POLICY MAKERS FACE A TREND: 'COVERT' ACTIONS BECOME OVERT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504390001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 11, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504390001-3
WALL 5'I'REET JOURNAL
11 February 1986
Policy Makers Face a Trend: L-
`Covert' Actions Become Overt
FOREIGN
By ROBERT W. MERRY
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON-The Reagan adminis-
tration and Congress recently debated
whether the U.S. should give overt or co-
vert aid to Angolan rebel leader Jonas Sa-
vimbi. The debate was public. That meant,
if Mr. Reagan didn't eventually ask for
overt aid, everyone would know he had
opted for covert aid, essentially making it
overt.
As it turned out, that process of deduc-
tion was unnecessary. Shortly after the ad-
ministration secretly notified Congress
that it would proceed with covert military
aid to Mr. Savimbi's anti-government
guerrillas, that information showed up in
public print. Thus, Angola joined Nicara-
gua in the realm of what Senate Intelli-
gence Committee Chairman David Duren-
berger calls "'overt' covert action."
That raises a question: Given public
nervousness about secret operations,
Congress's expanded role in overseeing
U.S. intelligence agencies and the seem-
ingly inevitable leaks surrounding such
matters, has covert action become an un-
realistic foreign-policy option?
"My tentative conclusion is that, within
any sensible meaning of the term, covert
action isn't a viable policy option in the
post-Watergate era," says former United
Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick.
Richard Allen, former national security
adviser to President Reagan, calls covert
programs "highly problematic."
Lack of Information
Mrs. Kirkpatrick calls her conclusion
tentative because she can't know for sure
that there aren't any successful covert op-
erations under way. And some experts note
that there are circumstances in which co-
vert action may work, despite the current
political atmosphere.
But just about everyone agrees: The
range of options that can be kept secret is
tration officials became so frustrated with
waging political battles over foreign policy
that they ended up concentrating too much
on the narrow range of options that could
be undertaken covertly.
Guerrilla Warfare
By contrast, the Reagan administration
has sought to widen that range of options.
and hence finds itself constantly battling
Congress-overtly-over foreign-policy
goals it wants to pursue covertly. The re-
sult, Sen. Durenberger complains, is
"months or years of disruptive legislative
guerrilla warfare."
The lesson, many experts believe, is
that government officials should carefully
study the criteria for successful covert ac-
tion and operate vigorously within the con-
fines of those criteria. And they should rec-
ognize the political reality that some for-
eign-policy goals simply will have to be de-
fended openly in the political arena.
What are the political confines of covert
action? Most experts say long-term, large-
scale operations aiding movements en-
gaged in military hostilities aren't likely to
he kept secret. "The point... is that
large-scale controversial covert actions
will certainly become public," Sen. Duren- i
berger said in a recent speech.
Political Prospects
Small-scale operations aimed at boost-
ing political prospects of U.S. sympa-
thizers within foreign countries stand a
better chance of remaining clandestine.
"My judgment," says a former top con-
gressional staffer involved in foreign-af-
fairs issues, "is that covert activities that
might involve assistance to political par-
ties or getting our viewpoints across still
are policy options."
But that still precludes a wide range of
options that were available to presidents in
the pre-Vietnam era. Obvious examples of
clandestine operations that became public
are the assistance for Nicaraguan and An-
golan rebels and the recently revealed
Reagan plan to undermine Libyan Presi-
dent Muammar Qadhafi.
much narrower today than in the pre-Viet- What about the CIA operation to foster
nam era, when congressional oversight of the overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh in
intelligence was nominal and a broad for- Iran in 1953? Highly unlikely today, most
eign-policy consensus existed in the coup- experts agree. And the widespread CIA in-
try. Today's oversight procedures, says volvement in Chile's 1964 national election,
Robert Turner, senior fellow at the Center which remained secret for a decade?
for Law and National Security ins Char- "Much more difficult today," says a for-
lottesville, Va., provide a "veto by disclo- mer U.S. intelligence official.
sure" to members of key congressional Some experts, suggesting public opinion
committees. may be swinging back toward giving presi-
That poses a difficult challenge to any dents greater leeway, say Mr. Reagan's
administration as it confronts the geopoliti- highly public battles on the issue may fos-
cal forces that inevitably threaten global ter that trend. "The administration has to
stability. The pitfalls are many. keep going up that mountain until there's a
One Washington foreign-policy expert greater sense of the necessity for covert
believes, for example, that Carter adminis- action," says Mr. Allen.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/24: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504390001-3