MOSCOW'S ANGOLAN GAMBLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504400018-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: March 28, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ST"T
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504400018-3
MOSCOW'S
Angolan
gamble
~ CORD MEYE R
s the Libyan forces of Col.
Muammar Qaddafi
clashed sharply with the
U.S. Navy off the Mediter-
ranean coast of Africa, a more dec--
siveconfrontation with wider strate-
gic consequences looms ahead in
southern Africa.
In Angola, the stage is secretly
being set for a massive new Soviet-
backed offensive to destroy finally
the UNITA guerrillas led by Dc Jo-
nas Savimbi.
Since the coordinated attack last
September failed to dislodge Mr.
Savimbi's Forces from their
southern base, the Marxist MPLA
regime in Luanda and its Soviet and
Cuban supporters have clearly re-
solved totry again, on a larger scale.
Confirmed by U.S. intelligence, a
mayor Soviet sea and airlift of mod-
ernrn panes, helicopters, tanks, and
actiIlery has been followed up by the
movement southward of an entire
CuTian regirnent, which now _ is
-poised for attack from its most ad-
v~d" position on the southern
-f~t7t.=
n view of the prolonged wet sea-
I son with unusually heavy rains,
Reagan officials do not expect
the main assault to begin until the
end of April or early :~iay. But they
expect then "a maximum effort" un-
der the direction of Soviet officers
and with many of the 35,000 Cuban
troops in Angola committed to
frontline fighting in order to break
the stalemate.
If Soviet General Secretary Mi-
khail Gorbachev succeeds in this
calculated gamble, nn which he has
wagered a billion dollars in ad-
vanced weaponry, the glittering
prize will be the removal of UNITA
as an effective force and the opening
up of strategic vistas for the advance
of Soviet influence into Namibia,
7.aire. and South Africa.
For Fidel Castro, a definitive de-
feat of UNITA would end the steady
erosion of his popularity at home as
the result of mounting Cuban casu-
alties.
WASH I `JGTOJJ T I'1E~
28 '~arcn 1986
For President Eduardo dos Santos
in the Angolan capital, Mr Savimbi's
defeat would allow him to extend the
control of the MPLA regime
throughout the country and to end a
decade of civil war.
In the face of this imminent offen-
sive, both Reagan officials and
UNITA leaders display aremark-
abledegree of quiet confidence that
the attack can be successfully con-
tained.
Jeremias Chitunda is Mc Savim-
bi's foreign policy adviser and is in
Washington for consultations. When
questioned on his reasons for being
so sure that UNITA can defend it-
self, he gives an impressively de-
tailed and coherent explanation.
First, during the long rainy sea-
sun,the C\ ITA guerrillas have been
able "tu make substantial territorial
~auis" and have extended their ef-
fertiyeinfluence over nearly half the
country. In the northeastern prov-
incc of Lunda, a UNIT.?~ offensive
hay brought more than -~ percent of
:\nKolan diamond production under
its conti?oi and given ~Ir. Savimbi a
valuable new source of hard cur-
rency
1lureoyer, C\I"I'A commanders
hay e made good use of the time since
last September to recruit and train
ad~tuwnal guerrilla forces from tri-
bal groups in all parts of the countr}.
\uu commando units have been
armed for special operations into en-
emy territory.
eagan officials are parncu-
R lady impressed b> the
development of a whole new
generation of competent command-
ers.
In comparison to the high morale
and tight discipline of UtiITA, the
JIPLA troops seem demoralized.
and there is such bad blood between
'he Cubans and the MPLA that the
Cubans believe they have been delib-
erately led into ambushes b} their
allies.
Finally, and most important in ~Ir.
Chuunda's judgment, there is the cu-
mulative and widening impact on
the whole region of the fact that the
Ragan administration is no longer
b~~un~ by the Clark Amendment and
,~ no~.i~ committed to providing
l `ITA with the anti-aircraft and
anti-tank weaponry it needs to hold
its own against Russian tanks and
helicopters.
Because of the? necess,t~ ~~!
avoiding any South :lfrtcar. ui-
rolvement, there has been some do
lay in arranging for the deliyer~ ui
the American weapons. but l.'~IT.a
leaders are now confident of obta,n-
ing them in sufficient time to eyu,p
and train their troops. ~Ioreoyer. the
active commitment of .-~mc:rtuan
arms to tiir Sarimbt's cause has en
couraged a surge of new assistance
to UNITA from both West European
and African states.
bVhen the MPLA offensive Earls, a~
Reagan officials hope it kill, the
UNITA leaders see the begmntng of
the end game in Angola. CNIT.-~
commanders are already assem-
bling the intelligence to plan for the
induced defection of entire ~IPL.-~
battalions. It would not take mam
such unit defections to begin n,
unravel the MPLA regime to
Luanda, and the hand of the ~iPL.-~
moderates who want to make a deal
with L'NITA would be strengthened.
n the meanwhile, all reports
from recent Cuban defectors
and refugees indicate that Ra-
dio J,Iarti's Spanish language broad
casts to Cuba are very effecttyel~
reaching the Cuban people ~ruh the
true costs of the decade-long war :n
Angola.
The war has become so unpopular
that attempted draft erasion is ?ide-
spread, and Reagan officials are
com?inced that the failure of the ap-
proaching offensive ~~ould force ,
serous reassessment in Havana '
Cord Meyer is a notionally syndi-
cated columnist.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504400018-3