EXPERTS SAY INTELLIGENCE STORIES HURT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605470007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 23, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

I I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605470007-6
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Experts say
intelligence
stories hurt
By Warren Strobel
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Despite the popular perception
that "Russia already knows," press
reports about intelligence oper-
ations can have drastic and lasting
effects on U.S. ? intelligence-
gathering capabilities, experts say.
Former intelligence officials and
academic experts, with a few excep-
tions, criticized media releases de-
tailing sensitive intelligence mate-
rial allegedly given to the Soviet
Union by Ronald W. Pelton, a former
mid-level National Security Agency
employee.
"If ... an agent has said some-
thing, does that mean we ought to
have free run on it? I would oppose
that," said William Colby, director of
the Central Intelligence Agency
from 1973 to 1976.
"Once the press gets going on it,
they probably tell them [the Soviets]
more than the agent would," Mr.
Colby said.
The reports could help the Soviets
determine the value of information
allegedly obtained from Mr. Pelton,
said John K. Greaney, former CIA
associate general counsel.
"That's the unknown quality when
you're handling assets [spies] - the
eracity of the information," said Mr.
reaney, executive director of the
ssociation of Former Intelligence
fficers. "Confirmation is the key."
"How do they [the medial know
hat the Soviets know?" asked
eorge Carver, a former CIA deputy
irector.
Mr. Carver, a senior fellow at
Georgetown University's Center for
Strategic and International Studies,
said that security breaches can be
expensive and long-lasting, forcing
intelligence agencies to remold op-
erations that have taken years to de-
velop.
In 1927, he said, ? British law-
makers trying to score political
points read intercepted Soviet ca-
bles into Parliament's record. "It
was a good two decades before they
[British intelligence] ever read [in-
WASHINGTON TIMES
23 'lay 1986
tercepted] another piece of Soviet
traffic," he said.
But one expert said that media
reports on the Pelton case did not tell
the Soviets anything new and
charged the Reagan administration
with trying to chill the press.
"The administration throughou
its history has sort of tried to intimi
date people," said Jeffrey T Richel
son, an American\University-pr-ofes
sor_and intelligence expert.
Taken to its logical conclusion, Mr.
Greaney's argument means "one
would never reveal anything about
intelligence," Mr. Richelson said.
"There doesn't seem to be any bal-
ance to that argument."
The current dispute began May
when reports surfaced that CIA
rector William Casey was consid
ing asking the Justice Departm
to prosecute five news agencies -
The Washington Post, The New York
Times, The Washington Times, Time
and Newsweek - for publishing ma-
terial about U.S. communications in-
telligence.
The move was widely viewed as
an attempt to stop The Post from
publishing an article it was prepar-
ing on the Pelton espionage case.
That article was printed Wednesday,
but The Post said it had deleted
much of the sensitive material.
By that time, however, NBC also
had broadcast a report detailing Mr.
Pelton's alleged activities.
Mr. Casey, who referred the NBC
case to the Justice Department and
is considering similar action against
The Post, declined a request for an
interview
The law Mr. Casey has cited
throughout the debate - Section 798
of Title 18 of the U.S. Code - specifi-
cally prohibits publication of classi-
fied material relating to U.S. and for-
eign cryptographic [code-breaking
and -making] operations or commu-
nications intelligence. Congress
passed the law in 1950.
Communications intelligence is
the preserve of the NSA, which gath-
ers the data, both coded and un-
coded, through a wide array of spy
satellites, ground listening stations
and other devices.
spokeswoman Carolyn John
son declined comment on the issue[
saying, "That's been our guidance."
The NBC report said that Mr. Pel-
ton allegedly passed to the Soviets
details of an operation code-named
Ivy Bells, which involved U.S. sub-
marines eavesdropping on Soviet
communications from inside its har-
bors.
In his 1985 book, "The U.S. Intelli-
gence Community," Mr. Richelson
describes in detail a similar pro-
gram, code-named Holystone.
The book suggests that the Sovi-
ets were tipped off about the pro-
gram by the 1969 beaching of a
Holystone submarine for two hours
on the Soviet coast and other acci-
dents many years ago.
"There are things out there that
we wouldn't want the Soviets to
know," Mr. Richelson said. "We
wouldn't want them to know where
Holystone submarines are at a given
moment."
But, he said, "I don't see anything
so far that's been published that's
caused any damage."
"The fact that we are planting lis-
tening devices in Soviet harbors is
new to me and presumably new to
the Soviets," said David Kahn, jour-
nalist and author of the "The Code-
breakers:'
"Presumably they could take
countermeasures which would be
deleterious" to U.S. intelligence-
gathering capabilities, Mr. Kahn
said.
"We have to weigh whether this
little bit of information will help the
American people. run their intelli-
gence agencies better or whether it
will harm intelligence operations,"
he said.
Mr. Colby, who directed the CIA
under Presidents Nixon and Ford,
said that even if the Soviets know
about U.S. operations targeted
against them, they may choose to ig-
nore them publicly until forced into
action by press reports. i
He cited an instance, recounted in
the memoirs of Soviet Premier
Nikita Khrushchev, who knew U-2
spy planes were overflying the So-
viet Union.
Mr. Colby said the overflights
were not what disturbed Mr. Khrus-
chev, whose government eventually
shot down one of the U.S. planes.
"The thing that sent him up the wall
was when President Eisenhower
[publicly] took personal responsibil-
ity for it," he said.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605470007-6