TROUBLESHOOTER HAS A SECOND MISSION: PACIFY INCREASINGLY CRITICAL CONGRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504870031-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: March 8, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504870031-7
IVASHINGTON POST
8 March 1986
Troubleshooter Has a Second Mission:
Pacify Increasingly Critical Congress
Old Policy Is Swathed in New Diplomatic Garb
By Joanne Omang
Washington Post Staff Writer
The dispatch of Philip C. Habib to
the diplomatic front in Central
America is an apparent effort to
clothe an old administration policy
in new diplomatic dress in order to
mollify an increasingly critical Con-
gress.
It is the latest repetition of a pat-
tern the Reagan administration has
followed whenever Congress no-
tices anew that efforts to make the
leftist Sandinista government of
Nicaragua cry uncle involve mili-
tary action and the killing of human
beings. When Congress protests,
the administration offers a diplo-
matic gesture to pacify the lawmak-
ers.
In November 1981, a National
Security Council document outlined
NEWS
ANALYSIS
plans for broad "polit-
ical and paramilitary
operations" against
Nicaragua, a policy adopted after
the administration apparently con-
ded that the Sandinistas were a
Soviet tool and would have to be
compelled to abandon their desire
to spread communism.
For a long time, however, the
administration's public defense of
its policy was very different. In
1981 the White House argued that
;id to the contra rebels would serve
only to stop Nicaragua from arming
leftist guerrillas in El Salvador. It
bas come a long way since, as in-
&cated by President Reagan's
earning this week that defeat of
l ievl ' aid to the contras would pro-
duce "a sea of red, eventually lap-
ping at our own borders."
In the beginning, Congress was
concerned about El Salvador and
most members heeded the admin-
tration's declaration that Nicara-
ua was a threat there. But lately
ley moderates in Congress have
become convinced that real nego-
tiations with Nicaragua have never
been tried.
Their resistance to more military
pressure has peaked just when the
administration has decided nothing
else will work. Now, the White
House evidently hopes that the ap-
pointment of Habib will persuade
Congress to provide him with a
$100 million club he can use to
threaten Nicaragua into submission.
Asked yesterday what negotiat-
ing tools Habib would have that his
predecessors lacked, State Depart-
ment congressional strategist Rich-
ard N. Holwill replied, "I hope to
God he has lethal aid [to the con-
tras]. There's nothing else the San-
dinistas want from us" except an
end to contra attacks, he said. "If
we don't have that, we don't have
negotiations; it's that simple."
The 1981 decision document said
covert U.S. efforts would try to
"build popular support in Central
America and Nicaragua for an op-
position front that would be nation-
alistic, anti-Cuban and anti-
Somoza." New "action teams" of
rebels would support that front.
But when Central Intelligence
Agency Director William asey
?riefed congressional intelligence
committees about the new orn
"contra" rebel aid program in De-
rem er 1981, he did not suggest
any political goal , accordin to par-
ticipants. He said t e objective was
to stop Nicaragua's arms pup y._tn
Salvadoran guerrillas.
Vernon Walters, then an am-
bassador-at-large, described this in
another context, at a November
1981 conference in Santiago, Chile:
"Too often, we have announced
publicly what we're going to do or
what we're not going to do. We be-
lieve that constructive ambiguity is
a very powerful weapon."
The contras grew from a ragtag
total of 500 orso fig tai ers in ate
1981 to 4,000 a year later, accord-
ing to intelligence officials, and t e
CIA pooh-poohed rebels' declara-
tions that t ey were working to
overthrow the Sandinistas.
But Congress was alarmed. In
December 1982 Congress forbade
spending "for the purpose of over-
throwing the government of Nic-
aragua or provoking a military ex-
change between Nicaragua and
Honduras."
In what would become a pattern,
the CIA responded in February
1983 by telling t o ouse m e i-
gence committee for the first time
that more aid tote contras was
justified "to put more pressure on
STAT
STAT
the Sandinistas to make them come
to the bargaining table
, actor ing
to a legislator involved.
Reagan declared in April 1983
that "anything we're doing in that
area is simply trying to interdict the
supply lines." He added, "I don't
think it's reasonable" to think such
a small guerrilla force "could nurse
any ambitions that they can over-
throw that government."
In May 1983 rebel strength
reached 7,000, and they were hit-
ting granaries, ranches, electric
lines. "We'll be in Managua in five
months," one said, referring to Nic-
aragua's capital. Reagan for the
first time called the contras "free-
dom fighters."
"The definition kept changing of _
what the objectives were," recalled
Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-
N.Y.), former vice chairman of the
Senate intelligence commit ee, in a
1983 interview. Chairman arrv
Goldwater (R-Ariz.) demanded that
Reagan "tell us in plain language
just what it is he wants to do rela-
tive to Nicaragua. --
Again responding with diploma-
cy, the administration in June 1983
named former Florida senator Rich-
ard Stone to be its first special ne-
gotiator for Central America.
In July the House barred funds
for "direct or indirect support of
military or paramilitary operations"
against Nicaragua. In August the
White House named former secre-
tary of state Henry A. Kissinger to
head a bipartisan national commis-
sion on Central America.
The pattern held the following
year. The contras mined the har-
bors of Nicaragua with CIA help,
and damaged seven ships. Congress
erupted in fury in April- and in June
1984 Secretary of State Georize P.
Shultz visited Managua to open di-
rect Patera talks.
Last year Reagan acknowledged
that he wanted to make the Sandi-
nistas "cry uncle," and Shultz
warned that failure to fund the con-
tras would be "consigning Nicara-
gua to the endless darkness of com-
munist tyranny."
When it became evident last
spring that Congress would reject
Reagan's renewed military aid re-
quest, he offered-unsuccessful-
ly-to delay using the aid if Nica-
ragua negotiated with the contras.
Habib's mission is the latest twist
in this plot, but the goals have not
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504870031-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504870031-7 A
changed. "Let there oe no [mslaxe,
Reagan said yesterday. "Ambassa-
dor Habib's efforts to achieve a dip-
lomatic solution must be be accom-
panied by an increased level of [mil-
itary] pressure on the Nicaraguan
communists."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504870031-7