NORTH REPRIMANDED ON IDEA TO 'NEUTRALIZE' TERRORISTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550023-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: February 22, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550023-1
64ASHI: GTON POST
- 22 February 11187
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then implementing them with pri-
N rth Re rimanded on Idea vat&.contractors and unconvention-
Tn `Neutralize Terrors,, 5 si he command chain.
cou"erterrorism in the administra-
tie walled McMahon, who left the
B Doman Mt an Carly last year, a steadying in-
and C antes R. Babcock fluence in the face of "cockamamie
WashH1 ton Poet _71"Writers ?d "
h
ungresstunat source WHO is [a-
17.1 Offtcia! . I n~ered by Choice of Word-' with the secret debate over
The Central Intelligence Agen-
cy's No. 2 official cursed and rep-
rimanded White House aide Lt. Col.
Oliver L. North in early 1984 for
secret y proposing that President
Reagan authorize planning to "neu-
tralize" terrorists, according to two
sources.
Deputy Director of Central In-
telligence John McMahon was so
angry at ort s c ioice o words-
which he feared might be inter-
preted as presidential approval of
assassinations-that he telephoned
North in the middle of the night and
called him an unprintable name, the
sources said.
Whether the wording of the still-
classified document was changed is
not known. But several officials said
the final directive made clear that
the president did not condone as-
sassination-which is against fed-
eral law-as part of a sweeping
"pro-active" covert counterterror-
ism program drawn up in 1984 in
response to the bombing of the Ma-
rine barracks in Beirut in October
1983 and.other terrorist episodes.
The incident revealed the fierce
rivalries and competing bureaucrat-
ic interests stirred up by the Rea-
gan administration's determination
to act against terrorists before se-
rious damage was done to its polit-
ical image at home, according to
past and current officials. From late
1983 on, terrorism became an ob-
session at the White House, where
memories of Jimmy Carter's polit-
ical debacle over the U.S. hostages
in Iran were still fresh.
"People would mention that Jim-
my Carter did better on some of
this, and it would just drive them up
the wall," a congressional source
said.
Others say that the North-
McMahon dispute also sheds light
on some of the underlying causes of
the Iran-contra affair, which appar-
ently grew out of North's efforts to
circumvent the traditional bureau.
cracy by centering sensitive covert
operations at the White House and
eas proposed by others in t
e
administration.
Bet an administration official,
reflecting frustration with bureau-
cratic inertia, declared, "McMahon
was distressed about anything that
required the agency to do some-
thing about terrorism."
According to sources, McMahon,
representing a CIA bureaucracy
chastened by revelations of past
abuses, was often joined by the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in urging ex-
treme care in responding to terror-
ist incidents. Advocating a more
activist approach were Secretary of
State George P. Shultz, several key
CIA officials and Pentagon believers
in the capabilities of the "Special
Operations Force," made up of the
Army's Green Berets and Rangers,
the Navy's Seal teams and the Air
Force's Special Operations Wing.
As White House concern grew,
North was pressing the cause of the
activists at the National Security
Council.
In mid-1985, North, a Marine
lieutenant colonel serving as deputy
director of the NSC's office of po-
litical-military affairs, became head
of an informal intergovernmental
group on counterterrorism at the
NSC.
In January 1986, Reagan signed
an updated intelligence order,
called a "finding," which was re-
viewed by Congress. According to
sources, this finding was focused on
counterterrorism and did not allow
assassination or U.S. training of
foreign "hit squads."
On March 8, 1985, a group of
Lebanese intelligence personnel
and foreigners who had received
CIA training under a covert pro-
gram authorized by Reagan were
reported to have set off a massive
car bomb in Beirut that killed 80
persons and wounded 200, but
missed the main target: a militant
Shiite terrorist leader.
According to a congressional
source, the incident resulted in the
halting of the CIA training program
and the dissolution of a similar
group in another country, which
apparently was pressing to carry
out assassinations.
But the January 1986 presiden-
tial directive did allow U.S. agen-
cies a much more activist approach.
According to one source, Congress
"gulped" when it saw the directive
but ultimately accepted it because
of widespread alarm about terror-
ism.
Among other things, as reported
Friday by The Wall Street Journal,
the directive allowed the CIA to
abduct suspected terrorists abroad
and bring them to the United States
for trial. Sources said Shultz and his
legal adviser, Abraham D. Sofaer,
were leading advocates of such ab-
ductions, if based on proper indict-
ments and warrants and if they
were feasible for "U.S. resources,"
such as commando units.
