GADHAFI, TROUBLED BY SERIES OF SETBACKS, ACTS TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00965R000605360001-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 3, 2012
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 19, 1987
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
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CIA-RDP90-00965R000605360001-4.pdf | 100.79 KB |
Body:
Sl Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 201.2/05/03_ :CIA-RDP9O-009658000605360001-4
{~' ARTfU~t Arru~nw 19 March 1987
ON PA6E.1~-
Gadhafi, Troubled by Series ~f Setbacks, :lets t~ f~epair the Damage
~By Jonathan C. Randa~t --~ 1i
Waeliin?trni Pait IroreiKiTScrv,cc -
CAIRO, March 18-Libyan lead-
er Col. Pituammar Gadhafi, stung by
a military defeat in Chad and dip-
lomatic setbacks throughout the
Arab world, is seeking to improve
relations with former enemies in a
bid to end Libya's growing isolation.
Analysts and diplomats familiar
with the 44-year-old leader's mer-
curial temperament are convinced
his moves are motivated primarily
by concern about deepening domes-
tic problems.
This winter Gadhafi reshuffled
his government and allowed the
execution of several fundamentalist
opponents on state television, an
rtct apparently intended to warn
Libya's 3.5 million citizens about
the risks of political dissent.
Moreover, major fence-mending
this month with Libya's moderate
pro-western neighbor Tunisu~ and
with Yasser Arafat, the long-es-
tranged chairman of the Palestine
Liberation Organization, reflect
Gadhafi's perceived fear of threats
from those quarters, according to
informed sources.
Libya's reconciliation with the
PLO-and active sponsorship of
efforts to end Arafat's differences
with Syrian-supported Palestinian
dissidents-appare~itly caused fur-
ther strains in Gadhafi's rapidly
cooling alliance with Damascus.
Major reverses in his unpopular
desert war in Chad were underlined
by an embarrassing defection to
Egypt of Air Force officers aboard a
C 130 aircraft earlier this month arcs
by Libya's persisr.ently delayed
counteroffensive to retake the
northern oasis of Eada, captured
Jan. 2 by Chad government troops.
tior are relations with his Moscow
superpower ally considered close,
despite his trumpeting of Kremlin
support in the event of fresh U.S.
military attacks. Gadhafi was so ir-
ritated by the poor performance of
Soviet-supplied air defense systems
during the U.S. air raid o1i two Lib-
yan cities 11 months ago that he
pointedly refused to receive Mos-
cow's new ambassador for six
months, according to diplomats.
On paper, neither the badly di-
vided PLO nor Tunisia, a small
state weakened_by the vagaries of
aging President Eiabib E3ourguiba,.
constitutes an obvious danger.
L3ut highly placed Palestiniap
sources insist that Gadhafi's deci-
sion to improve relations with the
PLO is largely motivated by his
mistaken conviction that Arafat is in
league with largely ineffective Lib-
yan opposition groups in exile.
Similarly Gadhafi is said to fear
that Tunisia's intelligence ser-
vice-considered amone the most
reliable on Libvan affairs by many
professionals-could initiate trou-
ble for him.
The transfer to Chad of many Lib-
v~n troops previously statiolle_d_on
the Tunisian border diminished his
ability to intimidate his neighbor and
facilitated Tunisian intelligence oo-
erations against Libva.
Last week, for the first time
since Tunisia broke off diplomatic
relations in August 1985, Gadhafi
sent a senior official, Khouildi Ha-
math, to Tunis to make amends to
Bourguiba.
As a gesture of good faith, Libya
reimbursed $6.5 million of its $9
million debt to the national airline,
Tunis Air, and promised redress for
summarily deporting 32,000 Tuni-
Sian workers from Libya in 1985.
Their unpaid wages represent the
bulk of the $150 million debt owed
Tunisia.
The ostensible cause of tension
with Syrian President Hafez Assad
is Gadhafi's support for arch enemy
Arafat in the long siege of Palestin-
ian refugee camps in Lebanon being
conducted by Syria's surrogates,
the Shiite Amal militia.
At the same time Gadhafi has
sought to improve his credibility
with Syria and other Arabs by crit-
icizing both Iran and its Lebanese
allies, the Shiite extremist militia
Hezbollah.
Gadhafi took Iran to task for ac-
quiring arms from Israel and the
United States. Surprisingly-in light
of charges that Libya-has supplied
Tehran with Soviet-built Scud B mis-
siles used against Baghdad since
1985-Gadhafi said that attacking
urban civilians with these and other
weapons was "not a revolutionary
act," although he still sided with
Iran's revolution and did "not defend"
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
And despite Arafat's tactical alli-
ance with Hezbollah-and that mi-
litia's rivalry with the pro-Syrian
Amat-Gadhafi recently told visiting
Lebanese journalists, "We support
Hezbollah if it calls for martyrdom on
Palestinian soil, but if Lebanon is the
target, then this is terrorism."
But Gadhafi's efforts to appear
more moderate experienced a hitch
when the Libyan media attacked
Saudi Arabia's King Fahd, judging
him remiss for decorating Adm.
William J. Crowe Jr., chairman of
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
for visiting Morocco.
Morocco and its king, Hassan II,
were criticized for having received
then-prime minister Simon Peres of
Israel last July. That visit effectively
ended the two-year treaty of union
between radical Libya and conser-
vative Morocco, an alliance which in
its time helped end an earlier era of
Libyan diplomatic isolation.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03 :CIA-RDP9O-009658000605360001-4