in the Philippines, buc
it could be another country lost to Communism."
The headcount of armed regulars in the New People's Army seri-
ously understates the influence of the broader leftist movement of
which the guerrillas are a part, known as the National Democratic
Front. An umbrella group embracing various community, labor,
church and other organizations, the :National Democratic Front
claims to have a membership of one million and the support of 10 mil-
lion Filipinos, out of a population of 54 million people. Its constituent
organizations are committed to supporting the guerrilla warfare of
the New People's Army and to a vaguely Marxist economic program
calling for the nationalization of selected industrtes.
The National Democratic Front advocates ananti-American for-
eign policy, demanding the removal of the two large United States
tilitary facilities here. Clark Air Base a~ the naval base at Subic
Bay, and the expulsion of most American corporations. The two Phi-
lippine bases are an essential part of United States military capabil-
ities in Southeast Asia, and most analysts agree that their loss would
be a major setback to American security interests. This concern has
been heightened by the expansion of Soviet military activity in the re-
gion, centered around the former American facilities at Cam Ranh
Bay, Vietnam.
Still, the leftist revolution gaining ground in the Philippines seems
to be a home-grown phenomenon. It is a third-world nationalist
movement preaching nonalignment, although critics point out that,
as with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and other rebel movements
elsewhere in the third world, the N. P.A.'s true orientation may not be
revealed until it has succeeded in gaining power. Its revolutionary
ideology is borrowed from Marx, Lenin and Mao, but its leaders say
they are adamantly opposed to falling under the imperialistic sway
of any superpower. Moving into the Soviet orbit, they insist, will
never be a part of their program.
According to State Department officials, there is no evidence of
"material" support tmm foreign governments. However, there is
evidence, they say, of financial support from sympathetic leftist
groups, mostly in Europe. The biggest sources of funds, according to
these officials, are organizations in the Eastern bloc, Scandinavia
and West Germany. Where those groups, in turn, get their money is
unknown- leaving open the possibility of indirect Soviet financing.
The Philippine revolutionaries appear to be skittish about direct
Soviet support, in part because N.P.A. leaders believe that any overt
connections linking their group to Moscow would invite American in-
tervention in the Philippines. And Chinese support of the N.P.A. is
unlikely, State Department officials say, because the Chinese seem
Li~~ ~ i~fiUQ~
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000503910001-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000503910001-6
willing to tolerate 'he Marcos All the rebels in the out- i
Government and .American !awed movement have
bases as a counterweight to adopted a nom de guerre. The ~
TODAY, THE NEW
People's Army is ac-
tive in nearly all of the
country's 73 provinces. West-
ernanalystsestimate that the
N.P.A. etiectively controls 20
percent or more of the vil-
lages, or barrios, in the
Philippines. The Marcos Gov-
ernment claims such esti-
mates are exaggerated. But
barrio residents, business-
men and hacienda managers
in some areas of N.P.A.
strength report that the per-
centage is far higher, with
Communist shadow govern-
ments, called Barrio Revolu-
tionary Councils, controlling
as much as 50 percent of the
barrios in many towns.
The group's members are
young, 19 or 20 years old, on
average. Judging from inter-
views with more than two
dozen N.P.A. fighters in three
different units in southeast-
ern Luzon, most are the sons
and daughters of impover-
ished tenant farmers. The
majority never finished high
school. Without the alterna-
tive offered by the New Pea
pie's Army, they faced the
same fate as their parents,
working long hours to scrape
a subsistence from the coco-
nut stands they farm. They
are the underclass in a feudal
agrarian world of two classes
-the hacienderos and the
tenants.
The hacienderos, or land-
lords, frequently live in Mani-
la, and their farms are run by
hired supervisors. The ten-
ants work the land, but the
hacienderos take most of the
crop, with the tenants making
do with what is left. It is
enough for adirt-floor dwell-
ing of a couple of rooms with
no plumbing. If there is elec-
tricity, it is typically supplied
by a car battery wired to a
naked lightbulb or two.
