TWO STICKING POINTS OF SALT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504850020-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: June 7, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/06: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504850020-1 STAT
ARTICLE AP EARED WASHINGTON POST
7 June 1986
10 ON PAG '
Points of SALT
wo Stickiig
President Reagan, in announcing his recent
decision to exceed the numerical limits of the 1979
SALT II arms control agreement, cited "continuing
Soviet noncompliance" with the pact.
Here is the background of the two Soviet orograms
mentioned by Reagan as violations of SALT 11,
which was signed by the two superpowers in 1979
but never ratified by the U.S. Senate, and of the
pertinent limitations contained in the
document.
SS25
`New Missile'
Sri V!1
,,e of the hard-fought provisions of SALT II
that each side could flight-test and deploy
may' one additional "new type" of land-based in-
tercontinental ballistic missil6 during the life of
the treaty.
4 -4m1982, the Soviets began to test a new weap-
4 dubbed the SS24; Moscow notified the United
States that this would be the "new type" per-
.witted under SALT II. In early 1983, the Soviets
.l gen testing a second new weapon, which the
,U ited States calls the SS25 and which is a vio-
latioa of the limits, according to the U.S. govern-
ment.
.... he U.S. objective in limiting "new types" of
aril riles was to impede the race in quality and
effectiveness of strategic weapons, a race as se-
filitfs as that in numbers of weapons. Ralph Earle,
,who was part of the U.S. negotiating team during
eke SALT II process, said recently that the re-
,st'riction on new types of missiles in the treaty
;vs:only "a gesture" toward limits on quality that
Washington had hoped to obtain.
he Carter administration initially proposed a
'baff'on any "new types" of ICBMs but the Soviets
-.refused. Eventually the two sides agreed on one
new missile each, so the United States could go
ahead with its planned MX missile and the Soviets
.with. either a new multiwarhead weapon (such as
this _$S24) or a new single-warhead weapon (such
as the SS25). The Reagan administration con-
tends that the Soviets went ahead with both in
violation of the treaty.
;..Jw to distinguish a "new type" from an exist-
ing missile was the subject of much negotiation. In
the end the two sides agreed to consider up to a 5
percent variation in length, diameter, launch-
we' ~ght or throw-weight as a modification of an
existing weapon; above 5 percent would be con-
sidered a "new type."
;fie Soviet Union has claimed that the SS25 is
a Rermissible modernization of the SS13, an old
single-warhead weapon from the 1960s. Rejecting
this claim, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency said recently the throw-weight of
the $S25 is 50 percent greater than the SS13
and, thus, far from what is allowed.
Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, Soviet army chief
of staff, said this week that the United States has
underestimated the throw-weight of the SS13 and
overestimated that of the SS25, citing technical-
itieg-that the United States rejects.
Since the Soviets will not disclose the specifi-
cations of their weapons, the United States relies
on calculations based on observation of Soviet
missiles in test flights and interception of missile
test data, known as telemetry, which is radioed to
Earth.
Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger
said June 1 that 72 SS25 missiles have been de-
d, "each one a violation of the SALT agree-
megt." The disputed weapon is being deployed
aft a truck for easy mobility. This would make
the SS25 less vulnerable to U.S. attack in time of
war and particularly valuable if fixed, silo-based
Soviet missiles are threatened or knocked out.
The United States is in the early stages of de-
veloping a second "new type" of missile, the sin-
gle-warhead Midgetman. Officials said this is not
a violation of the treaty now because it is far from
tligCXt-testing stage.
Telemetry Encoding
Limiting the encoding of electronic missile test-
ing data-telemetry-was among the touchiest
and most contentious issues of the SALT II ne-
gotiations and among the last to be settled.
Both sides "listen" to electronic data that the
other side's missiles send from space to monitors
on Earth. This is particularly important to the
United States as one of few sources of detailed
technical information about Soviet military pro-
grams and a key means of verifying whether the
Soviet Union is complying with treaty restric-
tions.
Because secret U.S. intelligence capabilities
were at stake, the issue was so sensitive that for
several years U.S. negotiators under Presidents
Nixon, Ford and Carter were forbidden to men-
even while truing hard to restrict "delh&-rare con-
cealment measures." Finally a Soviet negotiator
mentioned the word and opened up the subject.
Telemetry usually consists of signals trans-
mitted over 40 to 60 electronic channels carrying
a variety of information about the performance of
a test missile. The Soviets had encoded some of
these channels on their missile test flights since
the mid-1970s, and U.S. officials were eager to
eliminate or minimize the practice.
LCQjlV7Z'VuAn
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/06: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504850020-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/06: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504850020-1
3-
The United States did not propose that all en-
coding of telemetry be banned, primarily because
negotiators argued that the Soviets would never
accept such a restriction. Instead the U.S. pro-
posed-and the Soviets ultimately accepted-a
prohibition on telemetry encryption that "impedes
verification of complicance with the provisions of
the treaty."
U.S. negotiators conceded then-and Reagan
administration officials concede now-that it is a
"judgment call" to determine when encoding is
permitted and when it is so extensive as to im-
pede treaty compliance. During the last stages of
the 1979 negotiations, strenuous efforts were
made by the United States to describe impermis-
sible encryption in order to strengthen the re-
striction.
The Soviet Union is reported to have sharply
stepped up its telemetry encryption around 1981,
prompting increasingly strong U.S. protests.
Earle, the final chairman of the U.S. negotiating
team for SALT II, said recently his "subjective
view" is that the Soviets raised encryption levels
when the United States made it clear it would not
ratify the treaty, but would merely refrain from
undercutting it so long as Moscow did the same..
The Soviets have insisted publicly and in dip-
lomatic channels that their encryption of telem-
etry has been within the range permitted by
SALT II. The Reagan administration has called
the encryption, which according to officials has
been at its most extensive on the SS25 rpissile,
"deliberate impeding of verification" and thus a
serious violation of SALT II.
-Don Oberdorfer
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/06: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504850020-1