DISQUIETING SIGNALS SOUTH OF THE BORDER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504400046-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: February 22, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/17 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504400046-2
WASHINGTON TIMES
22 February 1985
~squieting signals
ut~ of the border
~s anyone
~tening
~ Meagan?
resident Ronald Reagan has
pulled out all the stops in his
drive to bring popular pres-
sure to bear on Conaress? to
a vrove S14 million in "covert" aid to
the 15.000 auerril as att tng t e
Marxst Sandinista government o ~.~
Nicaragua., ~ '~'~ '
The Contras' cause is just, the
amount to be given is a pittance, and
the cost o.` not assisting them is high.
Nevertheless, it will take more than
ore eloquent presidential speech to
induce Congress to cough up the
mone~~
In a weekend radio address from
his California ranch, Mr. Reagan
called the Nicaraguan insurgents
"our brothers" and compared them
to such early "freedom fighters" as
Simon Bolivar, the great Latin
American liberator, and three Euro-
pean heroes of the American
Revolutionary War, the Marquis de
Lafayette, Baron von Steuben, and
Thaddeus Kosciusko.
At the .same time, Mr. Reagan
made one of his strongest attacks on
the Sandinistas, characterizing
them as not "democrats but Commu-
nists, not lovers of freedom but of
power, not builders of a peaceful
nation but creators of a fortress
Nicaragua that intends to export
communism beyond its borders" -
American aid originally was ;
granted to the Contras - a loose alli-
ance of former Somozistas, demo-
crats and disaffected Indians - to
enable them to interdict the supply
lines running from Nicaragua to EI
Salvador. But increasingly it is
Becoming apparent the president is
supporting them to weaken or over-
throu? the Sandinista government of
Nicaragua. And more power to him.
~ CORD M~YER
Every Contra is not a .Jefferson,
just as every Sandinista is not a
devil. But the Contras pose no threat
to Nicaragua's neighbors; the San-
dinistas do. The Contras do not
oppose America's Central American
policies; the :+andinistas do.
If Nicaragua is permanently lost,
EI Salvador and Honduras will not
be long behind. And if they go, Gua- ~
temala and Belize will be
threatened. In the end, a Marxist
Guatemala will bring pressure to
bear on Mexico, the ultimate Soviet
objective in the area.
What's more, a decision to cut off
military aid to the Contras would
demonstrate yet again that the
United States is an unreliable ally,
one that abandons its friends even
before the going gets tough.
There are, of course, other ways
to approach the problem. The LT.S.
could break relations with Managua,
impose economic sanctions, recog-
nize. aContra government-in-exile,
and provide it with overt assistance.
Or we could send in the Marines. But
a Congress that balks at putting out
$14 million in overt assistance is
unlikely to agree to any such escala-
tion. _ __
Down the scale, we could try to get
private parties and third govern-
ments (such as the Israelis) to take
over the responsibility for funding j
the insurgents. While this has
worked to a degree in trying to
bridge the gap until the $14 million
became available, it is not a viable
solution over the long run: u~ho
wants to pull American chestnuts
out of the fire when the United
States doesn't care enough to do so
itself?
That the Sandinistas are both
firmly in the Communist camp and
determined to export their rev-
olution is hardly open to question.
The Nicaraguan regime's most pow-
erful leaders are dedicated Marx-
ists. Since the overthrow of the
Somozas in 1979, the Nicaraguan
-army has ballooned from 10,000 to
119,000 men, by far the largest mili-
tary force in the area.
The Nicaraguan army is equipped
with 200 armored vehicles,150 tanks
and 44 helicopters, backed up by an
estimated 10,000 members of the
Russian, Cuban, East German, But-
garian, Libyan, and Palestine Liber-
ation Organization's forces. The
Sandinistas also have links with
Iranian and Italian terrorist groups.
Yet, as in Vietnam, the adminis-
fration has not been successful in
selling either the American people
or the Congress on the realities of
the situation, or in explaining the
options to them. Many Americans do
not even know which government we
support (El Salvador) and which we
oppose (Nicaragua).
The Nicaraguan insurgency is ndt
the only one that the United States
ought to be supporting.
ad Jonas Savimbi's pro-
Western freedom fighters in
Angola had even a modicum
of American support for the past
four years, the probability is that by
now all of Africa would have been
treated to the sight of the Russians
and the Cubans clinging to the skids
of their helicopters while evacuating j
Luanda. As it is, we've been involved j
in interminable negotiations that
show every promise of leaving the
Marxists in control of the Angolan
government.
We have been giving considerable
assistance to the Afghan guerrillas
but not enough or of the right sort to
enable them to really cut up the
invading Russian army. The United
States has given no significant assis-
tance to rebel movements in Marxist
Mozambique or Communist Ethi-
opia.
As we approach the 10th anniver-
sary of the fall of Saigon, America
appears not yet to have learned it's
better to pay a little nou? than a lot
later.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/17 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504400046-2