THE DAMAGE THAT ESPIONAGE CAN DO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605710001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 2, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605710001-5
ON PAGE ) ;0
CORD MEYER
THE-
6~y Q o 4w
q I%w &
Presenting a potential threat to the
invulnerability of U.S. ballistic missile
submarines, the Walker spy case has
jolted both the Congress and the pub-
lic into a new awareness of the damage spies
can do. It is no longer fashionable to joke
about espionage as if it were a nasty game i-r
a fit subject for bad movies.
As the full investigative resources of the
U.S. intelligence community are brought to
bear to discover the extent to which American
codes, communi-
cations, and
e end nsive tactics
may have been
compromised and
must be changed,
an extraor hnar
article has
appeared in a
recent issue of the
English magazine
Encounter. It
t rowl-i s new light
on the history of
V espionage in
or War If an
draws lessons
direct y re evant
to the American
effort to cauterize any wounds caused by the
walker,
soy case-
The triumphs of British and Americans in
breaking the German and .Japanese codes in
World War If have been widely trumpeted.
But little had been published about the intel-
ligence coups pulled off by Nazi Germany
until a retired and well-respected senior Brit-
ish intelligence official. James Ruti ri ger,
did the original research among old war
records that resulted in his article "The 1-
'ink-ing of the Automedon."
As a little-known example of German pen-
etration of American codes that occurred
even before the United States entered World
War Ii, Mr. Rusbridger cites the case of an
Italian employee at the U.S. Embassy in Rome
who in August 1941 picked the lock of the
WASHINGTON TIMES
2 August 1985
American mili-
tary attache's safe
and photographed
his cipher for the
Germans. As a
result, the Nazi
high command for
18 months was
able to read all
U.S. military atta-
che cables around
the world.
Since Winston
Churchill had
instructed his
commanders in
Cairo to keep the
American mili-
tary attache fully
informed on Brit-
ish plans and
intentions, the
most damaging
effect of this German penetration was to give
(:en. Rommel advance knowledge of British
moves as described in the American attache's
cables from Cairo to Washington. 'there is no
way of counting how many more British sol-
diers had to die in desert fighting because of
this one brief chink in the security armor of
the United States.
Far more disastrous for both British and
American interests were the consequences
that flowed from a British decision to send a
top-secret copy of their War Cabinet minutes
for Aug. 8, 1940, to their commander in Singa-
pore via a vulnerable, slow merchant ship, the
Automedon, instead of by flying boat or by
armed destroyer.
When a German raider seized, searched,
an sank the Automedon on Nov. 11, 1940,
German intelligence obtained the 87 detailed
paragraphs of the War Cabinet min-
utes, which spelled out how com-
pletely unprepared the British were
to offer any real resistance if the
Japanese attacked Indochina
Malaya, Singapore, or the Dutch
East Indies.
At Hitler's specific request, this
devastating admission of allied
weakness in the Pacific was passed
totheJapaneseon Dec. 12, 1940.,~Ja
anese Adm. Kondo was later to t1T
the Germans that this intelligence
was critical to the success ul plan-
nin of the attacks on Pearl Flarbor,
the Philiooinev and Singapore in
December 1941. The original dam-
age cause y t is grievous loss was
compounded by an attempt
afterward to cover it up and not to admit it to
either the British commander in Singapore or
to the Americans.
Another disastrous chain of events was set
in motion May 10, 1942, by the capture of the
Australian steamer Nankin by another Ger-
man raider. In a search, the Germans found
on board among the general mail four top-
secret summaries for the period March 21 to
April 20, 1942, of the Combined Operations
Intelligence Center at Wellington, New Zea-
land.
Negligently loaded on the Nankin, these
most sensitive estimates of current and
future Japanese naval movements clearly
revealed to both Germans and Japanese that
the United States had broken the Japanese
naval code. The Japanese immediately
changed their codes, on Aug. 29,
1942, and a series of serious
American naval losses followed
before the United States recovered
the capacity to read the new codes
some months later.
If there is one lesson that emerges
from these events and from the
refusal of the Germans to admit to
themselves that their own top-secret
Enigma code had been broken by the
British, it is the necessity after an
intelligence loss for the most ruth-
less damage assessment that does
not shrink from the worst conse-
quences -- even if it means costly
and time-consuming reconstruction
and replacement.
In the first few days after the
Walker case broke, reassuring com-
ment that the damage was limited
came from some American officials
and sounded like whistling in the
J.mes Rusbridger:s cautionary tales from
World War II should teach all concerned that
prompt, cold-eyed admission to onesel and to
ones allies of the full extent of an intelligence
loss is the only way to contain the damage.
Cord Meyer is a nationally syndicated col-
umnist.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605710001-5