PELTON'S 'TOP-SECRET' INTELLIGENCE NOT SO SECRET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605510002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 5, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605510002-6
A4-A6Ai BOSTON GLOBE
fAft 5 June 1986
PeltOn'8 '
p-
to secret intelligence
not so secret
US claims security. _-compromised, but: many key details in public
By Fred Kaplan and Walter V. Robinson crt. Among other things, the
Globe Sta messages included information
WASHINGTON - In a crowded federal courtroom in abetwhere the Soviet subs had
Ct2
I have been made to the top-secret i'bre Pelton compromised the
commu
i
ti
n
ca
ons intelligence Ron- p'm, it had been an intelli-
ald W. Pelton is accused of selling ge. coup that apparently en-
to the Soviet Union for a paltry ha' it the hegemony of US sub-
$35.000 in cash. mks over Soviet subs In the
Thirty-seven miles away in the gT4"9-undersea cat-and-mouse
nation's capital, top US Intelli- ghat has a major role in the
gence officials have emerged from slower struggle for nuclear
the silence that shrouds th
sorit
i
y.
e
r
R. W. PELTON agencies in secrecy to threaten re- "'maven years after some US in-
Accused spy porters with prosecution for pub- tel_trnce officials rebelled public-
gram, articles about the intelligence that can be as- ly against a predecessor prosembled, for the most part, from unclassified technical arguing that the use of US subma-
manuals, pre-trial statements in open court and even rifles rn Soviet waters was too
from past news reports. dangerous and had no place in an
In the two cities, the government appears to be era of superpower detente, the is-
making contradictory arguments: Prosecutors in Bal- sue has surfaced anew, although
timore have asserted that Pelton sold a treasure trove only obliquely this time.
- ..s, ,,..~ U Ld w one ooviets tnat destroyed a suc-
cessful intelligence program. But officials in Washing-
ton have warned that even general press speculation
about the program may alert the Soviets to things they
do not know.
Obscured under this extraordinary security blan-
ket, according to sources, is the program the Soviet
Union is undoubtedly aware of because of the informa-
tion it gleaned from Pelton, but one which could prove
embarrassing to the United States if It were to become
publicly known.
According to the sources, the program involved the
use of US Navy submarines, creeping into Soviet wa-
ters at great risk, to facilitate eavesdropping on an un-
dersea communications system - an underwater re-
play of the U2 overflights of the Soviet Union that be-
came a deep embarrassment to the United States in
1960 when one of the reconnaissance planes was shot
down and its pilot, Francis Gary Powers, was cap-
tured.
With the help of a high technology device, identified
by Pelton in
triai,testimony this week as a "re-
cording system," US satellites or-
biting in space were privy to top-
secret Soviet communications.
Tbie US operation that was
coniomised, code-named "Ivy
BeIM;' allowed the United States
to Intercept messages that Soviet
sub trines sent to military com-
rnantX'posts ashore when they re-
i urfl to their harbors-after sea
Some details omitted
Senior US intelligence officials
have insisted, in meetings with
Globe _ reporters during the last
week. that publication of informa-
tion about the programs compro-
mised by Pelton could severely
damage US national security.
Although these officials have
repeatedly declined to provide spe-
citic information to support such
claims. The Globe has omitted
from this article a number of im-
portant technical details about
the program, and has described
others only in general terms.
Under the ground rules govern-
in>; the meetings with the officials,
the Globe cannot publish the gen-
eral arguments they raised about
why publication of the informa-
tion could damage US national se-
curity.
Because of. such government
sensitivity, the trial has also pro-
duced only limited mention of an-
other program Pelton allegedly
told the Soviets about. According
to the sources, the second
program involves a supercom-
puter so well known that its capa-
bility has been accurately detailed
domain
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605510002-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605510002-6
in a best-selling novel; and an in-
telligence-collection satellite. But
that satellite was replaced last
year by a newer model.
This and other issues raised by
disclosures at Pelton's trial have
presented a glimmer of how the
US advantage in sophisticated
technology has allowed it to out-
pace the Soviets in a crucial area
of intelligence gathering. And it
has provided rare snapshots of
the workings of the National Secu-
rity Agency, where Pelton worked
as an analyst until 1979. The NSA
is an agency so secret that even
the amount of its annual budget,
estimated at $4 billion, is classi-
fied.
This super-secret agency oper-
ated an underwater intercept
program that, by some accounts,
had apparently served to enhance
a long-standing US superiority in
what has been the most enduring-
ly stable leg of the US nuclear tri-
ad: US Navy nuclear-powered at-
tack and ballistic-missile subma-
rines, which hold great technologi-
cal advantages over their Soviet
counterparts.
