ISRAEL'S DEFENSE AS GOOD AS EVER?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504410003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 19, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-0
ilTl^t ~P~ NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
19 May 1985
AGE
4.t
ISRAEL'S DEFENSE
AS GOOD
AS EVER?
By Drew Middleton
YOU ARE NEVER VERY FAR FROM THE
sights and sounds of war in Israel. A tank
waddles into a field beside the highway
that leads from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv.
Young soldiers, returning from leave,
stand at every intersection thumbing rides
back to their units. As dawn breaks, three
fighters thunder north toward Lebanon.
Tanks and infantry move cautiously along
the roads beyond the frontier, alert to surprise Moslem
attacks.
Israel is a country at peace, desperately hoping for
continued peace. But Israel lives in the shadow of past
and future wars and new doubts of the future are being
fed by anxiety over the Israel Defense Forces. The con-
cern stems from the knowl=
edge that the I.D.F.
emerged from the 1982
campaign in Lebanon and
the long agony of the about-
to-be-concluded occupation
that followed with its repu-
tation as the finest fighting
force in the Middle East di-
minished.
Until recently, friends in
the West had considered Is-
rael's forces virtually in-
vincible. They still feel that
at its core the I.D.F., com-
prising the Army, Air
Force and a small but effi-
cient Navy, remains a
tough fighting force com-
manded by intelligent, ex-
perienced officers. But they
take a gloomier view of its
prospects in future con-
flicts. They base their judg-
ment on the I.D.F.'s overall
performance during the
last three years, its present
0965R000504410003-8
organization and command
structure and the expected
impact of budget cuts on all
three of Israel's armed
services.
Much of what has trig-
gered such pessimism was
evident during a recent
visit to Israeli defense units
in the field and in talks with
Israeli and foreign military
experts. While it is difficult
for knowledgeable observ-
ers to believe that Israel
will ever actually be over-
run by her enemies, the ex-
perts are, nevertheless, dis-
turbed by the prospect of Is-
rael having to stave off ag-
gressors with a diminished,
even inadequate, capabil-
ity. Harsh economic reali-
ties, primarily an annual
inflation rate of 445 percent, have necessitated a shift
from desired quantitative to qualitative improvement
at a time when various hostile states - notably Syria,
the likeliest potential enemy - are able to upgrade
their weaponry and the training of their armed forces.
IT WAS VERY COLD IN THE BEKAA VALLEY OF
eastern Lebanon earlier this year when I witnessed an
armored unit carrying out a firing exercise. The young
Hungarian-born major commanding held a stopwatch
on the tanks as they came out of a ravine and fired at a
Drew Middleton, for many years The New York
Times's military-affairs correspondent, is now a col-
umnist for The Times's Syndication Sales.
Continued
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mdving target. Their aim was
not as good as it might have
been. After the major shouted
an order to halt the exercise
he turned to his visitor and
said, "They'll have to do bet-
ter than that against the
Syrians next time - and they
will."
Time is the vital factor.
Even as Israel's armed serv-
ices struggle to compensate
for the limitations placed on
them, their Arab enemies,
both active and passive, are
reducing the I.D.F.'s margin
of superiority in high-tech
Finally, there is the morale
factor. In previous wars,
when Israeli forces were
fighting invaders, their high.
morale impressed foes and
friends alike. During the
short war in Lebanon in 1982,
however, there was an evi-
dent slackening of spirit. It
was by no means universal.
And its effect on performance
was marginal. But morale
did deteriorate, and accord-
ing to many Israelis, the de-
terioration was rooted in the
feeling that in invading Leba-
non the I.D.F. was going be-
weapons and command and yond its basic function - the
control procedures. defense of Israel.
