DEFENSE SNOOPS OFTEN KEEP INFORMATION TO THEMSELVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605470005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 8, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/01 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000605470005-8
8 February 1987
STAT
STAT
DEFENSE SNOOPS OFTEN KEEP INFORMATION TO THENSELVES
BY WILLIAM H. INMAN
Allegations that Pentagon intelligence officials suppressed a tip about a
major Iranian arms deal in hopes of gaining war data and and access to an
advanced Soviet tank come as no surprise to sources familiar with defense
intelligence operations.
"An extremely high priority ... is to get ahold of advanced Soviet
weaponry, " says_Jef-f-Ri-che _ a respected intelligence analyst at American
University in Washi g on, D.-C. "'Not to take a picture of it, or to have it
described, but to physically obtain that weapon. Whatever it takes to gain that
(weapon) is considered worthwhile.''
Indeed, a major Pentagon effort is called the Foreign Material Exploitation
Program. It has evolved over the years to coordinate efforts to collect bits and
pieces of hot Soviet weapons.
'Parts of-surface-to-air missiles -- sometimes whole airplanes - are
subjected to detailed and rigorous analysis," Richelson says. "Many of these
items come from a variety of sources. There are few questions asked about
sources.''
Pentagon officials learned more than a year ago about a private effort to
ship 39 warplanes and other war supplies to Iran but did nothing to put a halt
to the scheme by alerting civilian agencies, the New York Times reported
recently. The officials, according to the report, hoped by their silence to gain
valuable intelligence into the Iran-Iraq conflict and access to advanced Soviet
T-72 tanks captured by Iran.
The arms deal -- code-named Demavand -- was considerably larger than, and
separate from, the Iranian arms shipments authorized by the White House,
according to the Times.
"There is no doubt some defense intelligence people view their mission from
a particular slant," says Matthew Gallagher, a former CIA analyst.
Statistical data, for instance, prepared by the CIA about Soviet military
capabilities are often at odds with figures formulated by the individual service
branches, Gallagher said.
''It appeared there was a tendency for the military agencies to emphasize the
Soviet threat because it was more in line with institutional interests. The
CIA generally took a softer view on the Soviet capabilities."
Adds Richelson: ''One reason each service wants its own intelligence
capability is so that it can challenge CIA estimates with which it disagrees,
and which, not incidentally, might threaten its budget and mission."
There have been numerous examples of defense intelligence agencies
withholding key data from civilian authorities. During Vietnam, vital military
intelligence data was routinely withheld from the White House, the State
Department and other non-military agencies. Intelligence gaps were blamed for
distorting official expectations throughout the war.
The short-sightedness of defense agencies may have contributed to the
enormity of the Pearl Harbor disaster. On the eve of the Japanese attack in
C0Tnud
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/01 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000605470005-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/01 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000605470005-8
1941, Army and Navy intelligence branches had each gathered material, including
sensitive secret communications by the Japanese, indicating an imminent attack
on a U.S. naval base somewhere in the Pacific.
The material was forwarded to the White House, but not to the board of
analysts established by the White House to judge the importance of all
intelligence and to recommend action. The board was headed by William Donovan,
founder of the organization that was to become the CIA.
Not only before, but during and after the devastating bomb attack, the board
known informally as the ''College of Cardinals'' was deprived of hard
intelligence on Japanese war intentions, even though the data was readily
available.
In this latest incident, according to the Times, several high-ranking
intelligence officials last year heard from a credible source of a huge private
network established to ship nearly a billion dollars in American war material
from third countries to Iran. The Pentagon has denied it ever received such
information.
Intelligence officials named in the Times story declined to return phone
calls to UPI.
Some officials believe the informant's tip must have been passed along,
although not necessarily to civilian authorities.
''That's the nature of the system," says Lt. Gen. Danial Graham, former
director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, which monitors activities of all
military intelligence. "I would be surprised and appalled if such important
information wasn't widely known quickly (within the Pentagon)," he says.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/01 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000605470005-8