KHOMEINI'S LENGTHENING SHADOW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504400013-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: May 16, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ST Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17 :CIA-RDP90100965R000504400013-8
'ICt,> ~f'PEARED
~ ~ --.G~
CORD MEYER
ILLEGIB
ehind President
Ronald Reagan's
last-minute effort
to swing enough
votes in the Senate
to sustain his veto
and save his pro-
posed $354 million
sale of defensive missiles to Saudi
Arabia is a growing realization in the
White House of what defeat on this
issue could wean.
"Paken together with the with-
drawal last October in the face of
congressional opposition of the
planned sale of arms to Jordan, the
turndown by the United States of a
modest defensive arms package for
the Saudis, one that is not viewed as
threatening by the Israeli govern-
ment, would send a clear message to
all moderate Arabs. They could only
conclude that the United States can
no longer be relied on to help them
defend themselves.
This unmistakable signal of
American withdrawal from military
cooperation with the Gulf states that
will contro150 percent of the world's
oil by the 1990s comes at a critical
time, when a new and dangerous de-
velopment has changed the balance
of power in the area.
The leaders of Saudi Arabia, Jor-
dan, and Egypt are watching the
military balance slowly and imper-
ceptibl}? begin to tilt against Iraq in
its long war of attrition against the
more numerous and more fanatical
Iranian legions of the Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini.
Although the statistical measure-
ments of military and economic
strength continue to show Iraq hold-
ing its own, this confident exterior
seems to be hiding a pervasive war-
weariness that manifests itself in
various ways.
Although Iraqi diplomats
staunchly deny it, there are reports
taken seriously by State Department
officials that some kind of an unsuc-
cessful attempt was made recently
on the life of Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein. If the reports turn out to be
true, there may well be far more dis-
sension beneath the smooth surface
of Iraqi official life than American
intelligence has }?et been able to
identify and measure.
Another manifestation of how the
fortunes of war may be gradualh?
shifting in favor of Iran's suicidally
courageous infantry is the peculiar
nature of the fighting on the Faw
Peninsula, which has been seized by
Iran.
WASHINGTON TIMES
16 ~4ay 1986
Flj~ ONLY
Kh
omeuu s
lengthening
shadow
Rather than risk the massive ca-
sualties that an infantry assault to
retake the lost territory would cost,
the Iraqis have been trying to defeat
and drive out the Iranians by relent-
less daytime bombing.
Not only has the Iranian army
clung tenaciously to its positions un-
der this bombardment, but during
the nights it has mounted what one
Pentagon official has described as
"a Dunkirk in reverse:' Marshaling
every craft that an outboard motor
c;an move, the Iranians have been re-
supplying and reinforcing their
troops under cover of darkness.
As Iranian forces continue to con-
solidate their hold on this strategic
piece of Iraqi real estate, Pentagon
officials fear that Khomeini will
move to establish some kind of
revolutionary Shiite political entity
on the peninsula as symbolic evi-
dence of changes to come in Bagh-
dad.
Unless the Iraqi commanders are
willing to risk the fragile morale of
their troops in taking the heavy ca-
sualties of afrontal assault, the Iran-
ians will steadily expand their foot-
hold.
In the face of this real danger to
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait,
the Saudis have asked to buy from
the United States ascaled-down de-
fensive package of Stinger anti-
aircraft, Sidewinder air-to-air, and
Harpoon anti-ship missiles to add to
their existing inventory of similar
weapons.
Although delivery of most of
these would not be made until 1989,
an American decision to refuse to
sell at this time when Khomeini's
shadow looms ever larger in the Gulf
would force the moderate Arabs into
a drastic reappraisal of the whole
strategy on which their defense
planning has been based.
Having gravely underestimated
the size of the opposition in the Con-
gress against this sale and having
failed initially to lobby for it effec-
tivel}: the White House is now deter-
mined to win next week the 34 votes
in the Senate that would allow the
sale to go through.
Part of President Reagan's prob-
lem is that he has succeeded so spec-
tacularl}? in alerting the American
people to Col. Qaddafi's brand of
Arab terrorism that many have
come to think of all Arabs as terror-
ists. Arelentless pursuit of terror-
ists is necessary, but it is no ,ub-
stitute for a balanced Amertcan
policy that seeks to achieve a negot~-
ated and peaceful settlement be-
tween moderate Arabs and Israelis.
In the meanwhile, to improve the
Saudi ability to defend against the
growing threat of Khomeini's expan-
sionism is not onl}? in the American
interest but in no wa}? endangers Is-
rael.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504400013-8