LIBYAN RAID ERODED QADDAFI'S POSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504400010-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 22, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/17 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504400010-1
WASHINGTON TIMES
22 August 1986
Fl~E ONLY
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Libyan raid eroded
Qaddafi's posirion
ontrary to the predictions
of many Middle East ex-
perts, Col Muammar Qad-
dafi has not been able to
exploit the U.S. raid on his Tripoli
headquarters to galvanize new pop-
ular support for himself at home or
to rally a united Arab world in his
defense abroad.
A measure of the Libyan dictator's
increasing sense of isolation is the
fact that he has recently sent out
special emissaries to try to persuade
prominent Libyan political exiles to
return home to
help solve the
country's massive
economic prob-
lems.
These desper-
ate appeals are
being consis-
tently rejected by
exiled leaders,
who have no confi-
dence in the er-
ratic colonel. In
the past, he has
tried to have them
assassinated, and
they suspect en-
trapment.
Reflective of
Col. Qaddafi's
fear that he may
have lost his char-
ismatic hold on
the Libyan
masses is his bi-
zarre and unchar-
acteristic per-
sonal behavior in
since January Libyan hard currency
earnings have been cut in two by the
drop in the world price of oil. Re-
sponding to American pressures,
European countries have sharply re-
stricted their purchases of Libyan
oil to drive the price down further,
and an Italian court has finally con-
fiscated Libyan assets because of
failure to pay past debts.
AS a result of the fall in hard
currency earnings, strict
import controls have had to
be introduced in Libya, large con-
struction projects have had to be
abandoned, and foreign workers
have been sent home. In a frank dis-
cussion with a Libyan exile, one of
Col. Qaddafi's officials recently ad-
mitted that conditions after the raid
were "terrible" and that there were
"shortages of everything" He even
suggested that President Reagan
might be the most popular man in
Libya for having acted against Col.
Qaddafi.
On top of the Libyan ruler's do-
mestic troubles is his barely sup-
pressed frustration with the failure
of the Arab world to support him
with effective action after the raid.
Although there was some verbal
condemnation of the U.S. strike, the
Arab heads of state refused to heed
Col. Qaddafi's demand to convene an
emergency summit meeting in Fez
to plan retaliation, and for this the
Libyan colonel accused them of cow-
ardice.
Finally, when Col. Qaddafi tried to
play the Russian card in response to
the raid, he was again rebuffed.
Sending his deputy, iViaj. Abdel
Salam Jalloud to Moscow, Col. Qad-
dafisought to sign a formal treaty of
peace and friendship with the So-
viets, but he became the first na-
tional leader to have requested such
a treaty to have been refused. Gen-
eral Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
was obviously not prepared to make
binding commitments to so unreli-
able apartner.
During his 17 chaotic years in
power, Muammar Qaddafi has often
been in deep trouble, but he has al-
ways managed to extricate himself.
On this occasion, Reagan officials
assert, "Time is against him, the
trend line is down, and he doesn't
have many assets left"
The most likely outcome is seen to
be an internal military coup against
him, but don't count Col. Qaddafi out
until it has actually occurred.
the weeks following the American
bombing raid. Instead of rallying the
population as he used to do with per-
sonalappearances before enthusias-
tic crowds, he has confined his pub-
lic appearances to remote rural
towns and relied on TV to reach
large audiences. He keeps so low a
profile and travels so continuously
that even his close aides can't reach
him when important decisions are
pending.
Fear of his own people seems to
have replaced his former bombastic
confidence, and there is hard evi-
dence that this personal concern for
his safety is fully justified. Accord-
ing to U.S. officials, there have been
at least four attempts on his life in
the last two years, including one last
November by a cousin who was a
colonel in the Libyan army. More-
over, at a recent soccer riot in Trip-
oli, graffiti defaced the ubiquitous
posters that display his portrait, and
derisive chants against him were
heard for the first time.
Instead of unifying the country
behind him, the U.S. raid has served
to deepen the lack of confidence be-
tween Col. Qaddafi and a substantial
part of the Libyan officer corps. He
blames them for failing to shoot
down the U.S. planes, and they blame
hi~n for having provoked the raid by
his terrorist attacks on Americans
and for having supplied them with
obsolete Soviet weaponry.
Even more disturbing to Col. Qad-
dafi must be the growing disen-
chantment within the Libyan army
with his failure to extricate it from
the unwinnable war in the deserts of
Chad. His costly and unsuccessful
attempts to help rebel forces against
the French-supported Chadian re-
gime has cost so many casualties
that desertions from the Libyan
army are a growing problem, and
Col. Qaddafi's talk of replacing the
army with a people's militia cannot
have improved morale.
In the past, the Libyan dictator
has been able to control and stifle
discontent by a generous distribu-
tion of economic benefits from the
cornucopia of Libyan oil wealth, but
Cord Meyer is a nationally syndi-
cated columnist.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/17 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504400010-1