In the other two legs of the tri-
ad - nuclear-armed bombers and
land-based nuclear missiles - the
two superpowers have the ability,
theoretically, to neutralize each
other with a surprise first strike.
With the third leg, however, the
US capability serves as a more sig-
nificant deterrent to a Soviet nu-
clear attack: the Soviets know
that US ballistic-missile subma-
rines can roam the oceans almost
at will, all but impervious to Sovi-
et detection and able to deliver a
lethal counterblow in the event,of
a Soviet nuclear attack against
the United States.
US undersea advantage
Even without the intelligence
compromised by Pelton, the Unit-
ed States holds a substantial un-
dersea advantage, with its use of
sophisticated methods for identi-
fying and tracking Soviet subma-
rines. methods that could be em-
ployed in case of war to neutralize
much of the Soviet submarine
fleet.
Some of those methods, the
sources said, are related to the sec-
ond program. Project B, the term
used by the prosecution to de-
scribe one of the programs Pelton
is accused of compromising. It has
been referred to at trial only as
"valuable information. a bout how
quickly the US is able to process
and evaluate information" and
the upgrading of the actual
equipment that collects Soviet Sig-
nals.-According to the sources, those
are a reference to the satellite that
has been replaced and to the Cray
supercomputer that millions of
readers have learned about from
Tom Clancv's 1984 novel. "The
Hunt For Red October." Even be-
fore publication of the book. thou-
sands of scholars were aware of
the computer through the large
number of unclassified publica-
tions Clancy used in his research.
The Cray. according to these
widely available publications, is
used by the Navy as well as by
NSA to integrate and process data
from disparate systems that in-
clude intercepted communications
and the "SOSUS" underwater
sensor system that is designed to
detect and track Soviet subma-
rines.
Adm. Carlisle A.H. Trost, who
was nominated by President Rea-
gan last week to be Chief of Naval
Operations, cited that integration
effort during public testimony be-
fore a Senate committee in 1982.
Trost described a new program
called the Rapidly Deployable Sur-
veillance System, which would be
part of the Integrated Undersea
Surveillance System (IUSS). IUSS.
in turn, includes the SOSUS sys-
tem and Surveillance Towed Ar-
ray System (SURTASS).
Pelton, testifying in his own de-
fense this week, added some de-
tails about Project B to the public
record. But he said it was of little
or no value to the Soviets, insist-
ing that it involved only the re-
placement of old NSA radio signal
demodulators and an enhance-
ment of the "data link" used to
transmit signals back to NSA for
analysis.
Information for $4.50
Some of the technology that is
being shielded from public view is
available to anyone who is willing
to pay $4.50 for Clancy's widely
circulated novel, which has al-
ready sold 2.5 million copies.
In the novel, which has been
read by President Reagan and oth-
er US officials who pronounced
themselves astonished at Its accu-
rate detail, Clancy brings dry and
uninteresting technology to color-
ful. suspense-filled life in the fic-
tionalized thriller about a defect-
ing Soviet nuclear-missile subma-
rine.
Thanks to that z
technology,
much of which the government
considers highly classified, the US
Navy is able to locate the way-
ward Soviet submarine and bring
it. along with its classified Soviet
secrets, to port, while the Soviet
Navy is frustrated in efforts to
find its own submarine.
Among other elements of the
undersea surveillance system,
Clancy cites the existence of the
Cray, so powerful that it can pro-
cess and analyze millions of bits of
data from oceans that have been
seeded with sophisticated sensing
devices to detect Soviet submarine
movements.
Describing the fictional top-se-
cret control center. Clancy wrote,
"In the basement were a pair of
Cray-2 supercomputers tended by
twelve acolytes, and behind the
building was a trio of satellite
ground stations, all up- and down-
links. The men at the consoles
and computers were linked elec-
tronically by satellite and landline
to the SOSUS (sonar surveillance
system) system.
"Throughout the oceans of the
world, and especially astride the
passages that Soviet submarines
had to cross to reach the open sea,
the United States and other NATO
countries had deployed gangs of
highly sensitive sonar receptors.
The hundreds of SOSUS sensors
received and forwarded an unima-
ginably vast amount of informa-
tion. and to help the system opera-
tors classify and analyze it, a
whole new family of computers
had to be designed, the [Cray] su-
percomputers."
By government definition,
However, any references to SIGINT
(signal intelligence, which in
cludes any electronic and commu-
nications intelligence) are consid
ered highly classified - even if;
they are in the public domain.;
That argument has been reem
phasized by intelligence officials,
who have warned reporters that;
republication of the material could
violate a 1950 statute barring dig-'
closure of any SIGINT material.
