CRITICS RAP PLAN TO SELL OFF KEY MINERALS

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000604920032-9
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 4, 2012
Sequence Number: 
32
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 7, 1985
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00965R000604920032-9.pdf265.44 KB
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STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/04: CIA-RDP90-00965R000604920032-9 WASHINGTON TIMES 7 May 1986 key minerals Critics rap plan to sell off By Iris J. Portny THE WASHINGTON TIMES Reagan administration officials and congressional critics squared off yesterday over an administration plan to sell strategic materials from a national defense stockpile to help balance the budget. The stockpile is a $10 billion col- lection of critical minerals and other commodities - such as silver, chro- mium, cobalt, manganese, platinum and industrial diamonds - kept to support.key U.S. industrial needs if the United States gets involved in a long war. The administration proposed last July to add more than $3 billion to the U.S. Treasury over the next five years by selling off some of the com- modities, which are now kept in de- pots across the country managed by the Federal Emergency Manage- ment Agency. But congressional critics say the plan will hamper U.S. defense readiness. "The administration's stockpile plans appear inconsistent with our stated military doctrine - military forces capable of fighting across the entire spectrum of potential con- flict," said Rep. Charles Bennett, 'Florida Democrat and chairman of the House Armed Services subcom- mittee responsible for overseeing the defense stockpile. "If we cannot sustain conven- tional conflict, a nuclear war be- comes more likely - a war no one can win," Mr. Bennett told the Senate subcommittee on preparedness at a hearing on the issue. The national defense stockpile has been stored by the government at widely varying levels since its creatio;i in 1939. Commodity shortages of imported items, such as tin and rubber, are regarded by de- fense experts as having hampered the U.S. war effort during World War II and the Korean War. Mr. Bennett and Sen. James Mc- Clure, Idaho Republican, the two leading critics of the administra- tion's stockpile proposal, joined rep- resentatives from 12 executive branch agencies in testifying at the hearing. Mr. Bennett and Mr. McClure an- nounced yesterday that they will in- troduce legislation that would make the executive branch more depen- dent on congressional approval for its authority to sell items from the national defense stockpile. The legislation, to be added to the defense authorization bill on which both the House and Senate armed services committees will soon vote, would also remove authority for managing the stockpile from the di- rector of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The FEMA director now sets stockpile policy guidelines with the. 2a_1 ice o executive branch a cies, including the CIA and the de partments of Commerce Interior, State and Defense, which wor as a Und islation, those agencies would advise the secretary of defense, who would assume responsibility.for_ s_tockn?le 22L L Public debate of the White House proposal to sell off stockpiled com- modities has been hampered by an executive branch decision to keep classified most of the documents that led to Mr. Reagan's decision last year. Bernard Maguire, assistant direc- tor of FEMA, said at yesterday's hearing that "this proposal came after two years of interagency study and thousands of hours of review." He referred to an 800-page report which had been produced before the 1985 stockpile decision but agreed, when questioned, that no statement was ever released regarding the content of the massive, classified study. He refused to comment on what it said. The General Accounting Office, at Mr. Bennett's request, is review- ing the interagency study, which was done at the direction of the National Security Council. "Unfortunately, GAO is having difficulty in obtaining the cooperation of federal agencies involved in the study," Mr. Bennett said. The White House announced the plan on July, 8, 1985, was quickly barred by Congress from imple- menting it until October 1, 1986, and is now trying to convince the House and Senate armed services commit- tees to include authority to proceed with its plan in the 1987 defense au- thorization bill the two committees are now considering. The Reagan administration pro- posal consists of four parts: ? The immediate reduction of 1979 stockpile acquisition goals from $16.3 billion to $5.4 billion, as measured in March 1986 prices. The commodities were valued at $6.7 bil- lion when the plan was announced in July 1985. ? The sale, over a five-year period, of $2.5 billion of the estimated $3.2 billion surplus of commodities now in the national stockpile. ? The establishment of a double "tier" system of identifying stockpile items. Tier I would include $600 million (originally valued in 1985 at $700 million) of priority com- modities "not available in sufficient quantities from domestic or reliable foreign sources:' Tier II would be a $4.8 billion (originally $6 billion) "supplemental reserve." ? The release of $870 million now kept in the National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund to help reduce the federal deficit and to buy new commodities. "Congressional oversight will help to eliminate the use of the na- tional defense stockpile for budget- ary purposes;' Mr. McClure has ar- gued. Political considerations, not budget pressures, are the persistent spoiler of stockpile management, according to a former official who participated in the 1979 Carter ad- ministration review of defense stockpile needs. "Every item on the stockpile list represents a problem with a specific solution that doesn't call for stockpiling," said the former official, who requested anonymity. "For ex- ample, platinum is stockpiled. If, during an emergency, you recycle all the catalytic converters carried by American automobiles, you'll have more than enough platinum for de- fense production needs. "The idea that you're going to buy or sell things ought to be in the pub- lic domain;' said Mr. Bennett. "Congress now authorizes the number and kinds of airplanes, tanks, artillery tubes and warships. Why [not also] the strategic and critical materials needed by our in- dustry to support our conventional fighting forces?" he asked. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/04: CIA-RDP90-00965R000604920032-9 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/04: CIA-RDP90-00965R000604920032-9 ? NATIONAL DEFENSE. STOCKPILE Inventories and acquisition goals for the 62 strategic commodities - such as bauxite, cobalt, silver, manganese, platinum, chromium, titanium, tungsten, industrial diamonds, graphite, copper, and tin - now needed for wartime defense production have, since 1939, jumped up and down. They have never matched. (Figures in billions of 1985 dollars.) 28 :ate ry xf ?: Acquisition oals were fre ., In 1976 and, 1979, Ford and July 8, 1985, Reagan proposals quently changed between a Carter administrations return drops stockpile acquisition ' 1954 and 1975 to reflect U.S. to high acquisition goals. goals to $6.7 billion. New 'tier t tions i m h S U Sales of commodities in inven Items valued system proposed p ang ng . assu c . ~ . governing military planning z . t ? tory stabilize as $16.3 billion at $700 million to be placed in and industrial preparedness. goals are set. 'Tier ", priority items not l availab e from U sources S g~ r _r u r ag . . . Proposed Tier II would be a 20 - x - supplemental reserve." \ xp. e\.Y 'rx ON M11- ~ bx Y yY d 1 S '..s'~ a3 '~ d? S C~x; '?t` _ k. ~ i ~~ S x p ~ 1 4 16 ~ :. /`h