WAITING FOR REAGAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504820028-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: February 14, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504820028-6
r
WASHINGTON POST
14 February 1986
Rowland Evws '
And Robert Novak
Waiting
For
Reagan
A seemingly isolated decision oa
whether to send modern weapons to
anti-Soviet Afghan rebels may deter-
mine the future of the Reagan Doc-
trine far beyond bloody Afghanistan.
Debate is heated in the Pentago,
where the Joint Chide of Staff, worried
about Soviet reaction, have delayed
IA " ositioaa. nstan s - ent
Zia, w ose country is at the cutting,
edge of Soviet power, shares no such ti?.
midity. Zia believes the new weapons.
might drive Moscow into serious negop-,
ations and end its ocaipation, i'
Opposition from the CIA and the mill-
tart' is in truth a surface problem. The
real cause of y is esi rat Rea-,
gan's own failure to compei the bet-;
reaucracy to carry out his doctrine of
reversing the communist tide by helpings
freedom fighters across the world. Iran
short Reagan has been silent,
The strong recommendation by Pen-
tagon civilians, middle-level State De--
partment officers and White House na-
tional security staffers to arm Afgha r,
rebels with more than bows and arrows
is a test that will decide the future of the,
Reagan Doctrine. It is up to the presi--i
dent to go beyond rhetoric. Weapons foil
Afghan rebels, aid to Nicaragua's corp.,
tras and help for Angolan anti-Soviet
guerrilla Jonas Savimbi all hinge on Rea-
gan's determination to save his doctrine
from death by disuse.
That is the opinion of Rep, James$
Courser of New Jersey, just back front.
a high-level congressional study tour-
that included Pakistan. He and other'
members of the delegation (which in-^
eluded administration officials) refusecikt
to discuss any aspect of the Afghaa,
weapons question. Courter, no bomb.
thrower, but a prudent student of nash
tional security, did make one commentl
to us: "If they can't muster the will
and the discipline to make this tougllik
decision, then where can they?"
The need for modern weapons in the,
hands of Afghan freedom fighters is not
in doubt. The Soviets recently importedi,
a new monster weapon, the 240-mikL
limeter mortar, that has transformed::,
their ability to rout out guerrillas hidden:
in the fastness of small valleys.
A new, slow-flying aircraft has given,
the Soviets a front-line reconnaissance;
they have never had before. Other,
new weapons being battle-testes
against Afghan rebels are pouring in,--'
Aid to the mujaheddin from friendWt
states that do not like the idea *-
Soviet conquest of Afghanistan will
never by itself turn back that invasion.
Pakistan's Zia first proposed up.
grading weapons for the rebels more
than six months ago, and was turned
down in Washington. He repeated his
suggestion when the congressional
delegation dined with him in Islamabad
on its recent visit.
The joint chiefs are wary for two
basic reasons. First, shoulder-fired
Stingers (anti-aircraft weapons) would,
sooner or later for the first time fall'
into hands of the Soviets, who could-
profit from Stinger technology.
The second reason is more prat
found. Given Soviet power in that re-
gion and its proximity to Pakistan, the
military brass worries about a sudden
military reaction by the Kremlin when
Stingers knock out dread Soviet MI=
25 helicopter gunships. The U.S.
logistic and supply-line base is thou-
sands of miles away.
But Reagan never pretended that
carrying out his doctrine would be;
risk-free. Zia, whose vulnerable natioir.
has the most to lose, is willing to take,
his share of that overall risk. More,
over, there is an upside trade-off: Zia's
conviction that the Soviets, tradition-
ally conservative in military policy;
would move toward withdrawal, not
bigger war.
That is why the strongest backers
of the Reagan Doctrine, viewing the
decision on Afghan rebel aid as cruciali
say privately that the president must
make clear to his own administration
the depth of his commitment. White
House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regal
has been quietly advised by these supw
porters of the doctrine to set up an
Oval Office command post to oversee
all special aid programs in support of
major anticommunist movements.
Presidential oversight could work
magic in clearing away parochial
worries of military leaders, whose in-
stinctive attitude is to avoid risk-tak-
ing. In Zbigniew Br'zezinski's phrase, it
would end "managerial neglect." The
idea of helping the Afghans gets et
thusiastic su rt at the Penta on out.
side the
monolithic o position even within the
chiefs. CIA bureaucrats stn carrying
the wounds of congressional probes a
deca a ago, are nervous about s
enterprises would quickly fall in
line if nudged v t to press ent.
Upping the ante in Afghanistan .
would demonstrate that Reagan has,
the will to make his doctrine work.
That is a message bearin important
consequences not" on Capitol Hill:
at Fie Pen agora an t e (IA-butur-
tFie~emlm as w .
?r li seem Anxrim syndicaw
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504820028-6