N.P.A. fighters speak of the ~,
injustice of Philippine soci-
ety, and they defend their
movement as an attempt to
improve the lives of disad-
vantaged tenant farmers like
their relatives and neighbors.
But few of them talk of the
other two main elements in
N.P.A. doctrine - opposing
imperialism and "bureau-
crat" capitalism.
the Tagalog word for com-
rade or companion; a first
name or Filipino niclmame
follows. Ka Nestor, a 2>l-year-
old who became a guerrilla
seven years as[o. conceded
that his early knowledge of
the group's doctrine was lim-
ited. "In truth," he said,
"when I joined I did not really
understand the objectives of
the movement. I had only a
general idea that this was for
the good of the people. "
Nineteen-year-old I{a
Andy, a veteran N.P.A. guer-
rilla who bears the scars of
seven bullet wounds suNered '.
in battle, is now a member of !!
an N.P.A. "sparrow squad,"
which specializes in assassi-
nations of local officials and
military officers. "I don't
Prot anymore," he says, in a
statement typical of many
N.P.A. fighters, mast of
whom, like 85 percent of Fili-
pinos, were raised as Roman
Catholics. "I don't believe in
God anymore. The N.P.A. is
my family now and the move-
menc is my religion."
To its members and to the
local communities where it is
strong, the N.P.A. has sold it-
self as a kind of "social po-
lice." It maintains peace and
order, administers its brand
of rough justice, collects
taxes and carries out its ver-
sion of agrarian reform. In
the N.P.A. program of land
reform. the traditional crop-
sharing arrangement on ten-
ant farms, which gives the
landlord two thirds of the
crop a~ the tenant one third,
is reversed.
There have been signs that
once the N.P.A. is powerful in
an area, it tends to abandon
its "Robin Hood" image and
use force to extort funds from
villagers and gain support
through coercion. Yet for the
most part, the N.P.A. is still
widely perceived as a benevo-
lent organization, performing
tasks for the community that
the Government should but
does not.
This image has imbued
most of the rebels with a sin-
cere belief in the righteous-
ness of their revolutionary
movement, despite the via
lence and hardship the guer-
rilla life involves. The N.P.A.
preaches abstinence and dis-
cipline. Drinking is banned.
There are strict rules guiding
courtship (including the
pointed suggestion not to
marry outside the move-
ment). Premarital sex is out-
lawed.
Like soldiers in any army,
the N.P.A. fighters have
lengthy periods of empty
time. They fill it playing vol-
leyball, telling stories and
jokes, strumming guitars and
singing. All activities seem to
include people in groups of
three or four or more. Few in-
dividuals are left to them-
selves. Asked what she liked
about being a member of the
N.P.A., I{a Totoy, a 21-year-
old guerrilla, replies: "The
principles, the discipline and
the camaraderie. "
The rebel movement, for
security reasons, is intention-
ally vague about its com-
mend structure. both at the
national and regional levels.
Two former campus activists
at the prestigious University
of the Philippines in Manila,
Rodolfo Sales and Rafael
Baylosis, are identified by
Government authorities as
the chairman and secretary
general of the party. For
their part, the guerrillas will
not identity anyone by title,
except to say someone is
"senior member" or a "re-
sponsible officer" in the
N.P.A.
THE SLIGHT 36_
year-0!d man, with a
pencil-thin mustache
and heavy-lidded eyes, is
known as 1{a Oggie. He is one
of the most senior members
of the N.P.A. in the Bicol re-
gion, or nationally, for that
matter. An anti-Government
activist in Manila, he joined
the rebels in the hills in early
1970. That was 15 months
after 11 young revolution-
aries, in a split with the inef-
fectual, Soviet-0riented Huk-
balahap rebel group, formally
created the Communist Party of the
Philippines, on Dec. 26, 1968. The
young radicals pledged to re-establish
the party "guided by Marxism-Lenin-
ism-Mao Zedong thought." In keeping
with the Maoist edict that "power
grows out of the barrel of the gun and
~pi1"f' if dQ
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000503910001-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000503910001-6
the party controls the gun," the New
People's Army, the party's military
wing, was established on March 29,
1~ -one year before Ka Oggie
joined up.
