COUNTERING THE DECLINE IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000604920008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: December 4, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Y Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/04 :CIA-RDP90-009658000604920008-6
TORRINGTON REGISTER-CITIZEN (CT)
4 December 1985.
A proposal
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TORRINGTON
SEVERAL RECENT news head-
lines seem to indicate that there
are some major problems within
the United States intelligence com-
munity. We have read about a
former FBI agent on trial for espio-
-Wage; another FBI man sentenced
to prison for criminal activities;
three CIA officers charged with
espionage one of whom escaped
his surveillance and is probably in
Moscow today; the defection and
re-defection of the supposed num-
ber five man in KGB.
What does all this mean? These
recent developments represent two
contradictory but interrelated
events .from the past. First, the
problems that resulted from the
Congressional investigations of
American intelligence in the mid-
1970s have now become apparent.
And second, these problems have.
begun to be addressed in a quiet
way by the Reagan administration.
While the above cases and others
certainly point to some human
failings, these same failings cannot
be ignored when they affect the
individual and collective security
of all Americans. Everyone should
take notice and seek some answers
to a few perplexing? questions.
What has happened to our coun-
terintelligence capability that is so
vital to American security inter-
ests? If we can no longer guarantee
that reliability and loyalty of our
own agents, how can we adequate-
ly assess the motives of intelli-
gence service hostile to our best
interests? Are there solutions to
the problems posed by these and
other questions?
Most people are aware that
every country has spies, intelli-
gence officers. Fewer are aware
that countries have counterspies,
counterintelligence officers. Intel=
ligence officers generally are re-
sponsible for the. collection,
analysis, and dissemination.of in-
formation and knowledge. This in-
policy makers to formulate plans
of action. Intelligence officials are
truly. every country's first. line of
defense. Their actions can prevent
an assassination, thwart would-be
terrorists, and even prevent a dan-
gerous situation from escalating to
a war between nations.
The American counterintelli-
gence officer's task is doubly im-
portant. He must prevent foreign
intelligence services from succeed-
ing in their missions and just as.
importantly, guarantee that our
own intelligence personnel are loy-
al to their duties in their service to
our country. These tasks have
grown more and more difficult in
recent years. The congressional
investigations ~f our intelligence
services that came in the wake of
our involvement in Vietnam and
the Watergate scandal unfairly
jeopardized our own internal and
external security. This could not
have been the intended .effect.
Even though the sometimes public
hearings produced sensational
headlines regarding abuses con-
ducted by the American intelli-
gencF community, these abuses
were few and far between and, for
the most part, already corrected
through internal mechanics within
the intelligence services them-
selves.
As a result of these investiga-
tions, overly restrictive legislation
served to hamper counterintelli-
gence investigations. Lack of ap-
propriations and resultant
manpower cutbacks further
eroded the morale of our men and
women in intelligence and partic-
ularly those assigned to counterin-
telligence duties. Counterintel-
ligence capability was virtually
dismantled in both our civilian and
military agencies. This is no.exag-
geration. In the early days of the
Reagan presidency, President
Reagan could not travel to certain
American cities because the Secret
Service could not assure his safety.
Secret Service was not receiving
the intelligence that is essential for
evaluating potential threats
against the president.
At one time there was one coun-
terintelligence officer for every
Soviet intelligence officer operat-
ing.within the United States. Today
that ratio is about 1 to 5. Increased
manpower will help, but it will take
a long time to replace the years of
experience gained by those coun-
terintelligence .officers who lost
their jobs. Better screening proce?
dares for new personnel, the use of
the polygraph and more frequent
reinvestigation 'of all current per?
sonnal will also help. The volume
of classified information must be
reduced by restricting the number
of people who have the power to
classify. Actual access to classified
information must be strictly lim?
ited to those with aneed-to-know.
Contractors in the public sector
who work on classified US govern-
ment programs must also be made
more accountable. They too must
upgrade their own internal securi-
ty programs.
However, nothing can be accom-
plished without the full. support of
the American public. We must first
educate ourselves to the challenges
that face American intelligence
today, even though the dangers of
terrorism, assassination, espio-
nage, and subversion may never
directly affect us all. Armed with
this knowledge, we must demand
that our elected officials in the
congress pass appropriate legis-
lation so as to make it possible for
our intelligence officers to more
easily accomplish their missions.
Together we can succeed in pre-
serving the freedom that every
American so dearly cherishes.
The writer served in counterin-
telligence with the U.S. Army dur-
ing the Vietnam years, and is a
current member of the Association
of Former Intelligence officers. ,/~
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/04 :CIA-RDP90-009658000604920008-6