Israel's chief tactical re- Such feelings were encour.
form in the light of the 1982 aged by the many Israelis
war in Lebanon, Western who opposed the war and
military experts say, should have been exacerbated by a
be tighter coordination prolonged occupation, punc-
among its ground services tuated by violent clashes.
and its air force. There were Some citizen soldiers refused
too many instances during orders to serve in Lebanon
that war, the analysts say, (for which a few were impris-
when Israeli tanks or infantry oned), a situation unprece-
fought alone without the em- dented in the history of Is-
ployment of what the United rael. During my talks with Is-
States Army refers to as the
all-arms concept, by which
air squadrons, armor, infan-
try, artillery and combat en-
gineers fight as a team under
the direction of a single
ground commander. This
concept, doctrine in the
American forces, is now
being adopted by the forces of
many NATO nations but has
yet to be accepted by the
I.D.F.
raeli troops in Lebanon, sol-
diers emphasized their dis-
taste for occupation duties
and spoke of the hidden dan-
gers they faced - a grenade
rolled at them from the cen-
ter of a crowd, terrorists con-
cealed behind bushes.
Another serious problem
faced by Yitzhak Rabin, the
Minister of Defense, and
Lieut. Gen. Moshe Levy, the
I.D.F.'s Chief of Staff, is the
A related problem is organ- I impact of the cuts in the Is-
izational. In the view of sev- raeli defense budget on the
eral Western experts who armed forces' effectiveness.
have monitored operations in A knowledgable Israeli re-
the Middle East for many serve officer concedes that
years, the Israelis have never i the I.B.F. "will have to cut a
fully exploited the use of the lot of tat and, possibly, some
helicopter for the transporta-
tion of troops in battle. One
reason for their reluctance
may be that their helicopters
"belong" to the air force, and
individual services are in-
variably wary about transfer-
ring resources to another
service. Still, while helicop-
ters are always vulnerable,
the Israeli air force has al-
ways been able to establish
local air superiority and so
could be relied on to safely es-
corttroops.
muscle."
Such cuts will inevitably af-
fect the order of battle, the
number of divisions, brigades
and air squadrons immedi-
ately available in the event of
a military crisis verging on
war.
One Israeli reserve officer
told me during a meal shared
at a restaurant in Jerusalem
that it would also be neces-
sary to "streamline" mili-
tary personnel, a move likely
to involve the enforced retire-
ment of some combat-experi-
enced majors and lieutenant
colonels. While the full im-
pact of such a move cannot be
weighed until specifics of the
defense budget are revealed,
a reduction in force would al-
most certainly make an ap-
preciable difference in com-
bat readiness. But my source
believed that because of the
I.D.F.'s increasing depend-
ence on advanced technology,
special efforts would be made
to retain those officers with
expertise in the development
of new weapons, warning sys-
tems and communications.
According to Israeli offi-
cials in Washington, the new
budget will amount to about
$5.75 billion, or approxi-
mately 25 percent of the gross
national product. (The alloca-
tion of funds to the three serv-
ices, which is done by the
Cabinet's Security Commit-
tee, is classified information
and is not discussed in the
Knesset, Israel's parlia-
ment.)
In comparison, Syria spent
$3.2 billion on defense in 1984;
Jordan, approximately $480
million, and Egypt, in the last
reported year, 1983, $3.04 bil-
lion.
One economy known to be
under active consideration,
according to another Israeli
military source, is the trans-
fer of one of the three ar-
mored divisions now on ac-
tive duty to reserve status.
Experts calculate that it
costs about S60 million a year
to maintain an Israeli ar-
mored division on active
status but only a fifth of that
sum when a division is in re-
serve. So the savings would
be significant. Monetary sav-
ings must, however, be bal-
anced against military disad-
vantages, 'for a transfer in
status would mean that the
division would not be fully
manned or in an operational
status.
Air force officers expressed
fears that budget cuts may
have an adverse effect on
their training programs,
should flying time be re-
duced, as seems likely, to
well below the 20 hours a
month NATO air forces esti-
mate is needed to keep pilots
at top pitch.
d,
Maintaining its air force at
peak capacity is vital for Is-
rael, whose borders with its
enemies are only minutes
away by air. Yet high fuel
costs make the air force the
most expensive armed serv-
ice. The annual cost for a sin-
gle squadron is estimated at
between $45 million and S50
million. One Israeli military
expert pointed out that the
funds needed to maintain
three active fighter squad-
rons for a year just about
equaled Israel's entire ex-
penditure for education.
Thus, he feared, the Govern-
ment might be tempted to put
one or more of Israel's active
squadrons on reserve.