Seated on the floor of a tenant farm-
er's dwelling one night, smoking and
speaking by the light of a kerosene
lamp, Ka Oggie said that the N.P.A.'s
first decade had been marked by mis-
takes and setbacks. The group's ideo-
logical fervor did not translate into
combat effectiveness. "We didn't
know anything about waging a war,"
the rebel veteran said, ' `and we had to
learn with many lives, unfortunate-
~ In the 1970's, the movement's
agrarian reform was more radical
than the current program, and mis-
takenly so, in the view of today"s
rebel leaders. "It was 90 percent for
the tenant and 10 percent for the land-
lord," ICa Oggie said. "If the landlord
did not accept, there was confisca-
tion. That extreme approach lost us
the support of the middle forces -
landlords and small-business men.
Now, we recognize that we need their
support."
Indeed, the N.P.A.'s ability to re-
cover from its early setbacks is
largely attributable to its flexibility.
It has adapted Communist revolution-
ary theory to Philippine conditions,
broadening its support.
Militarily, the party has also fash-
ioned aFilipino variant of the Maoist
model, tailored to the nation's geogra-
phy. The blueprint for its brand of
guerrilla warfare was presented in a
1974 tract entitled "Specific Charac-
teristics of Our People's War," by
Amado Guerrero, thought to be a pen
name for Josh Maria Sison, a founder
and first chairman of the Communist
Party of the Philippines.
"In a small, fragmented country
like the Philippines," Guerrero
wrote, "it would be foolhardy for the
central leadership to ensconce itself
in one limited area." Instead, he de-
clared, the N.P.A. should set up a
series of decentralized "guerrilla
fronts," each spanning several adja-
cent towns and villages and including
a party organ, an N.P.A. unit and a
network of civilian organizations sup-
porting the revolutionary movement.
At present, the rebels claim to have
more Wan 60 such fronts scattered
across the country.
Building popular support is the
foremost consideration of We revolu-
tionary movement, I{a Oggie
stressed: "We are doing Wings in We
countryside that any decent govern-
mentought to be doing -helping poor
people meet their basic needs and giv-
ing them justice."
into an empty glass," he continued.
"We give them something, while the
government gives them nothing."
Government officials dismiss
claims as self-serving romanticism.
The N.P.A., President Marcos as-
serts, is less concerned with improv-
ing life in the Philippines than with
justifying the actions of a member-
ship that is made up largely of "plain
criminals, local bandits, or bored
young people seeking adventure."
The movement's foreign policy is
still developing. At this juncture, it
seems to be a leftist amalgam of na-
tionalism, Marxism and opportun-
ism. According to the Communists
and the members of the National
Democratic Front, their objection to
the American military bases in the
Philippines is primarily nationalistic.
They don't want any foreign bases in
the country, they say, adding
that the Philippines should be
a neutral, nonaligned nation.
Yet the June 1985 edition of
Ang Bayan, the underground
publication of the Communist
Party of the Philippines, de-
clared: "It is the duty of the
Filipino people to forge links
of solidarity with the other
peoples of the world. Our
principal enemy is U.S. im-
perialism, which is also the
principal enemy of the peo-
ples of the world."
Virtually every observer of
the Philippine guerrilla
movement is watching
closely for signs of outside
sponsorship, but the Phi-
lippine military says it has
not yet found evidence of sup-
port from any foreign govern-
ment.
For his part, Ka Oggie, the
Bicol guerrilla officer, says
that the rebels want the back-
ing of governments that are
"friends of our revolution,"
though he declined to name
any candidates. "It will be
difficult to win without for-
eignsupport," he admits. The
overseas backing that the
N.P.A. needs, he says, woWd
be mainly weapons ship-
ments, including artillery. So
far, We rebels' arms are
mainly high-powered rifles,
with M-16's by far We most
common. They also have.car-
bines, and some machine
guns and grenade launchers.
