THE SECRET SHARERS AND CITIZEN RIGHTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504050004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 5, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

~ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504050004-7
BOS','ON GLOBE
5 January 1986
ESPIONAG~~
The secret sharers
and citizen rights
Freedoms. ianperiled by CIA's links with friends
By Jeff McConnell
Special to the G~
her t arrest of Navy ter-
ror analyst Jonathan
Jay~milard for spying for Is-
rae n the United States,
Isr 1 s most important
a-ly, has put a ew spotlight on spying
Among friends. owever, there is a relat-
ed problem that: is deeper and more
troubling: the ortQaslonal collusion -
sometlmes deliberate, sometlmes inad-
vertent -between Amertcan Intelligence
agencies and the inrtelligence and securi-
ty servl~es of "irtmdly" countries.
That collusion oan take two forms. In
the first. Americ:~n intf~lligcnce agencies
either directly assist ur passively toler-
ate intelligence activities by agents of
foreign governments operating in the
Unlte, the prac-
tices often vioalr? ti?,~? ?~rnstitutional
rights of US re.~dcnts.
ments shortly after Aquino's murder. Yet
even before a determination had been
made over the sufficiency of evidence for
indictments, the Justice Department re-
portedly shared FBI files on the MFP
probe with Marcos' martial law regime.
Among these files were said to be docu-
ments seized in an FBI raid on the San
Francisco home of Steve Psinakis. a for-
mer MFP officer.
The San Francisco Chronicle rtpotted
that photocopies of some of those dibiea-
ments were forwarded to Gen. Fabian
Ver, then chief of staff of the Philippine
armed forces and formerly head of Mar-
cos' personal intelligence unit, the Presi-
dential Security Command.
Apparently among the information
passed on to the Marcos regime was oonff-
dential, noncriminal information on anti-
Mar=cos activists based in this eoun'try.
Psinakis charged in a recent interview
that a list of MFP activists inside the Phil-
ippines also found its way to Ver. He said
that some on this list were subsequently
arrested and that twb have dlsappeare~d.
Between 19131 and 1983, a federal psinakis' charge cannot be verified.
grand Jury secretly investigated the ac- There are precedents, however: Between
tfvltlts of US-based opponents of Philip- 1968 and 1974, the CIA and the FBI car-
pine President Ferdinand Marcos. The pried out Operation CHAOS, a spy oper-
probe was prompted by allegations by ation against American political activists
the Marcos government that ttte dissl- with international ties. Throughout the
dents had holes to a campaign of bomb- duration of CHAOS, the US government
logs that had rocked Manila In late frequently exchanged data on targeted in-
1980. According to'a US government af- dividuals with "friendly" intelligence ser-
iidavit recently filed in Washington, the vices. It also requested clandestine oper-
main target of this investigation was ations against them. One CHAOS target,
the Movement for a Free Philippines, an gbdeen Jabara, learned during a lawsuit
organization of moderate anti-Marcos settled in 1984. after a decade of litiga-
activists. According to other ~accourrts, tion, that the FBI had supplied noncri-
~another target was the late Bentgno urinal material about him to three foreign
Aquino, who allegedly had ties to several governments. The Bureau promised, as
MFP members. Aquino was the most part of the settlement, to attempt to ne-
prominent snit Mares activist and was trieve that material.
assassinated in August 1983 on his re-
turn to Mar-ila after three years of self-'\,~
unposed exile In the Uniled titatcs. The
grand fury Investtgatlon, the ulfidavit I
asserts, was suspended without indict
In 1978, the FBI briefed the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee in executive session on
the case of Sami Framail, a US citizen then
attending Michigan State. F.amail had
been seized and imprisoned shortly after
arrtving in Israel to visit his dying father.
He was eventually charged with, and con-
victed of, membership in a pakstinlan or-
ganization outlawed to Israel.
Jabara; who was Esmail's attorney,
had suspicions resulting from his own
case that. even though Esmail had done
.nothing illegal in the United States. the
FBl had transmitted information about
Esmail to Mossad. the Israeli intelligence
service, some time prior to his departure
for Israel. Jabara contacted James
Abourezk. then senator frnm South Dako-
ta, who arranged the executive session
hearing.
The Justice Department confirmed Ja-
bara's suspicions. When Abourezk ques-
tioned them on the FBI's authority "to
transmit this kind of noncriminal infor-
oration," department officials acknowl-
edged the noncriminal nature of the in-
formation conveyed but held they had
had the authority to do so based on de-
partment guidelines and a presidential
executive order governing liaison, rela-
tionships with foreign services.
"They sent up their top counterterror-
ism guy," Aboure~k recalled recently.
"They [the FBI had information that [Es-
mail] was on his way and gave it to the
Israelis. But they said the Israelis said
they already knew." In this way. Abour-
ezk contended, the FBI sought to deflect
responsibility for Esmail's arrest. But he
emphasized that the FBI "volunteered the
information - Mossad did not ask."