The 1.D.F.'s response to the
threat that budget cuts would
reduce the flow of new weap-
ons into Israel has been to up-
grade existing systems. The
range of the 155-millimeter
field gun, for example, is to
be extended and its ammuni-
tion improved by the intro-
duction of a bigger propellant
into shells. When the plan is
fully implemented, by the
middle of 1986, the Israelis
will have equipped all their
American-built M-60A3 tanks
with the latest guns and firing
systems. And all their F-4
Phantom jets will have been
modernized by the addition of
advanced engines and weap-
ons.
Israeli economists, indus-
trialists and journalists em-
phasize that in a situation of
economic crisis, the military,
until now favored in the draw-
ing up of budgets, must
Continupc'
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H.ghten its belt and take cuts along
with other Government departments.
However, the explosive situation in
the Middle East and the steady im-
provement in the forces of potential
enemies will probably influence the
extent of the I.D.F. cuts.
Meanwhile, the military is also up-
grading the efficiency of the air and
ground early-warning systems that
would signal the mobilization or
movement of hostile armies and air
forces. The West Bank, facing Jor-
dan, is now studded with warning sys-
tems. And Israeli drones (pilotless
reconnaissance aircraft) and manned
scout planes maintain constant pa-
trols along all frontiers.
In an emergency, the Israelis ex-
pect that they will also have access,
as in the past, to American satellite
photographs showing enemy troop
movements. But that advantage, they
know, wf be offset under similar cir-
cumstances by the Syrians receiving
photos of Israeli movements from the
Soviet Union.
The resolve to maintain training
standards for reduced forces and the
efforts to improve the performance of
tanks, guns and aircraft have not, in
general, stilled the note of apprehen-
sion that surfaces whenever Israelis
discuss Arab forces.
S INCE THE ESTABLISHMENT
of the Jewish state 37 years
ago, Israel has consistently
been able to defy or defeat quantita-
tively superior Arab forces through
qualitative superiority in weapons,
technology and manpower.
But now, according to Aharon
Yariv, a retired major general who
headed Israeli military intelligence
from 1964 to 1972, "In view of the di-
minishing advantage in the quality of
its weapons systems and the difficult
manpower and financial constraints
under which it operates, Israel must
be prepared to forego a further ex-
pansion of force levels and to concen-
trate on qualitative improvement."
The I.D.F., another Israeli general
explained, "must think not only in
terms of the immediate potential
enemy" - Syria - "but about other
Arab states whose qualitative
strength is improving daily as a re-
sult of arms deliveries from the
United States and other Western
countries, as well as the Soviet
Union."
bitterl criticized by Israelis for army would be able to field 11
y
weapons sales to Arab countries. One armored divisions, 15 inde-
widely-quoted estimate is that the pendent infantry brigades
military establishments of all Arab and five airborne brigades. In
nations, with the exception of Egypt,. addition, Western intelli-
have acquired about $60 billion in gence sources estimate that
arms since the 1973 war, and that the Israeli army, which has
about 60 percent of these weapons relied on massive firepower
have been supplied by Western na- in four victorious wars, can
tions, notably France, Britain and the now deploy 3,600 tanks, a fig-
United States. (Since its treaty with ure that includes a growing
Israel, Egypt has not been considered number of versatile Merkava
by the United States as one of what battle tanks.
the Israelis call "the confrontation
states" of the Middle East and conse-
quently has qualified for significant
Out of necessity, Israeli in-
dustry has become adept at
modernizing its older tanks,
American military assistance.) such as the British Centurion,
Israeli military and civilian offi- and renovating captured
cials are well aware that American armor, chiefly Soviet T-54 /
aid to their nation, amounting to $1.4 55's and T-62's. These tanks
billion in fiscal year 1984-1985 and would enter battle accompa-
scheduled to be $1.8 billion in 1985- nied by 8,000 armored recon-
1986, is likely to be criticized in the naissance vehicles and per-
United States - by Congress, which is sonnel carriers.