Much of what Wey carry
bears the legend "property of
U.S. Government" or "U.S.
Army," having been seized
from the Philippine military
in ambushes or, occasionally,
purchased from corrupt offi-
cers.
To benefit from foreign
backing, Ka Oggie said, the
Philippine guerrillas must
first increase their strength
enough to control large sec-
tions of the nation's shoreline
so that weapons shipments
can land easily. The N.P.A.
should reach that threshold in
"a couple of years," he fig-
ures.
TALL, LEAN, WITH
close-croPP~ g='aY
hair, Col. Rodolto Bla-
zon stands at the forefront of
the Philippine Government's
effort to stem the growth of
the Communist insurgency.
The 50-year-0ld marine cow-
wander heads the counterin-
surgency drive in the area
around Davao, the sprawling
port city of Mindanao. In
Davao, the New People's
Army is so active with its or-
ganizing, tax collections and
selective liquidations of Po-
lice and other officials that
Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile
has called the city a "laboratory for
the N.P.A." It is Blazon's job to make
sure that the Communist experiment
i in Davao and the surrounding coun-
tryside is not a success.
Following the declaration of mar-
tial law in 1972, the Philippine mili-
tary acquired a reputation for being
corrupt, abusive and top-heavy with
officers personally close to President
Marcos. Blazon epitomizes the other
side of the military -the professional
soldiers. He is a graduate of the Phi-
lippine Military Academy, which is
modeled after West Point. He is intel-
ligent, articulate and respected both
by supporters of the Government and
by its strident critics. The marines
under his command are also highly
regarded in the community. They are
disciplined, well trained and well
equipped troops.
Blazon commands military sweeps
in the hills surrounding Davao to cap-
ture guerrilla uniu, but he spends
most of his time talking to civilians,
usually in small groups. He talks to
students, local businessmen, opposi-
tion politicians, anybody who will lis-
ten. "The military side of the N.P.A.
is often overstated," Blazon says.
C.ontit-u~
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000503910001-6
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/03 :CIA-RDP9O-009658000503910001-6
G
"The real danger is their teach-ins,
their so-called education program,
~ That is what I work to counteract, and
i that's where the main counterinsur-
gency battle. has to be fought and
won."
"This insurgency problem," he
went on, ' `is not going to be solved by
body counts. The important thing is to
change the thinking of the people.
They have to be convinced that their
grievances against the Government
may be temporary and that Commu-
nism is the real enemy."
Blazon views himself as a kind of
evangelist. In his lectures, he sides
with institutions, not personalities. "I
teach for democracy and against
Communism,.' he explains. "I don't
promote the Government." At times,
in fact, he sounds like an opposition
politician: "If you take away the op-
position groups, you have a dictator-
ship. They are the alternative for a
peaceful change. We need them." To
the opposition, his admonition is to be-
ware of the "danger of Communist in-
filtration" - a warning he presents
as the lesson of the Nicaraguan revo-
lution.
During the last year, more than 20
barrios in Davao that were once heav-
ily influenced by the Communists
have been returned to Government
control, thanks to the coun-
terinsurgency campaign. But
in some of these, the marines '
are nothing more than an oc-
cupying force, and the civil-
ian population is neutralized.
"If the marines are there, the
villagers support them,"
noted Prospero Nograles, a
Davao human-rights lawyer.
"But if the N.P.A. comes in,
they will cooperate with
them."
Another important factor is
the presence of less-disci-
plined Government troops in
the area. The marines under
Blazon account for only about
one third of the regular mili-
tary troops in the area. These
9,500 regulars are far out-
numbered by the 7,000-strong
contingent of the paramili-
tary civilian home detense
force. Poorly paid, badly
equipped and often undisci-
plined, these units occupy the
lowest rung of the Philippine
military. They are known as
trigger-happy bad boys who
are frequently little more
than guns-tor-hire, and whose
side businesses include theft
and extortion. So, though Bla-
zon and his charges are im-
pressive and respected, they
are twt the face of the mili-
tarythat most people see.