Congressional investigations in the
mid-1970s into Operation CHAOS and
other cases in which the FBI and the CIA
disregarded constitutional guarantees on
freedom of speech and political activity
went a long way toward ending purely do-
mastic abuses. But collusion by American
agencies with "friendly" services re-
mained apiece of unfinished business.
The work by Congress led presidents
6/M(Rll@d
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504050004-7
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504050004-7
Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter to sign ex-
ecutive orders putting the FBI out of the
business of policing political beliefs and
squarely back in the business of enforc-
ing the law. The orders also placed re-
strictions on direct CFA operations
against Amerman residents. According to
the Gaffer order, both agencies wen for-
bidden to "request or otherwise encour-
age" foreign services (or any other agen-
cies) to do what FBI and CIA employees
were already prohibited from doing them-
selves.
A 1978 report found that
the US State Department
rarely expelled `friendly'
foreign services for im-
proper activities.
The Carter order did not, however, re-
strict acquiescence by federal intelligence
agencies to the activities of "friendly'' for-
eign agencies in the United States or
against American residents abroad; nor
did it restrict the dissemination of infor-
mation to "friendly" services on persons
residing to the United States.
Three events, in late 1976, put the
congressional investigators back to work.
One was the assassination in Washing-
ton of former Chilean Ambassador Orlan-
do Letelier and the alleged involvement by
the Chilean intelligence service. DIVA.
Another was the Shah of Iran's beast on
network television that the Iranian intel-
ligence service, SAVAK, was spying on
Iranian students within tht United
States. Finally, there vgere growing indi-
cations of harassment of Korean-Ameri-
cans and Korean nationals living in this
country, as well as reports of infiuence-
buying in Congress by the Korean Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency.
Investigators found that the allega-
tions and reports wen true, that numer-
ous people had been victimized by acts or
threats of violence by these services and
that many more lived in fear. Moreover,
they found that the FBI and the CIA had
known more about these activities than
they had ever admitted.
A 'h7pot~ietlcal' conaectioa
The extent of the US connection was
suggested by a 1984 article in the Har-
vard International Law Journal by Mi-
chael Gknnon. who; as legal counsel to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
headed a review of these issues in 1978.
Since the facts his committee discovered
have remained highly classified, Gannon
characterized the US connection in terms
of a hypothetical "friendly" intelligence
agency he called. THRUSH. But though
the THRUSI-f agency is hypothetical. con-
gressional reports, both secret and pub-
lic, make clear that Gknnon's model for
THRUSH could have been DIVA. SAVAK
or the KCIA.
"The Central Intelligence Agency con-
tributed significantly to THRUSH'S estab-
lishment,' Glennon wrote. "THRUSH
keeps CIA officials partially informed con-
cerning its activities in the United States,
and Federal Bureau of investigation re-
ports to the CIA fill in most of the gaps.'
The CIA makes no objection to the con-
. tinuation of those activities. It fails to
transmit to the State Department any
particulars of its tacit agreement with
THRUSH.
"The CIA is fully aware that the,lnfor-
mation gathered by THRUSH or given to
THRUSH by the FBI y,l,~aed to identify -
those targeted for '~__t~ing' [harass-
ing] and the CIA so informs the FBI. Nei-
ther United States a vea this con-
sideration any weight en formulating
policy concerning liai `with THRUSH.
Each regards lice currst~t relationship ~'
with THRUSH as re+ya, ding. THRUSH
provides intelligencx J~~rmatlon both
from within and without the Unitcd
States which is import~pf-to national se- ~ _
curtly." .
The classified rej~i of Glennon's
1978 investigation, portions of which
were made available [Washington rt
porter Dak Van Atta, 'rkre that inac- ,
lion and indifference by he US govern-
ment, moreover. often lii-~1litated the ha-
rassment of us residet>~+by these foreign
intelligence service3?i~he committee
found that the FBI "ai~tef~ no affirmative
effort to ascertain ttlLa-aetivittd in the
United States of 'frie>~' foreign co~n-
triea' intelligence aer~df" but only in-
vestigates "specific cdrp~ie-lnta of crimi-
nal violations over whMEf! it has jurladio-
Uon," which make up~~liinlted portion of
complaints. The CIA v~l-~tound to acquire
such information ori~ ~'incldentally."
while the National purity Agency,
which eavesdrops on ~it~rnational' com-
munications, and the~6tate Department
do so hardly at all. "Wltt1 certain exoep-
[ions," the report aseltted, "officials of
the State DepartmenF IMiBve conveyed to
the FBI or CIA no actl~-E~Or continuing in-
terest" in such activity!?'
The dissemination ibf `-the information
acquired, and action 69i fit, was found to
be "irregular and inf~tient." The CIA
was said to do the beatr~lK,'but sometimes.
out of fear, to limit actlte4 to Its informs=
lion. FBI or State Deprrtknent investiga-
tions could provoke ~etlprocal actions
against its overseas ~b~rations. It was
found that FBI inform8tiiln did not reach
Justice Department prosecutors or ni-
evant officials in the Sttiit Department or
'CIA; and the State DepArtment was found
"rarely tf ever" to resort tb the remedy of
expulsion for such improper activities by
"friendly" services. ~- ~
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504050004-7