THE NEW BREED OF ANTI-U.S. SPY IN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605740041-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: June 15, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

~,~ , -, Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000605740041-8
WASHINGTON POST
15 June 1986
The New Breed of Anti-U.S. Spy in Europe
~'By W_iliiar~`Shawcross~
M AGNUS PYM, the double agent of John Le
Carre's new novel, "A Perfect Spy," declares at
one point: "We betray to be loyal. Betrayal is
like imagining, ~lren the reality isn't good enough."
Pym is the spy who came of age in the 1940s. Now,
for many West European liberals, "reality" is an un-
wanted bond with the United States. They could argue,
like Magnus Pym, that to be loyal to their own coun-
tries, and to a greater good, they need to undermine
that Bond, betray it if necessary. If so, such traitors may
be men of some apparent distincton-like Arne Tre-
holt, who is now serving the maximum 20 years in Nor-
way in return for his work for the KGB.
The Treholt story is an alarming tale of vanity, self-
delusion and greed-alarming because it seems likely
that he could be the new sort of perfect spy.
Treholt was the golden young man of the Norwegian
Labor Party, and an accomplished, ambitious official of
the Norwegian Foreign Office. In 1983 he was made
chief of the Foreign Office's press department, a
charming man of 41, every journalist's friend and best
contact. Blond, good-looking, energetic (a marathon
man), in a glamorous second marriage to a television
star, fun, relaxed-and narcissistic.
In January 1984 he was in charge of press arrange-
ments for Secretary of State George Shultz's visit to Nor-
way for the European Security Conference. His arrest a
few days later aroused absolute incredulity among those
who knew him. Arne Treholt a spy? Out of the question!
Norway was thrown into utter consternation.
And not only Norway. Treholt had been a diligent
campaigner against the junta of the Greek colonels and
was thus closely connected with Andreas Papandreou
-and his socialist government in Greece.
"Say it's a lie, say anyone, but not Arne Treholt. We
all loved that man, not only for what he did for Greece,
but also as a personal friend," wailed Melina Mercouri.
Alas, it was not a lie. He had spied for 15 years.
This did not diminish his celebrity. In prison he be-
came amillionaire by writing and smuggling out a book
complaining of the "Gestapo methods" and the "Kaf-
kaesque process" to which he was subjected. In fact, he
was treated with the utmost kindness. He had athree-
room suite: an office, a bedroom and an exercise room.
His wife-was allowed to visit him, until she dumped him.
She has written her own account, which made.her very
rich, too. It is rather galling for the Norwegians.
Treholt was born in a farming community. His father
was Labor Minister of Agriculture. Arne got on, well
with him, but not with his mother, and left their country
home to live in student digs in Oslo when he was 15.
After school he did Norway's compulsory military ser-
vice, read political science at university and entered
politics by becoming leader of the student section of the
Norwegian Labor Party. He also worked as a journalist.
Then came the Vietnam war, which made anti-
Americanism the political creed for thousands upon
thousands of young Europeans. Treholt was involved in
the antiwar movement in Norway, not as a dedicated
sonality who always seemed to be greeting and standing
beside the principal speakers. But he never seemed to
have any well-formed political" views. One of his best
friends said of him later that he had no ideology-be-
yond anti-Americanism.
is most passionate cause was against the mili-
taryjunta that seized Greece in 1967. He helped
organize opposition in Norway and traveled
around Europe seeing all the Greek exiles, from King
Constantine to Andreas Papandreou to the Moscow
Greek Communists. He had no doubts the real problem
was that the colonels enjoyed the support of the Nixon
administration.
In the lard '60s, the Scandinavian governments took
the junta before the European Court of Human Rights.
Treholt was the assistant to the lawyer arguing the
Norwegian case. He claimed to have been followed and
threatened by Greek secret policemen who were acting
with the blessing of Washington. It was at this stage of
his life, in his late 20s, that the KGB beckoned to him.
"Like most of the other young politicians, I was at-
tended to by Russian diplomats," Treholt
wrote in a letter from prison. "We had glo-
rious lunches where we discussed Norwe-
gian and international politics."
The Soviet Embassy in Oslo courted
young idealists, treating them to caviar,
vodka and Georgian champagne-in a coun-
try with the highest liquor prices in Europe.
Treholt later claimed his first. Soviet con-
tact, Yevgeny Belyayev, was "a little pest
whom I kept at arm's length." But they met
frequently for discussions on world affairs.
. The KGB is a patient and subtle organisa-
tion. One of its techniques is to .lure people
into giving away information without having
to admit it to themselves. Thus Treholt's
vanity was constantly polished; he was told
that he was really "building bridges" be-
tween East and West, and thus helping to
further and protect Norway's position, rath-
er than compromising it.
t was three years before money entered
the relationship, when Belyayev gave
Treholt far too much money to buy and
mail some books. Treholt said he was so
upset by the incident that he considered tell-
ing the police. But he did not even tell his
wife. The court would find that Belyayev's
actions fitted "the typical pattern for the
recruitment of new intelligence agents" and
that "one decisive feature of the develop-
ment was to get him to accept money."
