THE SECRET AGENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605750014-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: November 17, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000605750014-7
ON PAGE .-Yj: 17 November 1986
S ESSAY J Willam_Safire
The Secret Agent
WASHINGTON
W ho is this fellow that Ronald
Reagan trusts more than his
Cabinet secretaries? His-
tory will want to know what sort of
man was able to persuade his Presi-
dent to turn away from a lifetime of
straight dealing.
Marine Lieut. Col. Robert McFar-
lane was an assistant to Senator John
Tower at Armed Services in the Carter
years, and came to the attention of
Reagan men with a report castigating
the Carter Administration for its mili-
tary ineptitude in trying to free hos-
tages at "Desert One" in Iran.
He deserved a political payoff for
that helpful judgment, but Richard
Allen did not want him on the Na-
tional Security Council staff. Al Haig
welcomed him at State, however,
where the tight-lipped McFarlane
soon cultivated William Clark, Presi-
dent Reagan's Haig-watcher at State,
and through him, Michael Deaver.
When Mr. Allen came under fire at
the N.S.C., Mr. Deaver urged the Presi-
dent to dump him and bring in Mr.
Clark and Mr. McFarlane; when the
hapless Judge Clark wore out, Mr.
Deaver - increasingly interested in
foreign affairs appointments - helped
slot his friend "Bud" into the sensitive
spot at the N.S.C.
The McFarlane sojourn at the
White House was disappointing. He
was an apparatchik with a geopoliti-
cal vocabulary, pontificating at
Roosevelt Room briefings of pundits
who rolled their eyes at his preten-
sions. When all the power flowed to
George Shultz at State, the frustrated
Mr. McFarlane quit.
On his departure, I characterized
him - along with his successor, a
naval officer named Poindexter who
shined at note-taking - as "Option
Three" men, who tended to split the
differences between State and De-
fense and C.I.A. in advising the Presi-
dent. They were more brokers than
players, I thought at the time, and
had not the Weltanschauung of a Kis-
singer or Brzezinski.
That stung. Colonel McFarlane
may appear to be a cool and level-
headed man, and he works hard at
that appearance on television by
never taking issue, praising question-
ers for good questions, and calling all
interviewers by their first names. Un-
derneath, this buttoned-up fellow
seethes with envy at the respect
given Dr. Kissinger, and tastes the
bile of thwarted ambition.
In Colonel McFarlane's mind, N.S.C.
predecessors suffered from Spengle-
rian pessimism or lacked strategic
reach. It was the belittled "Bud" - de-
spite the reluctance of touted Pentagon
strategists - who saw how high-tech-
nology leverage could _ "stress" the
Soviet economy and force the Russians
to retrench, and who sold Mr. Reagan
on "Star Wars."
He did grant Henry the brilliance of
the secret China opening. And that
was how the rejected McFarlane saw
he could gain the credit given concep-
tualizers'. what he needed to break
out of the apparatchik mold was a se-
cret mission to the forbidden city of
the 80's, Teheran.
When the feeler for hostage ransom
came from Hojatolislam Rafsanjani,
who saw a way to match his country's
immediate need for arms with its peri-
odic need to humiliate U.S. Presidents,
Colonel McFarlane was ready. He
twanged Mr. Reagan's hostage heart-
strings and, always low key, persuaded
him to make the worst mistake of his
Presidency: to authorize a down pay-
ment of 250,000 pounds of arms to es-
Buttoned up -
but
seething
tablish the McFarlane bona fides in
dickering for hostage releases.
When the Iranians, arms in hand,
made the ransom public, the public re-
vulsion began to set in. It turns out the
President had underestimated the
downside risk in giving Iran the chance
to show him up as liar, softy and dupe.
The rest of the story will unravel
along with the Reagan prestige. The
Saudis must have been mightily im-
pressed by Iran's ability this summer
to swing the U.S. around, and suddenly
dumped Sheik Yamani and changed
their oil price policy to appease the
winners. OPEC price hikes would not
only benefit Iran, but help most the
Soviet Union (largest oil seller) and
drive up U.S. prices. The damage done
by Colonel McFarlane's lust for strate-
gic stardom is not limited to the loss of
respect for America's word.
Nor should investigators forget
that Saudi Arabia is still Michael
Deaver's largest and most loyal
client. Colonel McFarlane told me
last spring he could not remember
1985 conversations held with the new
lobbyist and foreign agent; his mem-
ory may have improved under oath.
Perhaps a grand jury providing
lifetime employment for a special
prosecutor can discover the details of
a back channel between the U.S., the
Saudis and Iran that the tarnished
Mr. Reagan wants so desperately to
hide. The tightly controlled colonel
has much more to tell.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000605750014-7