GAZING SOUTH WITH MYOPIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504160045-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: February 1, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504160045-0
urn PAGE /OJ r'ebruary 1y85
VIEWPOINT
Gazing South With Myopia
By Gen. T. R. Milton, USAF (Ret.), CONTRIBUTING EDITOR
Given half a chance, Central
America need not fear a
Marxist takeover. It may be
denied that half a chance,
though.
Campaign rhetoric
bears a certain re-
semblance to the
burning of incense.
Both serve a ritu-
alistic purpose; nei-
ther has lasting ef-
fect. As proof, recall
the words of John F.
Kennedy in one of his celebrated tele-
vision debates with Richard Nixon.
Kennedy took the Eisenhower Admin-
istration to task for permitting the es-
tablishment of a Communist base
"only ninety miles off the coast of the
United States."
Admittedly, this particular bit of
campaign rhetoric was translated, la-
ter on, into the effort at the Bay of
Pigs, but not with any real conviction.
That venture will stand as an example
of irresolute behavior on the part of
the United States. What could have
been an easy little amphibious opera-
tion was doomed by the last-minute
denial of air superiority. The subse-
quent fiasco put Fidel Castro firmly in
place as the USSR's Caribbean surro-
gate, and the New Frontier went on to
other things. Two decades later, we
face growing danger to the south.
Our Latin American policy has been
one of inconsistency and uncertainty,
with the single exception of Grenada,
a splendid small triumph carried off
too quickly for mobilization of the
usual opposition. In all fairness, occa-
sional displays of ineptitude like that
of the CIA guerrilla manual have
strengthened opponents' hands, but
the basic opposition to an anti-Com-
munist Caribbean policy needs no en-
couragement: It is firmly entrenched
in various religious groups, in aca-
demia, and in.a curious assortment of,
organizations staffed with the same
earnest types who made a career of
opposing the war in Vietnam.
Opposition to any decisive Latin
American policy has been effective
enough, thus far, at least to make any
Central American opposed to Marxist
revolution think twice before signing
on to a US-backed operation. Con-
gressional abandonment of the Nica-
raguan FDN, or contras, for instance,
stirs up unhappy memories of other
halfhearted US ventures into counter-
revolution, memories of the Cuban
unfortunates at the Bay of Pigs, and-
even more poignant-of the hill tribes
of Indochina who joined our side.
It should now be clear to most peo-
ple that the favorable judgments of
Castro made early on were dangerous
miscalculations, ones that allowed
him to consolidate his power under
the benign, if myopic, gaze of Uncle
Sam. The Sandinistas are presently
consolidating their revolution, and so
they still talk of pluralism, and press
freedom, and other democratic pass-
words.
Their actions, however, are the true
indication of the direction in which
they are moving, which is precisely in
the same direction taken by Cuba. Be-
cause the contras, even with shaky
support, have kept the Sandinistas
busy, Nicaragua is still a seedy Marx-
ist backwater,. unable to do much in
the way of exporting revolution, but
that is plainly on the agenda. El Sal-
vador first, then Guatemala and Hon-
duras, with the rest falling like ripe
mangoes.
It is difficult to understand the emo-
tional support in this country for the
Sandinistas and the FMLN revolution-
aries of El Salvador. While it is true
that government forces have commit-
ted atrocities, the guerrillas have
caused a great deal more hardship
and have had their full share in the
killings. General Vidas Casanova has
made much progress toward an effec-
tive and disciplined Salvadoran mili-
tary while supporting President Du-
arte in the best democratic tradition.
Duarte, with his unblemished liber-
al, even left wing, credentials, should
have the automatic support of Ameri-
can liberals in his efforts to end the
destructive war. That he has, instead,
the concerted opposition of liberal
America, along with influential seg-
ments of the press and television, is a
reflection either of mass liberal con-
fusion or hypocrisy. Take your pick.
Across the border in Nicaragua, the
Soviets are providing Hind helicop-
ters and other modern weapons in
quantity to the 50,000-man regular
army and 200,000-man militia. To-
gether with the weapons come a few
hundred Soviets and East Germans
and at least 1,500 Cuban advisors. All
this to put down the FDN and, it goes
without saying, to keep the popula-
tion in line. Once the contras are
taken care of, full attention can be
given to El Salvador.
The sad thing about this story is
that Central America, given half a
chance, need not fear a Marxist take-
over. A region once dominated by au-
thoritarian military figures is now in-
creasingly democratic. El Salvador
held free elections and chose Duarte.
Honduras has a democratically elect-
ed president, and even Guatemala will
have free elections in 1985. Panama is
democratic after its fashion, and Cos-
ta Rica has long been a democracy.
South America is moving along on
the same path. In all of Latin America,
only Chile, Paraguay, and Fidel Cas-
tro's Cuba have truly authoritarian re-
gimes. Nicaragua is headed that way,
but the Sandinistas have not yet
snuffed out the opposition, nor has
any real power figure emerged.
The trend is definitely toward freely
elected governments and away from
dictatorships, either of the right or
left. No one can claim credit for this,
but a strong United States interest in
Latin America?must have had some-
thing to do with it. Like politicians
everywhere, those in Latin America
talk one way for publication, another
off the record. Off the record, they
have been heard to applaud the mili-
tary exercises in Honduras, the naval
presence off Nicaragua's shores, and
the new high profile of the US South-
ern Command, once a tropical old
soldier's home.
If there is continued, effective, and
nonclandestine US interest in Latin
America, the Soviets and Cubans will
be left, at best, with a down-at-the-
heels Communist outpost in Nicara-
gua. ^
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504160045-0 _