seeking to limit American defense Israeli artillery includes
spending; by the armed services, approximately 1,000 guns,
which face pension reductions, and by ranging downward from the
the general public, wary over pro- 203-millimeter self-propelled
posed cuts in Social Security and howitzer and the 175-millime-
other domestic programs. A visitor ter self-propelled gun.
gets the impression, however, that Is- The Israeli air force now
raeli leaders, aware of their country's numbers about 555 combat
strategic importance to American in- aircraft. The quality of its
terests in the Middle East, believe pilots and command and con-
that the aid will be delivered. trol structure is legendary in
At present, the total armed forces the Middle East. The initial
of Israel consist of about 170,000 men attacks on Egyptian airfieltis
and women. Mobilization would raise in the 1967 war are univer-
the total to about 540,000, of whom sally acknowledged to have i
100,000 could be expected to report for decided that war before it
duty in about 24 hours. really had a chance to get
Increasingly, new conscripts in- rolling.
clude large numbers of Jews from Today, the air force, which
North Africa, whose assimilation into also includes 60 armed hell-
Israeli society has sometimes been copiers, relies on American
f the more than
difficult. But none o
two dozen general officers whom I in-
terviewed during my stay in Israel
had any doubts about the I.D.F.'s ca-
pacity to absorb and train
these Sephardic Jews, now a
sizable percentage of the
country 's population. One
general said they have, in
fact, been surprisingly easy
to train, and that after years
spent under Arab rule, many
of them "are extremely ag-
gressive."
The army, the largest Is-
raeli service, has an active
strength of 130,000 men and
women, augmented under
mobilization by 310,000 re-
serves. The air force has
30,000 regulars and 50,000 re-
serves. The navy, the small-
est service, has 10,000 regu-
lars and 10,000 reserves.
aircraft, especially F-15 and
F-16 fighters and, to a lesser
extent, on the Kfir, an Israeli-
manufactured fighter-bomb-
er.
The navy, though it had put
forward a modernization pro-
gram, is apparently sched-
uled to make do with its
present fleet, which includes
three British-built subma-
rines; 23 fast, missile-armed
patrol boats; one missile-
armed hydrofoil; 47 patrol
craft, and 15 landing craft
and two support ships.
3.
Continued
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A decade ago Israeli plan- II Equally important to Is- I I
The Syrians are considered
stubborn and skillful fighters
by Israeli soldiers and air-
men, despite the fact that in
the past they have suffered
from the inflexibility of their
military doctrine, acquired
from their Soviet instructors.
One Israeli officer I met
spoke highly of the conduct of
a Syrian infantry battalion
during the war in Lebanon. It
was inferior in firepower and
numbers to the attacking Is-
raelis, he noted, but had stood
its ground and inflicted casu-
alties on the attackers.
ners would have viewed
Syria's numerical superiority
with equanimity. Today,
aware of the rising technolog-
ical level of equipment in the
hands of Syrian troops and of
those in other Arab countries,
they are far from compla-
cent.
These Soviet-supplied
weapons intelligence officers
point OLt are simpler to use
and maintain than more so-
phisticated American arms.
The sources also emphasize
that Syria has made a major
effort to retain technicians in
its forces and has instituted a
program to train additional
ones in technical institutions
at home and in the Soviet
Union.
The weapon-absorption
process has been speeded up
by an estimated 7,000 to 8,000
Soviet advisers and techni-
cians, who have been active
from the basic battalion level
upwards. Recent intelligence
reports note slight reductions
in the number of Soviet advis-
ers in Syria, but they point
out that the reductions may
be temporary and due to the
rotation of officers and non-
commissioned officers be-
300,000, with ano er tween
army reserves. The air force the Soviet Union and
has 650 combat aircraft of Ste'
which, Western analysts re- Soviet deliveries of aircraft
port, about 300 are of ad- and antiaircraft missiles
vanced types. Air force per- present a serious problem, Is-
sonnel strength before mobi- raeli air force officers assert.
lization is 90,000 men, with In late 1982 and early 1983,
another 37,500 in reserve. Russia sent the Syrians 50 ad-
Syrians' first priority, the Is-
raelis believe, would be to try
to regain the Golan Heights,
lost to Israel in the 1967 war.
