SUMMIT TEST IN SUDAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504400027-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: November 29, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504400027-3
()nl PAGE
CORD MEYER
Summit
test in
Sudan
he print was not dry on the
joint U.S.-Soviet statement
agreed to at the Geneva
summit when the U.S. State
Department signaled mounting
trouble in the Sudan- by warning
American citizens not to travel to
Khartoum and by cutting back the
U.S. official presence in the country
by 10 percent.
Behind this warning shot across
the bow of the TY~ansitional Military
Council, which took over in Khar-
toum after Gaafar Nimeiri's over-
throw last April, is deepening Amer-
ican concern that the new Sudanese
regime is unable or unwilling to pro-
tect the lives of U.S. citizens and of-
ficials. Whether the Soviet govern-
ment, behind the scenes, continues
to fuel and exploit a growing anti-
American sentiment provides an
early test of its post-Geneva inten-
tions.
A stream of notorious terrorists
from Libya have been identified
freely debarking at the Khartoum
airport, including the man who is
known t6 have assassinated U.S. Am-
bassador Cleo Noel in Khartoum on
March 2, 1973. The recent bombing
of an American Embassy car luckily
resulted in no loss of life but intensi-
fied the fear of worse to come.
In spite of official U.S. requests
for the deportation of these known
terrorists, the well-intentioned Su-
danese government has taken no ef-
fective action, paralyzed by the dis-
mantling of its security forces and
anxious to preserve its new relation-
ship with Ltbya's Col. Muammar
Qaddafi. The limited U.S. with-
drawal sends a clear message that
Sudan cannot continue to count on
extensive American help in dealing
with its economy and huge external
debt, unless it is prepared to cooper-
ate in protecting American lives.
The current Soviet role in the de-
liberate destabilization of the mod?
erate regime in Khartoum has many
facets and is designed at the least to ~,
WASHINGTON TIMES
2~ November 1985
deny Sudan'e bases on the Red Sea
and strategic territory to the United
States in times of Middle Eastern
crisis.
In Khartoum itself, the disci-
plined Sudanese Communist Party
under Soviet control played a key
role in organizing the demonstra-
tions that toppled Mr. Nimeiri and
now keeps the political scene in con?
stant turmoil, as 46 political factions
prepare for national elections
scheduled for next April.
But much more significant is the
interventionary role of General Sec-
retary Mikhail Gorbachev in en-
couragingPresident Mengistu Haile
Mariam of Ethiopia to ship Soviet
arms and ammunition to the black
revolt led by Col. John Garang in the
southern Sudan.
Operating from well-supplied
bases within Ethiopia, Col. Garang's
Sudanese People's Liberation Move-
ment isnow strong enough to control
the southern third of Sudan. The So-
viets have used their influence to
prevent the start of serious negoti-
ations that could lead to some form
of federal solution between the Arab
north and the black Christian and
animist south.
By keeping the Sudan weakened
and divided by constant civil war,
the Soviets serve their purpose of
strengthening the position in the re-
gion of their chosen instrument, Col.
Mengistu, who is about to announce
the transformation of Ethiopia into a
People's Democratic Republic. i
Although the Soviets have pro-
vided Ethiopia only 1 percent of the
famine relief it has received, they
have supplied the Ethiopian army,
the largest in Africa, with $3 billion
worth of arms, and 8,000 Cuban
troops still remain in the country as
a Praetorian Guard.
Having given Col. Mengistu the
ideological rationale for his one-
party dictatorship and for his Forced
collectivization of peasant holdings,
the Soviets are determined to keep
him in power and have used the tri-
bal revolt in Eritrea to make him
more dependent on their help. The
latest U.S. intelligence estimate sees
Col. Men istu remainin aol' in
char a for the foreseeable future
rou s rut esa su resaion of
a oooosition.
In atough-minded speech just be-
fore the summit, Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Africa Cheater
Crocker described a serious Ameri-
can diplomatic effort last summer to
engage Col. Mengistu in a dialogue
that might lead to the termination of
armed support Por Col. Garang and
permit negotiations toward a Suda-
nese federation. But according to
Mr. Crocker, "the Ethiopian leader-
ship, apparently fearful of its Soviet
mentors, would not permit any real
progress in this direction:'
Of all the so-called regional issues
that divide the United States and the
Soviet Union, from Afghanistan to
Nicaragua, this question of whether
the Soviets can be persuaded to halt
Ethiopian support to the southern
revolt in the Sudan is perhaps the
least difficult and most susceptible
to solution.
If in tho improved atmosphere
created by the summit meeting the
Soviets cannot be persuaded to take
this small step toward peaceful com-
promieo, there is no hope of making
any progress on the larger regional i
conflicts.
In a real sense, whether or not the
Soviets are willing to help end the
civil war in the Sudan is a fair teat oP
whether the summit changed any-
thing.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504400027-3