HIS POWER HAS LIMITS BUT LOOK OUT FOR SUBTLE SKILLS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504400045-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: March 15, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504400045-3
WASHINGTON TIP~ES
15 March 1985
His power has
But look out for subtle s '
CORD MEYER
tried to shake up the bureaucracy. A ma~or-
ity of the Politburo met secretly and
removed him from office.
~
,
0 outward appearances, Mikhail S. It will be interesting to watch just how far
Gorbachev, the newly selected gen- Mr. Gorbachev dares to go in challenging the
eral secretary of the Communist ~ existing order in his promise to improve pro-
Party of the Soviet Union, seems to . ': ductivity and make the system work better.
enjoy vast and untrammeled authority in i Any real decentralization of economic
comparison with the popularly elected lead- deeision-making or any significant grant of
ers in the West. autonomy to peasant farmers threatens the
He is immune from criticism by-any oppo- monopoly on power of the Communist Party
sition political party and assured of 99 itself. Therefore, for all his bold rhetoric, Mr.
percent support when the Russian people Gorbachev is likely to settle for tinkering
are allowed to vote. There is no free press to i with the economy rather than risking the
expose his mistakes and no courts capable fundamental changes that are so necessary.
of overturning his decisions. But behind the ~ Wit hin t ewe eneral secretary has wide
n g
As one senior Pentagon official remarked,
"We really got to like old Chernenko and
wished he would stay. It was a quiet period
for us. Now there will be a transition to a
much harsher world with far more initia-
tives."
Cord Meyer is a nationally syndicated col-
umnist.
curtain of complete secrecy with which the ever, t e
Soviet Politburo shrouds its debates, there ~ scope to maneuver, particularly in the field
are limits on Mr. Gorbachev's exercise of ,i cials have taken a ose look tthis record and
power.
Unlike the newly elected American pres- ' do not s are argaret ate _er s optimism
ident who can choose his own Cabinet, the .,.bout his tntennons on the world stage. 1 ney
general secretary must live with the Polit- ~ point out that his first powerful patron was
buro members who selected him until they Mikhail Suslov, who got him named to the
either die or can be persuaded to step down. 'party Secretariat in 1978 in a deal with Mr.
It took Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid ~ Brezhnev
Brezhnev four years or more to move from His second influential patron was Yuri
being first among equals to positions of pre- Andropoq who gave him authority over
eminence. party cadres. In view of this backing from
In Mr. Gorbachev's case, veteran Kremlin the most doctrinaire ideologue in the Soviet
watchers disagree as to how long it will take .Union and from the former boss of the KGB,.
him to build a solid majority that he can it is reasonable to assume that Mr. Gorba-
count on in the Politburo. Since Mr. Gorba= '~ chev will prove a tough and determined pro-
chev was put in control of party personnel ponent of the Communist cause in his
by Yuri Andropov, he presumably has had a ;international dealings.
~ There is, moreover, a significant differ-
head start in arranging to move his support-
ers into position, and the next plenary meet- ence between him and all previous Russian
ing of the Central Committee should show .leaders. He is the first of the new generation
the extent to which he can fill the vacancies , of urbane, educated, and sophisticated appa-
in the Politburo with his own people. ratchiks to make it to the top. His trip to
A second and more serious limitation on London last December demonstrated the
the new general secretary's freedom of ~ diplomatic value of his superior tact and
action is inherent in his role as member and ,intelligent sophistication. It was more than
h
k
d
I representative of the new class of party
apparatchiks and privileged bureaucrats
that run Russia. He has been selected by this
nomenklatura, as the elite is called, not only
to rule the Soviet Union but to defend their.
~ interests.
As Yuri Andropov briefly demonstrated,
with Mr. Gorbachev's support, it is possible
to criticize and even to punish the most
extreme cases of official corruption, but the
~ whole range of special privileges associated
with high rank in Russia is sacrosanct. An
I attempt by the general secretary to curb
', these rewards is likely to engender the reac-
~ tion Mr. Khrushchev encountered when he
e
t
e
a public-relations triumph and mar
emergence on the world scene of a new and
more formidable type of Soviet leadership.
President Reagan's Kremlin watchers do
not underestimate the subtlety and skill with
which Mr. Gorbachev will try to exploit and
widen the splits within the NATO alliance.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504400045-3