Syria's greatest advantage
lies in the numerical strength
of its mobilized regular
forces. Last year, an addi-
tional infantry division was
formed out of commando
units, so that even prior to
mobilization, Syria can now
deploy nine divisions, plus in-
dependent brigade groups of
airborne and special forces.
Its regular forces total
th 350 000
V tutes an immediate
and significant threat
to Israel," contends General
Yariv. Israeli experts think
that Syria now has the where-
withal to fight a 14-day war
without massive infusions of
weapons, ammunition and
fuel from the Soviet Union.
General Yariv and other mili-
tary experts believe, more-
over, that Syria is receiving
further arms deliveries,
which will increase its ability
to extend that time frame.
Once these new Soviet
weapons are absorbed into
use, the possiblity of a Syrian
surprise attack is taken seri-
ously by Israeli planners. The
MIG-25's and SU-20's,
equipped with additional fire-
power and more sophisti-
cated radar. Israeli and
Western intelligence experts
believe that still more air-
craft, perhaps another 50,
have been delivered during
the last 18 months. The Soviet
Union is also known to have
linked the Syrian air com-
mand and control system
with a major Russian com-
mand center in the southern
U.S.S.R. This link is seen by
Western analysts more as a
means of keeping the Soviet
air command in touch with
operations in any future Mid-
dle East war than as a source
of Soviet resupply in a crisis.
rael's military future has
been the Soviet delivery of
surface-to-surface and sur-
face-to-air missiles. The
Syrians now deploy SS-21 mis-
siles, non-nuclear weapons
with the capacity to knock out
Israel's seaports, oil reserve
depots and communications
centers. A decade ago, the Is-
raeli answer to such a devel-
opment would have been to
raid the missile sites. Today,
however, the I.D.F. must
take into account a signifi-
cantly improved Syrian air
defense system, which now
includes 48 or more SA-5 sur-
face-to-air missiles, whose
range and accuracy are
greater than the more than
100 mobile batteries of Soviet
missiles already deployed. In
view of this, Israel could ex-
pect high losses in any raid.
The ability of Syria's econ-
omy to maintain an enlarged
military structure for a pro-
tracted period of time is ques-
tioned by Israeli experts.
Their conclusions are based
on Syria's reduced financial
support from the Persian
Gulf states, led by Saudi Ara-
bia, which are now heavily
supporting Iraq's war with
Iran.
Some Israeli experts, how-
ever, conclude that there is no
reason to believe that Syria's
military expansion has
placed an unbearable strain
on the national economy and
that it is unlikely to do so for
the next four or five years.
S YRIA IS THE MOST
obvious and urgent
threat to Israel, but
there are others, foremost
among them, Jordan.
Given the I.D.F.'s combat
experience, and its training
and weaponry, it is difficult
for a foreigner to consider
Jordan a real menace. But Is-
raeli military spokesmen are.
given to extolling the high
fighting quality of the Jorda-
nian Army. They also stress
the importance of deliveries
of American Cobra helicop-
ters and Maverick air-to-
ground missiles and remind
visitors that the West Bank,
and other targets within Is-
rael, such as Jerusalem, are
well within range of Jordan's
heavy guns.
sive to recover the West
Bank, probably in concert
with a Syrian attack on the
Golan Heights, is a possibil-
ity, it is, to my mind, a re-
mote one. Some Israelis see a
greater danger. They fear
that the assimilation of the
West Bank into Israel could
promote the type of fierce in-
tramural guerrilla warfare
that has torn Northern Ire-
land apart for so many years.
Jordan is also seen by the
Israelis as participating in
the general Arab campaign to
reduce Israel's superiority in
the air. In 1973, the Royal Jor-
danian Air Force had 50 com-
bat aircraft. Today, it has
103, by Western intelligence
estimates; 120, by Israeli cal-
culations. In addition, the
Jordanians are now absorb-
ing French Mirage F-1 fight-
ers and improved American
Hawk surface-to-air missiles.
An even more serious
threat to Israel's security
could come from Iraq, should
it succeed in winning the Gulf
War. The Iraqi Army and Air
Force, tempered by five
years of war against Iran and
armed largely by the Soviet
Union, would be a powerful
element in any anti-Israeli al-
liance.
