HOW GOOD IS THE ARMY?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504820027-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: February 28, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

WASHINGTON POST
28 February 1986
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504820027-7
How Good Is the Army?
The Philippine army's refusal to fight
for Ferdinand Marcos was the key fac-
tor in a bloodless transfer of power few
believed possible, but it also raises con-
cern among Pentagon experts whether
its troops will prove any more intrepid
in battling communist insurgents.
Credit for the peaceful transition
should not be attributed to Marcos' hu-
manitarian impulses, according to Pen-
tagon sources. They say his orders to
eljte Ranger units to attack the military
rebels at Camp Crame were refused,
raising a question: Were the Rangers
making a political statement or were
they revealing a lack of discipline?
That is one of many questions asked
in Washington about Corazon Aquino's
new regime. Did Aquino mean it dur-
ing her campaign when she repeatedly
promised to remove "eventually" U.S.
bases.? In the words of one administra-
tion official, could "crony capitalism"
be replaced by "crony socialism"?
Even those Reagan officials who
were most worried by the tilt against
Marcos are overjoyed that he was
forced out without civil war and with
the army intact. But they also realize
this: Though ridding his country of its
authoritarian ruler was surely the
beginning of solving Philippine prob-
lems, a solution requires much more.
There is no certainty Aquino's army
will be more effective than Marcos'.
Analysts at the Pentagon see perhaps
half of the New People's Army guerril-
las responding to Vice President-Prime
Minister Salvador Laurel's amnesty
offer. The remaining half are well-
armed, hard-core Marxist-Leninists.
In trying to root them out, the new
government must do far better than
the Marcos army did. Visitors to the
Philippines, including us, have been
appalled at the indiscipline and disincli-
nation of many units to fight the insur-
gents. What is suspected at the Penta-
gon is that the refusal of the Rangers
to obey orders could have been more
evidence of military disarray than re-
hellion against Marcos.
What's more, the problem of private
armies in the interior persists. me in
U.S. intelligence believe Evelio Javier, a _
former governor of Antique province
and a strong unto loge ter, was mur-
dered ter the a ection by just suc t a
Rang, not on orderstfrom Manila. Dur-
ing our travels on e is an o inda-
nao, we found not only the government
losing the guerrilla war but also a total
breakdown of law and order.
The political acrobatics of Juan Ponce
Emile in keeping the defense portfolio
in the Marcos and Aquino cabinets is no
good omen for military reform. Until
last weekend, Emile was considered
part of the problem: a Marcos crony
who became a millionaire during long
tenure at the Defense Ministry that saw
declining military peformance. While
Enrile's defection probably prevented
civil war, it is no harbinger of change.
More is hoped for from Enrile's co-
defector, Gen. Fidel Ramos. A man of
rare integrity at senior levels in the
Philippines, he failed to accomplish
much during a stint as acting chief of
staff under Marcos, a failure excused by
lack of support from the presidential pal-
ace. Over lunch at Philippine Constabu-
lary headquarters in Quezon City,
Ramos told us what no other senior offi-
cer would: the people were sick and
tired of corruption.
Corruption aside, the Philippine army
desperately needs arms and equipment
-which means more U.S. aid. During
the campaign, candidate Aquino told us
her country needed less military aid be-
cause NPA insurgents would embrace
the new amnesty offer. Ramos and
other officers will have to explain that
reforming the military will be expensive.
Hopes for a tougher military effort
depend on Aquino's backing away
from some campaign pledges-such
as abandonment of U.S. bases when
the present agreement ends in 1991.
It is notable that her most anti-Amer-
ican supporters are not in her Cabinet.
The new finance minister, industrialist
Jaime Ongpin, is viewed by senior Amer-
ican officials as the best hope for eco-
nomic reform. Although conservative
businessmen are suspicious of him, Ong-
pin is concerned that Aquino is to his left
and wants to pull her into a free-market
mold. He will have help here from the
new trade minister, Jose Concepcion, an-
other rich businessman who headed the
citizens group, Namfrel.
The Aquino Cabinet is more conser-
vative than would have seemed likely in
a post-Marcos landscape happily free of
the physical and emotional debris of civil
war. But doubts must remain, especially
whether the army can fight as it will
have to in the months and years ahead.
(,) IN News America Syndicate
to/
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504820027-7