SALT SHAKERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504160042-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: July 8, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STET
( Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504160042-3
ARTIr:L~ APPEARED ~
ON P,1~ 1 8 July 1985
Are the Soviets cheating?
SALT SHAKERS
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S declaration of June 10 that the
United States will continue to abide by SALT II at least
until the end of the year deepens rather than resolves the
controversy over Soviet cheating on arms control agree-
ments. Reagan's announcement, like many previous
statements from the administration, accused the Soviet
Union of violating nuclear arms agreements. And it makes
future U.S. compliance contingent on the correction of the
alleged violations. Reagan said he intends to reconsider
the issue in December after the Pentagon submits a report
on U.S. options in response to continuing Soviet viola-
tions. Given Reagan's view that at least one of the Soviet
violations is "irreversible," it seems likely that he will find
the Soviets guilty as charged. And if Reagan remains true
to his word, that will spell the end of full U. S. adherence to
SALT II, and may even lead to complete renunciation of
the treaty.
Three allegations of Soviet cheating lie at the heart of the
present controversy. In each case the Soviet Union is prob-
ing gray areas in the SALT agreements in ways the United
States finds unacceptable. In each case some ambiguity
remains about whether the Soviets' actions constitute trea-
ty violations, and in each case there is a grain of plausibili-
ty to the Soviets' justification for their behavior.
The most serious compliance issue involves a large ra-
dar station under construction near Krasnoyarsk, a city in
central Siberia. According to public reports about classi-
fied intelligence data, this installation appears to be capa-
ble of detecting attacking American missiles fired from
Trident submarines. If so, it is a clear violation of Article VI
(b) of the 1972 ABM Treaty, which permits early warning
radars to be built only on the periphery of the country and
facing outward. Since Krasnoyarsk is hundreds of kilome-
ters from the Soviet Union's borders, there is no wav that
this radar can be construed as being "on the periphery."
The complication is that large radar stations can serve
other important functions besides early warning. They are
essential for what is known as battle management, that is,
targeting incoming warheads for antiballistic missile
forces; they can track satellites in space; and they monitor
missile tests. The ABM Treaty sought to limit the battle
management capabilities of early warning radars by limit-
ing their location to the periphery, while permitting the
space-tracking and intelligence activities. In fact, an ap-
pendix to the ABM Treaty of 1972 known as Agreed State-
ment Fspecifically exempts radars for those purposes
from the provisions of the agreement. In effect, there is a
defect in the treaty. Agreed Statement F contradicts Article
VI by providing legal grounds for deploying large phased-
array radars in the interior of the country.
The Soviets have exploited this loophole. They insist
that the Krasnoyarsk facility will track satellites, and ar-
gue further that its dedication to this purpose will become
clearer as time goes by. However, even arms control advo-
cates critical of the Reagan administration find the Soviet
story to be dubious, since the published reports on Kras-
noyarsk indicate that the new facility closely resembles
existing Soviet early.warning radar stations. If the United
States were to accept the Soviet position, the Soviets could
establish a network of similar radar stations throughout
the country. This would undercut the 1972 ABM Treaty,
which aimed at blocking the construction of ABM systems
by either superpower. Even if the Soviets have found a
legal loophole that permits the Krasnoyarsk installation,
their interpretation is and should be unacceptable to the
U.S.
The Krasnoyarsk radar station, though, is not an insur-
mountable issue. It alone can provide only a small portion
of the coverage needed to make a Soviet ABM system
effective. For example, U.S. ICBMs headed for the Soviet
Union would go over the the North Pole, an area that the
Krasnoyarsk station cannot cover. U.S. security is not ap-
preciably affected by the station.
N A DIFFERENT political climate, the Standing Consul-
tativeCommission could be employed to close the loop-
hole. The commission was set up as part of SALT I to
clarify the line between permitted and prohibited activi-
ties. If serious discussions about Krasnoyarsk were taking
place, the commission could conceivably amend the treaty
to allow both sides to deploy one and only one large
phased-array radar in the interior of the country. This
would allow the United States to match Krasnoyarsk if it
so desired, while eliminating the open-ended loophole
offered by Agreed Statement F. Such an outcome would
certainly be preferable to the present situation.
But the superpowers are not seriously addressing the
Krasnoyarsk issue. Reagan counts Krasnoyarsk as aclear-
cut violation and considers it to be an indication of Soviet
interest in breaking out of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets
view the administration's allegations as a transparent at-
tempt to justify the abandonment of the ABM Treaty in
order to pursue the Strategic Defense Initiative. They re-
fuse, even within the official channels of the SCC, to ad-
dress the legitimate U.S. concerns. There is no sign that
this standoff-already two years old-will be resolved be-
fore the Reagan reevaluation in December.