That same argument appears;
to be the basis for the govern-;
ment's view of the sensitivity of
the trial's so-called Project A. al
though much less of the detail sur-`
rounding that program has sur-
faced publicly. Project A has beef
described obliquely in the cou
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room as "a specific set of equip-
ment" used to intercept signals
from "a particular Soviet commit
nications link.".
Prosecution threatened
Before the trial, court docu-
ments indicated that Project A,:,
compromised by Pelton. was code-
named "Ivy Bells." According to a
May 26 NBC News report that
prompted CIA Director William J.,
Casey to demand the prosecution
of an NBC correspondent, the pro",
ject was a "top-secret underwater
eavesdropping operation by
American submarines, inside
Russian harbors.
As the trial commenced last
month, the Washington Post,;
after agreeing to a request from
President Reagan that it withhold
some details of its reporting, fur
ther identified the project as 'a:
"costly, long-running and highly,
successful US operation that used
sophisticated technology to inter
cept Soviet communications." The,
Post, like NBC, said it involved'
submarines, and that the infor-
mation Pelton sold the Soviets
compromised the project and,
prompted the Soviets to retrieve,
the high technology device.
.The descriptions by NBC and
the Post are similar in some re ,
spects to those of a forerunner'
program. code-named "Holys-_
tone." that was detailed in 1975
by the New York Times. Under the
headline, "Submarines of US
Stage Spy Missions Inside Soviet
Waters," the Times described the
program as involving the use of
Navy submarines inside the Sovi-
et Union's three-mile limit to col-
lect vital data on the capabilities
and missile-firing abilities of Sovi-
et submarines.
According to the Times, the US
subs "were able to plug into Soviet
land communication cables
strewn across the ocean bottom
and. thus were able to intercept
high-level military messages and
other communications considered
too important to be sent by radio
or other less secure means." The
Times said that the Soviet Union
was aware of the program and
that two of the US subs had even
collided with Soviet subs inside
Soviet territorial waters.
References to other underwater
intelligence programs have ap-
peared in public or declassified lit-
erature. One is "Dark Eyes," an
eiectro-optical viewing system
that fits into a submarine's peri-
scope and takes night photo-
graphs. At least two others, "Prai-
rie Schooner" and "Sea Nymph,"
involve interception of Soviet sig-
nals.
A boost from technology
Thanks to technological break-
throughs, however, such commu-
nications can now be intercepted
and relayed back to the United
States without US submarines
having to remain in the area. The
marriage of existing technology to
advances in electronics and the
growing sophistication of US sat=
ellites orbiting far above the Earth
led to development of the project
Pelton compromised.
Pelton, according to testimony,
said the Soviets were already
aware of the program's existence:
The Post, quoting sources, report-
ed this week that Soviet aware-
ness of the program was based on
another collision between a US
submarine and a Soviet sub in the
Sea of Okhotsk. Pelton, according
to Globe sources, told the Soviets
how the messages were intercept-
ed and relayed to the high technol-
ogy device, which in turn relayed
the Information to a satellite,
which transmitted it to NSA.
Also according to Globe
sources, and as the Post has al-
ready reported, the Soviet debrief-
ing of Pelton led them to retrieve
the device and compromise the
program.
Like Holystone, its predecessor
program, the project compromised
by Pelton required US submarines
to enter Soviet waters. In the later
program, the subs did not have to
stay.
According to declassified por-
tions of the Navy's "Special War-
fare Master Plan," the Navy has
reconfigured some nuclear-
powered submarines for such spe-
cial operations. These subs, called
APSSNs, are outfitted with one- or
two-man minisubs known as
Swimmer Delivery. Vehicles.
During his testimony, Pelton
acknowledged that he had ad-
mitted to FBI agents last year that
his disclosures might have placed
in jeopardy "a few men who need-
ed to go to and from" the project.
CIA Director Casey has said
that Pelton's disclosures destroyed
a major source of national securi-
ty information.
Tapping directly into Soviet
3 ,
communications systems is not a
new technique. According to "Wil-
derness of Mirrors," by David C.
Martin, a US program from 1951
to 1956, code-named "Operation
Silver." intercepted encoded Sovi-
et messages to and from a com-
mand post in East Berlin by ta
-
p
ping into a cable. The operation
began after a US intelligence ana-
lyst found that coded signals sent
through a US cable Included faint
echoes of the message as it ap-
peared before being scrambled
into code.
It is the much more sophisti-
cated technology of the 1980s that
has enabled NSA, with its 50,000
employees, to become the world's
preeminent intelligence organiza-
tion. Although most Americans
have never heard of NSA, it has
long since eclipsed the CIA, and
the fabled-in-fiction use of under-
cover agents, as the source of the
country's most useful and timely
intelligence.
(Stephen A. KurkiIan of The
Globe staff contributed to this re-
port.)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/08: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605510002-6