By the time the Russian left Oslo in sum-
mer, 1971, Treholt was almost hooked.
They had a farewell lunch at the Coq d'Or
restaurant, and Belyayev brought along a
friend. This was an altogether more attrac-
tive character named Gennady Fedorovitch
Titov. Later, Treholt said that Titov was '`a
backroom soul or a voice on the streets but as a per- ~w
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000605740041-8
 _, Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000605740041-8
very fascinating and exciting type" who was
extremely well informed and intelligent; an
amusing, challenging person to be with, full
of jokes about the Soviet leaders, the very
antithesis of the system he made fun of rep-
resenting, aGorbachev before his time-
and abrilliant agent.
Treholt agreed to meet him again, and
again. Titov told Treholt never to waste his
name in his diary or address book, and nev-
er to call him at the embassy.
Treholt was now a consultant at the Nor-
wegian Foreign Policy Institute. This made
his lunches with Titov all the more enjoy-
able; he had authority when they discussed
Vietnam, Greece, journalism, NATO, peace
and friendship. Titov told Treholt that he
had very perceptive and original ideas.
By this time, Vietnam had radicalized the
Nordic socialist parties. In the Norwegian
Labor Party, the generation that had known
Nazi occupation was fading and a growing
segment on the left consisted of isolation-
ists, even neutralists. This was where Tre-
holt belonged. In 1972, he helped organize
tfie successful campaign mounted by the
left against membership in the European
Economic Commmunity.
reholt became an undersecretary in
charge of law-of-the-sea negotiations.
It is said that he gave away American
techniques for tracking Soviet submarines
and he was very helpful to the Russians dur-
ing negotiations over the Barents Sea that
began in 1977. When he returned from the
talks in Moscow he showed 1'itov his notes
on the negotiations, as well as classified
Norwegian papers. He would later explain
this by saying that "Titov explained to me
that the embassy got its reports so (ate and
that they were so incomplete that they did
not give any good background into what was
happening."
The final agreement fora temporary
"grey area" in the Barents Sea, which both
sides could fish, was thought by many Nor-
wegians to unduly favor the Soviet Union.
Treholt's spying, which he later called
"unorthodox diplomacy," might never have
been discovered but for the arrest in Jan-
uary 1977 of a more tragic spy.
This was Galtung Haavik, an elderly sec-
retary at the Foreign Ministry, who had
fallen in love with a Russian prisoner of war
whom she nursed when Norway was occu-
pied by the Nazis. In 1946 she joined the
Foreign Ministry, was posted to Moscow,
and resumed the affair, although the man
was now married-and suffered the pre-
dictable, banal, but terrifying, conse-
quences. Over the next 25 years she had at
least 259 clandestine meetings with eight
different controllers, including Gennady
Titov. She was finally arrested as she
passed documents to a Soviet diplomat in a
dark side-street of Oslo. She co-~fessed, and
died in prison six months later.
Titov was identified as a KGB general
and expelled from Norway. Treholt's meet-
ings with Titov came to light. For the first
time, he was under suspicion.
By now- the Greek junta had fallen. Tre-
holt was a frequent visitor to his socialist
friends, including Papandreou and Mer-
couri. At the end of 1978 Treholt was ap-
pointed to the Norwegian mission at the
United Nations. Just before he left, another
of the smooth men from the Soviet embassy
arrived saying he brought greetings from
"Henry," who would love to see him in Hel-
sinki. Treholt went, and he acid Titov met
again, two years after the wretched Haavik
had been arrested.
"Henry' wanted to reactivate Arne and
he had a new friend for him-the man who
was to be his contact in New York. He told
Treholt that they should meet in restau-
rants far from the United Nations or leave
notes in newspapers in the delegates'
lounge. Treholt did not object. Later he said
that he was only trying to improve Norwe-
gian-Soviet relations. The court decided
that this implied. "such an exaQQerated _.
sense of his own position and influence as to
be scarcely credible." But he may well have
been conceited enough to believe it.
Norway was a member of the Security
Council for part of the time that Treholt
was in New York. He provided the Russians
with Norwegian and NATO positions, often
before important ministerial meetings. He
was apparently very helpful on Afghanistan
before talks between former Secretary of
State Alexander Haig and Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko. Titov told him
Gromyko was very pleased with his work.
Treholt had three meetings with Titov in
Vienna or Helsinki (where Soviets can travel
without visas) while he was assigned to New
York. KGB generals do not hold such meet-
ings in third countries unless they consider
the agent very important. The court decided
the purpose of the meetings was for Titov to
point Treholt toward his next targets.
By this time, Treholt was in his late 30s
and very visible in Norway. He was talked of
as a future foreign minister-maybe, some
said, even prime minister. He was irritated
by the greasy-spoon cafes his Soviet contact
chose in New York. He insisted on more up-
scale places-which were also more visible.