HE SECOND compliance issue centers on a new mis-
sile known as the SS-X-25. The SALT II agreement
included a provision that allows both sides to test and
deploy only one new type of intercontinental ballistic mis-
sile. Late in 1982 Moscow announced it was testing its new
type of ICBM; the U.S. monitored these tests, and labeled
the new missile (which carried several warheads) the SS-
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504160042-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504160042-3
_i
X-24. But some months later, American intelligence de- treaty leaves it up to the superpowers to deci a or them-
tected flight tests of another missile carrying only one selves if their verification efforts are being hindered. This
warhead. This missile was designated the SS-X-25. Obvi- unhelpful formula emerged because both superpowers
ously, to test two new types of ICBM when only one is prefer ed to protect the right to encrypt. And to negotiate
permitted would be a clear violation of the SALT II agree- more specific limitations would have required disclosing
ment. SALT II, however, does allow modernization of U.S. intelligence capabilities, which the United States un-
existing types of ICBMs, provided there is no change in d_e_rstandably wished to avoid.
the number of stages and the fuel type and that the length, There is little doubt that the Soviet Union has signifi-
diameter, launchweight, and throwweight of the missile tartly increased the level of encryption in its missile tests
are not modified by more than five percent. The Soviets since 1981. The Reagan administration protests that the
claim that the SS-X-25 is merely the modernized (and high level of encryption has interfered with its ability to
therefore permissible) version of an existing missile, the verify Soviet compliance with SALT accords, and hence
SS-13, that they have deployed for years. constitutes a violation. The Soviet Union claims that its
The Reagan administration insists that SS-X-25 differs encryption record is consistent with the treaty, and it
from its predecessor by more than five percent (by exactly presses for more specific charges. The haziness of SALT II
how much, no one has said publicly). The problem is that was probably destined to cause a collision of this sort.
the SS-13 is an older missile, developed in the 1960s and Unlike the SS-X-25 tests, which cannot be undone once
deployed only in limited number. The Arms Control Asso- conducted, encryption is a correctable violation. In future
ciation, a private pro-SALT educational group, reported Soviet missile tests, the extent of encryption could be re-
last year that the U.S. has less solid intelligence about the duced to acceptable levels. But because SALT II was never
SS-13 than it does about more recent and more important ratified by the United States, norms of behavior were nev-
Soviet missiles. Moscow argues that U.S. intelligence un- er developed to reduce the ambiguity left by the treaty
derestimated the capabilities of the SS-13 which now provisions. And with the Soviet Union refusing to discuss
means thev exaegerate the difference between it and the _ such matters in the Standing Consultative Commission, it
S -X-25. is impossible to establish mutually acceptable guidelines.
Unlike the Krasnoyarsk controversy, which is the result
of a treaty loophole, the SS-X-25 issue is the result of a THE REAGAN administration says there are many
dispute about facts. The treaty is clear; the evidence is not. 1 other cases of Soviet cheating. The most comprehen-
Similar situations have arisen in the past-and been re- sive of the administration's three public reports on Soviet
solved to the satisfaction of the United States. In the mid- compliance was released in October 1984 by the Presi-
1970s, for example, it appeared that the Soviets were con- dent's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control. It
strutting new missile silos in violation of the SALT I identified 17 instances of alleged Soviet cheating, another
agreement. To allay U.S. concerns, the Soviet Union gave 15 examples of suspicious Soviet activity about which the
the United States information demonstrating that the facil- evidence is insufficient to claim cheating, and numerous
ities under construction did not contain missiles. Moscow breaches of "the duty of good faith" required by interna-
has been unwilling, however, to discuss SALT II-related tional law.
compliance issues because the United States has refused Careful examination, though, reveals that the report
to ratify the treaty. Meanwhile, President Reagan, in his contains only a few allegations of actual cheating on arms
June 10 statement, declared the SS-X-25 to be an irrevoca- control agreements. Most of the report details "circum-
ble violation that "cannot be corrected by the Soviet Un- vertions" in which the Soviets violated the spirit rather
ion," and reserved the right to an equivalent U.S. violation ~han the lPttPr of the treaty. or "breaches of unilateral
of SALT II-to build a new type of ICBM of our own. commitments" in which the Soviets changed their stated
The third area of compliance controversy is at once the military plans without breaching their treaty obligations.
clearest, because the change in Soviet behavior is unam- These actions, like much of Soviet foreign and military
biguous, and the murkiest, because the standards of tom- policy, are not to our liking but they do not constitute
pliance are ill-defined. It involves the rules for electronic violations of treaties. And in several of the actual viola-
eavesdropping. Both the U.S. and the USSR gather intelli- tions the Soviets admitted the infraction, but were unable
Bence about the other's missile systems by intercepting to meet the treaty deadline and eventually did bring them-
the communications (known as telemetry) emitted from selves into compliance. Thus many of the administration's
missiles during test flights. For example, the United States allegations are just the sort that earlier presidents would
usually learns about the capabilities of missiles like the SS- have dismissed as misleading or unfounded.
X-25 from intercepted telemetry. This data is invaluable, if Indeed, the Krasnoyarsk radar station, the SS-X-25, and
not indispensable, for verifying that the other side is abid- the coded telemetry are not inherently insoluble prob-
ing by the technical provisions of the SALT agreements. lems. But there is little prospect for the two sides to ad-
The problem is that these communications can betrans- dress the issues in ways that are constructive rather than
mitted in code (a practice known as encryption), thus combative. If Reagan finds Soviet violations uncorrectable
denying data to the other side. SALT II is maddeningly now, he is not likely to find them corrected by November.
vague about the practice of encryption. It specifically al- What the Soviets deny now they are likely to still be denv-
lows botl- sides to code their data-unless the co3ing ing at the end of the year. Reagan's decision may well
blocks the other side from verifvine the treaty. But the amount to only a temporary stay r,f execution for SALT II.
Steven E. Miller teaches defense studies at the Massachu- STEVEN E. MILLER
setts Institute of Technology, and is coeditor of Internation-
al Security.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504160042-3