In the past, such Arab al-
liances have not lasted long,
but while they have, an Is-
raeli military expert says,
"they are lethal."
The Iraqi army, which de-
ployed seven divisions in 1973,
now has 20 divisions, lavishly
equipped with just under
5,000 Soviet, Chinese and
Rumanian tanks and Soviet
field guns, howitzers and
heavy and light mortars. And
a new generation of French
fighter aircraft is joining the
Iraqi air force. So Israeli
military planners are under-
standably worried about the
effect of an Iraqi victory over
Iran on the balance of power
in the Middle East. They are
equally concerned by the ef-
fect a possible peace between
the two powers would have on
that balance of power.
Continued
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D
The latter could mean, Is-
rael planners contend, the
addition of at least 10 Iraqi
divisions and 150 combat air-
craft to the Arab side. The
divisions would, the Israelis
believe, be as good as any
Syrian divisions. And the
reinforcement would, of
course, increase the odds
against Israel.
An Iranian victory over
Iraq is considered unlikely.
Iraq has better weapons, bet-
ter-trained personnel and a
far more effective air force.
But Israeli intelligence
sources say such a victory
would only add to Israel's
problems. Islamic fundamen-
tsm, inflamed by victory,
would influence Shiite Mos-
lems in Syria, Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and
Lebanon. One result could be
a series of fierce internal
struggles. Another could be a
jihad, or holy war, against Is-
rael.
"That is perhaps a 50-to-1
chance," a veteran Israeli in-
telligence officer told me as
we sat in a bar in Tel Aviv.
"But we in Israel, we have to
weigh every chance, actual
and potential, in the military
balance. We have no margin
for error.
"For example, we can't
rule out a sudden change in
Egyptian policy," he contin-
ued. "The Camp David
agreement and the with-
drawal from the Sinai would
appear to put our two coun-
next two to four years. Dur-
ing that period, Israeli intelli-
gence foresees Egyptian
forces replacing Soviet weap-
ons and doctrine with those of
the United States. When that
process is completed, the Is-
raelis believe, Egypt will be a
far more formidable military
power than it was in 1973, the
last time the two clashed in
battle.
The Egyptians are acquir-
ing from the United States
and Britain M-60A3 tanks, ar-
mored personnel carriers,
self-propelled 155-millimeter
howitzers, TOW and Swing-
fire antitank missiles. And
their air force has on order,
or is already receiving,
American F-16 fighters and
French Mirage-2000 fighters.
T HE BOTTOM LINE,
after assessing
present Israeli
strengths and weaknesses,
the probable impact of
budget cuts on national mili-
tary readiness and the ex-
panding strength of Arab
forces, is that the I.D.F. is
still the most powerful force
in the Middle East.
While there is abundant evi-
dence that the Arab nations,
particularly Syria, Iraq and
Egypt, are overcoming the
long-established Israeli lead
in military technology, there
is no doubt in my mind that
the Israeli forces, man for
man, are at present superior
in experience, training and
weapons than any Arab state.
Yet every experienced Is-
raeli soldier consulted during
my visit firmly believes that
because of the growing Arab
strength any new war would
test Israel as it has not been
tested since its War of Inde-
pendence 37 years ago.
Despite the political convul-
sions and military problems
presented by the war in Leba-
non and the subsequent occu-
pation, the resolution of the
Israeli armed services to de-
fend their country appears
strong.
"Defend" is the operative
word. It is difficult to see the
post-Lebanon generation of
Israelis invading an enemy
country. It is equally difficult
to see them failing to smash
an invader. But there can be
no doubt that as Arab mili-
tary power expands, Israel
will face a hazardous period.
In the end, the Israelis
know that their salvation and
security are in their hands
and their hands alone. And
they find little consolation in
the knowledge that those
hands are not now as full as
they would like with what is
necessary for their surviv-
al. ^
tries on the path of peace. But
Egypt, like all Arab coun-
tries, is prone to political con-
vulsions. We do not know
what road a new Egyptian
president might take."
The I.D.F. assumption is
that Egypt will not be a mili-
tary threat for at least the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504410003-8