When he met Titov, either in Helsinki or
Vienna, he took no precautions; nonchalantly
he would take a taxi straight from the airport
to the rendezvous. He must have driven his
controllers insane. And with reason. He was
being tailed by the FBI in New York. -
y 1982, Treholt's wife wanted to re-
sume her television career full-time
and so he asked to be posted back to
Oslo. He applied to study at the Defense
College, where he would be handling infor-
mation on nuclear planning classified by
NATO as "cosmic top secret." When Tre-
holt's application was- received, Norway's
security system and several cabinet minis-
. ters were thrown into panic.
eL
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000605740041-8
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000605740041-8
",
It was clear to them by,now that he was.a
Soviet agent. But he was a respected public
figure; the security police were already un-
der attack on the left as a threat to civil
liberties, and the evidence had to be com-
plete. If they denied him a security clear-
ance, he might just lie dormant for years,
and surface as Norway's foreign minister.
They decided to let him into the college.
He took copious notes. It is a NATO tru-
ism that "the battle of the Atlantic must be
fought in the Norwegian Sea," and that the
Soviets would try to seize Norway and oper-
ate their submarines out of Norwegian fjords.
A few days after the course ended in Ap-
nil 1983, Treholt flew to Helsinki to see
Titov again. The court would find that the
material he gave Titov did immense harm
to Norway's security.
He was still in close touch with his Greek
friends. Papandreou was now prime minis-
ter and Greece was becoming the most in-
transigent member of both NATO and the
EEC. In 1983, Treholt was frequently in
Athens and engaged in spoiling actions,
most notoriously refusing to allow the EEC
as a body to condemn the shooting down of
Korean Air Lines flight 007 by the Soviets.
By now, Norwegian security police were
with him everywhere. In Vienna, they pho-
tographed him and Titov with a camera hid-
den in a baby carriage. In the picture, Titov,
a broad, short man, is gesticulating widely;
Treholt walks beside him, grinning
boyishly, as if immensely proud to be in this
great man's company.
At about this time, Oleg Gordievsky, the
former KGB resident. in London, who was
now a British double agent, informed Lon-
don that the KGB had a very important spy
in the Norwegian. Foreign Ministry. On Jan.
20, 1984, just after he had helped host the
visit of George Shultz, Treholt checked in
at Oslo airport for a flight to Vienna. As he
walked towards the departure gates Inspec-
tor Oernulf Tofte of the Security Pblice put
a hand on his shoulder.
At first Treholt said he was going to
meet a girl friend in Vienna. In his briefcase
tllere were 66 foreign ministry dowments,
He claimed he was simply using the case as
a travelling safe over the weekend. After
more feints and denials, he was shown a
picture of Titov. He said he had known him
long ago; but had not seen him since 1976.
He was -then shown the Vienna picture.
He began to vomit:
After a visit to the lavatory, he had a pro-
posal: "Let's team up and get those swine."
The police said that might have bees a good
idea 10 years ago. Treholt began to weep.
He confessed. Later, he would Bray that
his confession was false because he was a
victim of the famous "Stockholm syn-
drome," the sympathy that hostages devel-
op with their captors. He would say he had
done nothing to endanger national seecurity
and was only building bridges. But v~hen he
admitted having received $50,000 from the
Iraqis in return for documents, this defense
looked even thinner than at first. Taking
money from Saddam Hussein was some-
thing that even Treholt could not describe
as "bridge-building." The court reckoned he
had been paid reasonably by the Russians as
well, netting some $120,000 altogether for
his espionage. But Treholt and his latwyers
insist that this is a great exaggeratior~
When the case finally came to court, he
would appear immaculately dressed, as the
foreign minister he might have been, with
his bridge-building theses all prepared, but
he fell apart under specific questioning. The
court dismissed his defense as fantastic,
saying that the idea of the secret statesman
"contains such an outlandishly exaggerated
perception of one's own position and influ-
ence. that the court must dismiss the mo-
fives the accused has given."
n "The Meaning of Treason," Ret~ecca
West warned that such motives are so
often straightforward lies, designed to
make the spy seem idealistic to othters=
and probably to himself.
In the end there usually is no single mo-
five. As with Magnus Pym, Treholt's
treachery was bound up in fantastic ego-
tism, money, and the politics of the time,
particularly anti-Americanism. He was pre-
pared to betray not because, like an older
generation, he was disgusted with his own
society, but because of distaste for his coun-
try's principal ally, the United States.
.Such distaste is becoming more wide-
spread in Europe today. One Norwegian of-
ficial commented after Treholt's arrest, "If
Treholt, who enjoyed the best of Norwegian
life, could do it, how many more .like him
are there who grew up in his generation.
not only in Norway but in all of Europe?"
Quite a few, I should guess.
?1986 by 7'he Spectator, London
Sam Perry did additional research for tilsis
article.
William. Shawcross' latest book is "The Quality of
Mercy." ?his article is adapted from The Spectator.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/03 :CIA-RDP90-009658000605740041-8