ASSESSING HARM FROM SPYING CASE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504010006-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 7, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504010006-9
ARTICL$
ON PAGE
'Assessing
harm from
spying case
A
WASHINGTON - The alleged spy
ring of the Walker family might
have provided the Soviet Union with
clues an how to get at the US. Navy's
most precious secret: the location of
its nuclear-missile submarines.
Intelligence experts say the gov-
ernment might never be able to de-
termine exactly how much damage
has been done, although Pentagon
spokesman Michael Burch said yes-
terday that Defense Secretary Caspar
W. Weinberger now believed that it
was "even more serious" than he
thought last week, when he said the
United States suffered "a serious
loss."
Pentagon officials refuse to discuss
the case in detail for fear of giving
even more information to the Sovi-
ets. But three former top intelligence
officials agreed in interviews that
the Soviets might have obtained im-
portant pieces to a puzzle that, when
completed, would allow them to find
and track the submarines that carry.
two-thirds, of America's, strategic,
warheads.
..The Walker ring may have pro-
vided the Russians with information
to track our submarines with some
precision," said George Carver, who
served in top CIA posts from 1966 to
1976. "It could be the most damaging
case since the Rosenbergs gave away
the secret of the atomic bomb."
Carver was referring to Julius and
Ethel Rosenberg, who were executed
in 1953, after a celebrated spy trial.
Two former CIA directors, Stan.
field Turner and William Colby,
agreed that the most severe threat
from the Walker case, in which four
men have been charged with espio.
nage, might. be to the security of the
nation's nuclear strategic submarine
force, long considered invulnerable.
Turner, a former admiral who-was
CIA director under President Jimmy
Carter, said that he dtd not think
that the Soviets had the capability to'
detect US. submarines now but that
the alleged spy ring might have
helped them toward that goal.
"The danger," Turner said "is that
they might ... over a period of time
... get to a point where they, would
Ii I~ ,..,,, 1 \n
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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
7 June 1985
be able to tell where our submarines
are. They don't have it now, but they
may have gotten some clues." im-
All the experts emphasized the
portance of the strategic submarine
fleet in the nation's defense posture.
U.S. strategic nuclear forces are
divided into a "triad" - land-based
missiles, strategic. bombers and sub- i
marine-launched missiles - that
would retaliate against the Soviet
Union if the United States were at-
tacked. These are the forces that the
nation relies on to deter war.
able to
b
mi
h
The three former CIA officials said
the Soviets could have learned
enough from the alleged Walker ring
to piece together patterns of how U.S.
communications operate. The Soviets
might also have gained clues to what
the US. knows about Soviet commu-
nications.
Colby, CIA director under Presi-
dent Gerald R. Ford, said, "It's an
incremental thing. For them, it's a
jig-saw puzzle with a piece here and a
piece there that they may be able to
fit together into a pattern."
With the information, the Soviets
deduce how orders
e
t
g
been considered invulnerable to at. 1 are given to American submarines,
tack from the Soviet Union. Land what their patterns of operation are
based Minuteman missiles could be t and how they communicate with
struck by the Soviets because their- headquarters.
underground silos are large, station- From that - information, Carver
ary and can be located easily from said, they might have a start on
photo-reconnaissance satellites. where to look to locate submarines.
Bombers are even more vulnerable i They may,- over a period of time
because they are large and their air have been able to focus their analyti-
bases are easy to locate. . cal efforts to see -how we work," he
"Strategic submarines are the most said.
important part of our deterrent," ' A specific example of how informa-
Turner said. tion provided by the alleged Walker
All three of the former CIA offi- ring might have helped the Soviets.
dials agreed that the most damaging in seeking out U.S. submarines was
information supplied to the Soviets provided by Barry Blechman, an au-
might have concerned US. commu- thor of major studies of naval opera-
nications with the submarines. tions for the independent Brookings
They pointed out that three of the Institution and a former analyst for
four arrested in the case had special the Center of Naval Analysis, a think-
tank.
access to communications tech- Blechman said that a major prob-
niques and special clearances involy- lam in managing nuclear subma-
ing submarine communications.
rines has been communications be-
John A. Walker Jr., 47, the alleged cause it is difficult to send messages
ringleader, was a radioman with top- through water. As a result, he said,
secret security clearance at Atlantic.
Fleet Headquarters in Norfolk, Va.,' strategic submarines, trailing a'spe-
in 1975 and 1976, according to the
FBI.
His older brother, Arthur, 50, also
charged, taught anti-submarine war-
fare at an Atlantic Fleet special
school in the early.1970s. -
Jerry A. Whitworth, 43, arrested in
Davis, Calif., was a communications
specialist at the Naval Telecommuni-
cations Center, at the Alameda Naval
Air Station, near Oakland, Calif.,
from 1979 to 1982.
Michael Lance Walker, 22, seaman
son of John Walker, was arrested
aboard the aircraft carrier USS Nim-
i.: itz. `. - - - Law enforcement sources also
identified a mysterious fifth suspect
- dubbed "F" in correspondence
seized by the FBI - as Navy techni-
cian Gary Walker, 24, the half-
brother of John Walker and Arthur
Walker. But the sources said Gary
Walker has been cleared of involve-
ment in the spy operation. .
dial antenna, must come close to the
surface to communicate.
"It would be helpful for the Rus-
sians to know exactly how often it is
necessary for these submarines to
rise close to the surface to communi-
cate and how deep they might have
to be, what techniques are used," he
said. "They may have been able to
get this kind of information from the
Walker ring, we don't know."
Blechman said, however, that he
was personally convinced that tech-
nical problems facing the Soviets in
trying to locate US. submarines are
so complex that it is doubtful that
the Soviets would- be able to solve
them before the end of the century.
"I think our submarines are likely
to be safe into the year 2000," he said,
even though he agreed that the Sovi-
ets may have gotten clues to solve
the puzzle from the Walker ring.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504010006-9