THE SECRET SHARERS AND CITIZEN RIGHTS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000504050004-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 27, 2012
Sequence Number: 
4
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 5, 1986
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00965R000504050004-7.pdf221.26 KB
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~ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504050004-7 BOS','ON GLOBE 5 January 1986 ESPIONAG~~ The secret sharers and citizen rights Freedoms. ianperiled by CIA's links with friends By Jeff McConnell Special to the G~ her t arrest of Navy ter- ror analyst Jonathan Jay~milard for spying for Is- rae n the United States, Isr 1 s most important a-ly, has put a ew spotlight on spying Among friends. owever, there is a relat- ed problem that: is deeper and more troubling: the ortQaslonal collusion - sometlmes deliberate, sometlmes inad- vertent -between Amertcan Intelligence agencies and the inrtelligence and securi- ty servl~es of "irtmdly" countries. That collusion oan take two forms. In the first. Americ:~n intf~lligcnce agencies either directly assist ur passively toler- ate intelligence activities by agents of foreign governments operating in the Unlte, the prac- tices often vioalr? ti?,~? ?~rnstitutional rights of US re.~dcnts. ments shortly after Aquino's murder. Yet even before a determination had been made over the sufficiency of evidence for indictments, the Justice Department re- portedly shared FBI files on the MFP probe with Marcos' martial law regime. Among these files were said to be docu- ments seized in an FBI raid on the San Francisco home of Steve Psinakis. a for- mer MFP officer. The San Francisco Chronicle rtpotted that photocopies of some of those dibiea- ments were forwarded to Gen. Fabian Ver, then chief of staff of the Philippine armed forces and formerly head of Mar- cos' personal intelligence unit, the Presi- dential Security Command. Apparently among the information passed on to the Marcos regime was oonff- dential, noncriminal information on anti- Mar=cos activists based in this eoun'try. Psinakis charged in a recent interview that a list of MFP activists inside the Phil- ippines also found its way to Ver. He said that some on this list were subsequently arrested and that twb have dlsappeare~d. Between 19131 and 1983, a federal psinakis' charge cannot be verified. grand Jury secretly investigated the ac- There are precedents, however: Between tfvltlts of US-based opponents of Philip- 1968 and 1974, the CIA and the FBI car- pine President Ferdinand Marcos. The pried out Operation CHAOS, a spy oper- probe was prompted by allegations by ation against American political activists the Marcos government that ttte dissl- with international ties. Throughout the dents had holes to a campaign of bomb- duration of CHAOS, the US government logs that had rocked Manila In late frequently exchanged data on targeted in- 1980. According to'a US government af- dividuals with "friendly" intelligence ser- iidavit recently filed in Washington, the vices. It also requested clandestine oper- main target of this investigation was ations against them. One CHAOS target, the Movement for a Free Philippines, an gbdeen Jabara, learned during a lawsuit organization of moderate anti-Marcos settled in 1984. after a decade of litiga- activists. According to other ~accourrts, tion, that the FBI had supplied noncri- ~another target was the late Bentgno urinal material about him to three foreign Aquino, who allegedly had ties to several governments. The Bureau promised, as MFP members. Aquino was the most part of the settlement, to attempt to ne- prominent snit Mares activist and was trieve that material. assassinated in August 1983 on his re- turn to Mar-ila after three years of self-'\,~ unposed exile In the Uniled titatcs. The grand fury Investtgatlon, the ulfidavit I asserts, was suspended without indict In 1978, the FBI briefed the Senate Ju- diciary Committee in executive session on the case of Sami Framail, a US citizen then attending Michigan State. F.amail had been seized and imprisoned shortly after arrtving in Israel to visit his dying father. He was eventually charged with, and con- victed of, membership in a pakstinlan or- ganization outlawed to Israel. Jabara; who was Esmail's attorney, had suspicions resulting from his own case that. even though Esmail had done .nothing illegal in the United States. the FBl had transmitted information about Esmail to Mossad. the Israeli intelligence service, some time prior to his departure for Israel. Jabara contacted James Abourezk. then senator frnm South Dako- ta, who arranged the executive session hearing. The Justice Department confirmed Ja- bara's suspicions. When Abourezk ques- tioned them on the FBI's authority "to transmit this kind of noncriminal infor- oration," department officials acknowl- edged the noncriminal nature of the in- formation conveyed but held they had had the authority to do so based on de- partment guidelines and a presidential executive order governing liaison, rela- tionships with foreign services. "They sent up their top counterterror- ism guy," Aboure~k recalled recently. "They [the FBI had information that [Es- mail] was on his way and gave it to the Israelis. But they said the Israelis said they already knew." In this way. Abour- ezk contended, the FBI sought to deflect responsibility for Esmail's arrest. But he emphasized that the FBI "volunteered the information - Mossad did not ask." Congressional investigations in the mid-1970s into Operation CHAOS and other