HE N.P.A.'S STRUG-
gle has been promoted
by it followers not as a
coming Communist takeover,
but as a nationalist revolu-
tion. The nationalist theme
has broad appeal in the
Philippines, which was a
Spanish colony for nearly
four centuries and then, from
1898 to 1996, was controlled by
the United States, except for
the Japanese occupation dur-
ing World War II. In their
small-group indoctrination
sessions, the leftists rarely
mention the word "commu-
nism." In fact, many full-
time members of the move-
ment, including some in the
armed units, insist they are
not Communists, but merely
part of the National Demo-
cratic Front.
Whether this is a distinction
with a difference is dubious.
In ideological terms, the Phi-
lippine Communist Party and
the National Democratic
Front are virtually indistin-
guishable, blaming "Amer-
ican imperialism" for most of
the problems in their country
and elsewhere, and advocat-
ing the necessity of armed re-
bellion.
Still, many middle-class
Filipinos who support the left_
ist cause do not believe they
are backing Communism
and, perhaps naively, do not
believe that their business in-
terests and property will be
taken hum them if the rebels
win. A 38-year-old lawyer
who is a landowner in south-
ern Luzon says: "I don't
think this will be a Commu-
nist country, even after the
revolutionary movement
takes over. It is because
democracy has been sub-
verted in this country that I
support this revolutionary
movement."
Even some longtime party
members explain the Com-
munist element in the move-
ment more in terms of prag-
matism than as an unshak-
able faith in Communist doc-
trine. I{a Cesar, a rugged 35-
year-old with a stocky phy-
sique, is a senior party cadre
~ in the Bicol region. At the
home of a large landowner
sympathetic to the move-
ment, he said: "We believe
that radical change is needed
in this country, and we need
an ideology. We have seen
that the Marx-Lenin-Mao ap-
proach has been effective in
waging and winning revolu-
tionary struggles else-
where.,
"But," he continued, "that
doesn't mean it will have that
character here. We are open
to all elements of other ideolo-
glee as long as they help us
win..,
Yet many Filipinos wonder
whether the movement's tac-
tics as it strains to increase
its base of popular support
are only that -tactics, to be
cast aside as its strength in-
creases. This kind of reserva-
tion is frequently heard
among other opponents of the
'Marcos Government, espe-
ciallymoderates seeking non-
violentchange.
One of these is Jaime V.
Ongpin, a Harvard-trained
corporate executive in
Manila and a persistent critic
of the Marcos Government.
In Ongpin's view, the growth
of the New People's Army is
largely a symptom of the na-
tion's problems - an authori-
tarian regime, a bloated and
abusive military and a pros-
trate economy riddled with
corruption and favoritism.
The communist insurgency,
he believes, will wither away
if the Philippines gets rid of
Marcos and then sets about
the tasks of reviving demo-
cratic institutions and re-
forming the military and the
economy.
"The rise of the N.P.A. is
alarming but not overpower-
ing," Ongpin says. "There is
still time. Ninety percent of
the guerrillas are not com-
mitted to the Communist
ideology. They are just peo-
pie reacting to circumstances
- poverty and military
abuses. At present, with Mar-
cus's power, they are not
given a decent alternative to
joining the N.P.A. But the
Filipino is not a Bolshevik. He
doesn't want that much. He
wants to be left alone, to earn
a decent living and have
enough to send his kids to
school. "
Ongpin may not want Com-
munism in the Philippines
but, like a growing number of
moderates, he doesn't want
the American military bases
in the Philippines either. Ong-
pin favors the departure of
the American presence as a
pragmatic nationalist: he
does not think the bases serve
the Philippines. And asked if
he would stay in the Philip-
pines if the nation turned
Communist, he replies: "Yes
I would. I am Filipino and
this is my country, regard-
less." ^
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/03 :CIA-RDP9O-009658000503910001-6