FEAR OF IRANIAN VICTORY CITED AS REASON U.S. GAVE DATA TO IRAQ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504850012-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: December 16, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/06: CIA-RDP9O-00965ROO0504850012-0
~d
,I I i
ASHIJIGTON POST
16 December 1986
Fear of Iranian Victory Cited as Reason U.S. Gave Data to Iraq
By Don 0berdorfer
w. IIII,tt'N' ill ,t st.ltt wrltcr
The supply of U.S. intelli ence informa-
tion to Iraq by-the Central Intellig nit e
Agency was begun more than two ears
ago with the kn a ge o t e State De-
partment a d others in the executive
branch because of concern that Iran might
be winning the war in the oil-rich Persian
Gulf, U.S. sources familiar with the oper-
sai ester ay.
ation
he transmission to Iraq of detailed in-
telligence including data from sensitive
U.S. satellite reconnaissance photography,
was reported in yesterc av as ington
Posy White House and State Department
spokesmen would not confirm the report
in news briefings yeste-rcfay-citing a ban
on public discussion of intelligence mat-
ters, but neither the spokesmen nor of er
of s sought to deny rlie account.
Instead, officials speaking both for at-
tribution and on a "background" basis at-
tempted to place the supply of U.S. intel-
ligence information to Iraq in the context
of broader administration policy.
"Our policy is one of trying to bring an
end to the conflict as quickly as possible,
in such a way that there are no winners
and no losers," said White House spokes-
man Larry Speakes.
A senior administration official went on
to tell reporters, on a not-for-attribution
basis, that "a victory by Iraq is unlikely"
and that any U.S. intelligence supplied to
that country would have been "in pursuit
of the goal" of ensuring that neither side
could win.
Roth Wfiite House and State Depart-
ment officials insisted that the United
States was not seeking to engineer a stale-
mate in the 6-year-old war by supplying
secret intelligence information and polit
Ica, support to Iraq while making limiters
sa es of armaments to Iran as part of hos-
tae-reate negotiations
A U.S. Policy of seeking to deny victory
to Iran by a tilt of U.S. Policy toward Iraq
dates to late 1983, when Iranian military
gains raised the possibility that the Teh-
ran regime would triumph, according to
informed sources. After an interagency
review lasting at least two months,
sources said, the administration devised a
new set of policies centered on the con-
viction that an Iranian victory would he
"contrary to U.S. interests."
Reflecting this assessment, which was
made known to Persian Gulf nations in
December 1983, and reported by the U.S.
news media at the time. the administra-
tion undertook to improve its relations
with Iraq across a broad front and to
mount an international campaign, later
known as "Operation Staunch," to reduce
the flow of weapons to Iran.
In mid-1984, sources said, a U.S.-Iraqi
"into i ence exc an e o e rried out
b the CIA was aut ooze as part o the
enhanced as in ton ties wit a ad.
Mostly the "exchange 11 was one-sided,
with the United States providing intorma-
tion of military and strategic value to Iraq,
the Curries said, t ouNa a eweramount
of useful data about Iranian activities was
received from the Iraqi intelligence net-
work
The flow of U.S. intelligence is reported
to have increased following the restora-
tion of diplomatic relations between the
United States and Iraq n November 1984,
ending 17 years ot official estran ement.
Until the past Lew months ht,wevpr_ U.S.
tactical military intelligence being sup-
pTie(i is sai c to have been primarilybattle-
field intormation such as the location of
Iranian troop concentrations that threat-
euiec raw posi ionz.
There were conflicting reports yester-
day about whether actual photographs ta-
ken by U.S. satellites have been supplied
to Iran as part of the intelligence ex-
change. Some sources said flatly that no
photographs had been passed to Iran, and
others said they did not know whether
photographs had been supplied.
The Post report said it could not he es?
tablished whether actual photos were giv-
en, or only information obtained from pho-
tos, although the account reported that
two sources had said Iraq receives "select-
ed portions" of actual photographs.
The State Department, which was in-
volved in policy formulation leading to sup-
ply of intelligence data to Iraq, is supposed
to be kept informed of the substance of
the intelligence sharing through estab-
lished coordination channels involving sen-
ior State Department and CIA officials. It
was unclear how much detail about the
intelligence flow was made available to
State in these periodic discussions.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/06: CIA-RDP9O-00965ROO0504850012-0