cases in which the FBI and the CIA disregarded constitutional guarantees on freedom of speech and political activity went a long way toward ending purely do- mastic abuses. But collusion by American agencies with "friendly" services re- mained apiece of unfinished business. The work by Congress led presidents 6/M(Rll@d Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504050004-7 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504050004-7 Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter to sign ex- ecutive orders putting the FBI out of the business of policing political beliefs and squarely back in the business of enforc- ing the law. The orders also placed re- strictions on direct CFA operations against Amerman residents. According to the Gaffer order, both agencies wen for- bidden to "request or otherwise encour- age" foreign services (or any other agen- cies) to do what FBI and CIA employees were already prohibited from doing them- selves. A 1978 report found that the US State Department rarely expelled `friendly' foreign services for im- proper activities. The Carter order did not, however, re- strict acquiescence by federal intelligence agencies to the activities of "friendly'' for- eign agencies in the United States or against American residents abroad; nor did it restrict the dissemination of infor- mation to "friendly" services on persons residing to the United States. Three events, in late 1976, put the congressional investigators back to work. One was the assassination in Washing- ton of former Chilean Ambassador Orlan- do Letelier and the alleged involvement by the Chilean intelligence service. DIVA. Another was the Shah of Iran's beast on network television that the Iranian intel- ligence service, SAVAK, was spying on Iranian students within tht United States. Finally, there vgere growing indi- cations of harassment of Korean-Ameri- cans and Korean nationals living in this country, as well as reports of infiuence- buying in Congress by the Korean Cen- tral Intelligence Agency. Investigators found that the allega- tions and reports wen true, that numer- ous people had been victimized by acts or threats of violence by these services and that many more lived in fear. Moreover, they found that the FBI and the CIA had known more about these activities than they had ever admitted. A 'h7pot~ietlcal' conaectioa The extent of the US connection was suggested by a 1984 article in the Har- vard International Law Journal by Mi- chael Gknnon. who; as legal counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. headed a review of these issues in 1978. Since the facts his committee discovered have remained highly classified, Gannon characterized the US connection in terms of a hypothetical "friendly" intelligence agency he called. THRUSH. But though the THRUSI-f agency is hypothetical. con- gressional reports, both secret and pub- lic, make clear that Gknnon's model for THRUSH could have been DIVA. SAVAK or the KCIA. "The Central Intelligence Agency con- tributed significantly to THRUSH'S estab- lishment,' Glennon wrote. "THRUSH keeps CIA officials partially informed con- cerning its activities in the United States, and Federal Bureau of investigation re- ports to the CIA fill in most of the gaps.' The CIA makes no objection to the con- . tinuation of those activities. It fails to transmit to the State Department any particulars of its tacit agreement with THRUSH. "The CIA is fully aware that the,lnfor- mation gathered by THRUSH or given to THRUSH by the FBI y,l,~aed to identify - those targeted for '~__t~ing' [harass- ing] and the CIA so informs the FBI. Nei- ther United States a vea this con- sideration any weight en formulating policy concerning liai `with THRUSH. Each regards lice currst~t relationship ~' with THRUSH as re+ya, ding. THRUSH provides intelligencx J~~rmatlon both from within and without the Unitcd States which is import~pf-to national se- ~ _ curtly." . The classified rej~i of Glennon's 1978 investigation, portions of which were made available [Washington rt porter Dak Van Atta, 'rkre that inac- , lion and indifference by he US govern- ment, moreover. often lii-~1litated the ha- rassment of us residet>~+by these foreign intelligence service3?i~he committee found that the FBI "ai~tef~ no affirmative effort to ascertain ttlLa-aetivittd in the United States of 'frie>~' foreign co~n- triea' intelligence aer~df" but only in- vestigates "specific cdrp~ie-lnta of crimi- nal violations over whMEf! it has jurladio- Uon," which make up~~liinlted portion of complaints. The CIA v~l-~tound to acquire such information ori~ ~'incldentally." while the National purity Agency, which eavesdrops on ~it~rnational' com- munications, and the~6tate Department do so hardly at all. "Wltt1 certain exoep- [ions," the report aseltted, "officials of the State DepartmenF IMiBve conveyed to the FBI or CIA no actl~-E~Or continuing in- terest" in such activity!?' The dissemination ibf `-the information acquired, and action 69i fit, was found to be "irregular and inf~tient." The CIA was said to do the beatr~lK,'but sometimes. out of fear, to limit actlte4 to Its informs= lion. FBI or State Deprrtknent investiga- tions could provoke ~etlprocal actions against its overseas ~b~rations. It was found that FBI inform8tiiln did not reach Justice Department prosecutors or ni- evant officials in the Sttiit Department or 'CIA; and the State DepArtment was found "rarely tf ever" to resort tb the remedy of expulsion for such improper activities by "friendly" services. ~- ~ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504050004-7