A GENERAL'S NAM EXPOSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000604920001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 31, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000604920001-3
t' TU1. PY LARrD '" THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
31 January, 1985
A General's Nam Expose
Washington has an unlikely new cult
book in Gen. Bruce Palmer's memoir of
the Vietnam war, published last year by a
small university press. The Pentagon book-
store has trouble keeping it in stock. So
does Sidney Kramer's bookstore, located
just a few blocks from the . White House
and frequented by National Security Coun-
cil staffers.
The book's underground success-if you
'can call the Pentagonand the NSC an. "un-
derground'!-is. due partly to the reputa-
tion of Mr. Palmer, a former vice chief
of staff of the U.S: Army,who retired in
1974. But it is more i tribute to the book
itself, which offers a senior military com-
mander's honest, unsentimpntal, account' of
the Vietna.rrr.war'
Although ."The.-25-Year War." (Univer-
sity Press of Kentucky, 236 pages, $24) is
organized, around: Mr. Palmer's-. experi-
ences rather-than overall principles of
Bookshelf
warfare, some clear themes do emerge: He
argues that-.American military- involve:
ment in Vietnam, beginning May 1, 1950,
and ending. April 30, .1975; with the fall of
Saigon, was "the longest conflict in Ameri-
can history'.' .and our first defeat in war.
He blames not 'only the civilian planners,.
who made serious errors, but also the mili-
tary. From. the joint -chiefs of staff on
down, he says, they failed to devise effec-
tive strategy, or tactics in Vietnam.
Mr; Palmer's goal is to tell the truth,
however painful it may be for the senior
military officers and civilians who . man-
aged the. war. In.doing so, he challenges
some .of the myths' and rationalizations
about Vietnam that have grown up within
the military during the last decade. Specif-
ically, he questions whether:
-The military warned civilian -leader.
slip from the beginning that a limited war
wasn't winnable. This argument is made.
frequently by retired commanders, but Mr.
Palmer claims it just isn't so. He writes:
"Not once during the war did the JCS ad-
vise the commander in chief or the' secre-
tary of defense that the strategy being pur-
sued most probably would fail and that the
United States would be unable to achieve
its oblectives.":.-
-The military leadership had a sound
strategy to win the war but was prevented
from doing so, by meddlesome civilians.
Here again, Mr. Palmer suggests that clar-
ity of military judgment has come largely
with hindsight. During the war, he says,
"The, JCS seemed to be unable to articu-
late an effective military strategy that
they could 'persuade the commander in
-chief f and secretary of defense to adopt. In
-the end,.the theater commander-in effect,
Gen, Westmoreland-mae;successivere-
quests for, larger and larger force levels
withouLbenefit of,an ;overall concept and
plan:
=Gen. -William Westmoreland's' 'strat-
egy of attrition was working. until the U.S
political leadership lost its nerve after the
:'1968 Tet offensive. Mr. Palmer argues that
the numbers didn't support Mr.'Westmore-
land's- belief .that the U.S.could bleed
::North Vietnam 'into submission. He notes:
"At the height of the fighting in Vietnam,
during the 1967-1969 period, when casual-
ties were highest on both sides; there was,
no. compelling evidence that North Viet-
nani was hurting for manpower to keep on
fighting."
-Robert McNamara was the chief vil-
lain of. Vietnam, since he sent the.military
forces into battle, and then turned-his back
on them.. Mr. Palmer faults many of Mr.
`McNamara's decisions as secretary of de-
fense, but he offers a surprisingly sympa-
thetic. portrait: "The strong-minded and
-seemingly insensitive McNamara gave-an
irnpressibn, "perhaps unintentional, of ar-
.rogance,'but underneath this hard exterior
:_ vras asensitive,man. He had the percep-
tion to'see that something was seriously
awry in Vietnam, and the courage, right or
--wrong, to.. change his mind about the
war."
-The war could have been won quickly
if the civilian leadership had unleashed the
military in an all-out bombing campaign.
Maybe,. says Mr. Palmer, but he notes that
.the Army and Navy were always ','skepti-
cal".about the benefits of a massive bomb-
ing campaign, since "North Vietnam didn't
possess the industrial development to jus-
.tify strategic bombing.".
This is the. voice of a professional sol-
dier, trained to give `honest advice, and it
runs like'a clear stream through "The 25-
Year War."
Mr.,Palmer also writes with the anger
of a career Army man who saw his service
bent to. the breaking point by Vietnam. His
feelings come through in his portraits of
some of the leading actors of the Vietnam
years. He describes Henry Kissinger as an
arrogant, moody man, and recalls one Kis
singer tantrum in 1972 when the national`'.
security adviser seemed to take the side of
Peking in a dispute about whether a U.S.
fighter had strayed accidentally into Chi-
nese airspace. He describes Mr. ' Kis-
singer'saide at the time,"Gen. Alexander
Haig, as an insatiably ambitiousman who
attained - the 'rank of four-star general
through "chair-borne duty in.the White
House."
In a concluding section of the book, Mr.
Palmer sums up the operational lessons of
the war and what he calls the "larger les-
sons." Chief among them is that fighting
"limited" wars is difficult for a democ-_
racy. Caspar Weinberger has made the
same argument recently, but not .as poig-.
nantly as Mr. Palmer, who asks rhetori-
cally whether we are "a greater people, a
better nation' because we fought in Viet-
nam. He answers.: "We are probably
wiser, but certainly not stronger.
Mr. Ignatius is the Journal's:diplomatic
correspondent 'in' Washington.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000604920001-3