Some critics, however, argued
that authorizing such behavior was
not thoroughly considered. "in a
place like Beirut, the Delta Force
would be just another group of cow-
boys on the street," said Sen. Pmt- ?
rick J. Leah (D-Vt.), former ran-
ing muionty member of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence.
The North group became the fo-
cal point within the government for
devising tactics for penetrating and
disrupting terrorist networks and
for planning preventive or retalia-
tory strikes against them. Among
the ideas discussed were preemp-
tive strikes against terrorists, slip-
ping faulty weapons or ammunition
into terrorist arms caches and dis-
rupting the travel of known terror-
ists.
At the same time that this "pro-
active" approach was being devel-
oped, North was playing a central
role in arranging the shipment of
U.S. arms to Iran as ransom for
American hostages held by pro-
Iranian extremists in Lebanon.
At least two members of North's
counterterrorism group had detailed
knowledge of this program, accord-
ing to sources. One was Duane
(Dewey id head of the c~ o'un-
ferterronsm section of the CIA. The
other was then-deputy assistant sec-
retary of defense Noel Koch, who
represented the Pentagon on the
North group until May 1986.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550023-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550023-1
s
North approached Clarridge in
November 1985 and asked him to
help arrange a plane to move what
he called "oil drilling equipment"
from Israel to Iran. Several days
later, McMahon learned of the co-
vert program, which actually in-
volved U.S. arms, and ordered a
halt to CIA support until the pres-
ident signed a directive authorizing
the covert program.
Koch, according to the recently
released report of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, was
present at a White House meeting in
February 1986 attended by North
and two CIA officials, at which arms
sales to Iran were discussed.
Other members of the counterter-
rorism group representing the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, the
State Department and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff are reported to have
had only spotty information about
the arms sale program, which had
been vigorously opposed by Shultz
and Defense Secretary Caspar W.
Weinberger.
North was fired from the NSC
last Nov. 25 following disclosures of
his alleged role in diverting funds
from the U.S. arms sales to Iran to
aid the contras fighting the govern-
ment of Nicaragua.
What the NSC counterterrorism
group did and how it did it are two of
the most closely guarded secrets in
the U.S. government. The January
1986 presidential directive on coun-
terterrorism is still in effect. Several
sources said last week that the qual-
ity of intelligence about terrorists
has improved. Others say that the
NSC group was an effective team
that filtered out many of the "far out"
ideas that were proposed to it.
However, congressional inves-
tigators are expected to examine
the extent to which North may have
secretly used his counterterrorism
activities to support other, more
closely held covert activities known
only to him, then-national security
adviser John M. Poindexter and a
few others.
Through allies in the CIA and the
Pentagon, North had access to un-
conventional units and networks,
some of which were under govern-
ment command and others of which
were private contractors.
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Richard L. Armitage, who replaced
Koch on the NSC group in May
1986, is in charge of the Special
Operations Force, which includes
the units that make up the coun-
try's main antiterrorist commando
unit, the Delta Force, based at Fort
Bragg, N.C.
Many of the principal figures in
the Iran-contra investigation have
backgrounds in special operations,
and several, such as retired major
general Richard V. Secord, have a
background in counterterrorism,
having been involved in the planning
of an Iranian hostage rescue scheme
in 1980 that was never implemented.
Sources have revealed that the
counterterrorism program has em-
ployed the services of the Penta-
gon's covert unit, set up during the
1980 Iran crisis, called the Intelli-
gence Support Activity.
The Activity, as the ISA is called
in the intelligence community, is a
highly classified unit whose several
hundred members operate under
cover. What role the unit may have
had in such counterterrorist actions
as last April's raid on Libya has not
been revealed.
The Iran-contra affair arose at a
time when there was a strong
movement in Congress to strength-
en the Pentagon's counterterrorism
role, over the objections of the joint
Chiefs of Staff. Similarly, the Rea-
gan administration was pushing for
a more aggressive program to fight
terrorists at a time when CIA res-
ervations remained strong.
While some Pentagon officials
have argued for authority to "take
out" known terrorists, CIA officials
who were in the Vietnam war have
been strongly opposed to the use of
"hit squads." These officials believe
the use of hit squads had a corro-
sive effect on CIA morale and per-
formance in Southeast Asia. "We've
been down that road before, and
there's no way we'll do it again," an
agency official told The Wall Street
Journal in 1984.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550023-1