U.S. SEEKING TO LIMIT ACCESS OF SOVIETS TO COMPUTER DATA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000705920001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 27, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000705920001-1
r 3. "TFAP EAI -,
-, - WASHINGTON POST
+~ r.twt 27 May 1986
U.S. Seeking to Limit Access
Of Soviets to Computer Data
By Michael Schrage
Washington Post Staff Writer
The Penta on, concerned about
the ow o tgh tec noloQV tort to
Soviet bloc is truing to limit foreign
access to -government and commer-
cial computer data bases that con-
tain sensitive technical information.
A range of legal and technological
options are now under exploration,
from licensing access to high-tech
data bases to planting special com-
puter programs within the data
bases to monitor who is seeking
what information.
Government officials concede,
however, that they face formidable
obstacles in devising a workable
system, including such questions as
whether data bases enjoy the same
constitutional protections as other
media and how to implement re-
strictions in ways that won't deny
data-base benefits to American us-
ers.
"It's a suoercomplex Problem but
it'
,,s being worked very intently."
said Donald C. Latham assistant
secretary a of for comm~~t-
cations. command, control a nd In-
telh ence.
The effort stems from a growing
perception in the defense commu-
nity that the export of high-technol-
ogy data should be as strictly con-
trolled as the export of high-tech-
nology goods.
"Cocom [the Coordinating Com-
mittee on Multilateral Export Con-
trols, the multinational organization
that determines what technologies
are subject to export controls] is
only beginning to talk about control-
ling soft information as opposed to
hardware," said Stephen D. Bryen,
deputy undersecretary of defense
for trade security policy.
But Bryen acknowledged that
proliferation of global computer
networks and legal constraints
could make enforcement of restric-
tions on international data flows
very difficult.
Soviet scientists have publicly
confirmed that they regularly gain
access to U.S. computer data bases
through overseas telephone hook-
ups to keep up to date with ad-
vances in key technologies plus use-
ful software that often resides in
such systems.
At a conference held recently in
Rome, the head of the Soviet
Union's National Center for Auto-
mated Data Exchange indicated
that Soviet researchers used data
networks in Canada, Europe and
elsewhere to gain access to com-
mercial and government data bases in the United
States.
These data-base systems, employing sophis-
ticated computer software, enable users to re-
trieve in seconds reams of important technical
data that would otherwise take months of pains-
taking library research. Data-base retrieval has
become an indispensable tool of the international
research community.
These systems, ranging from data bases
housed in the national laboratories to commer-
cial offerings from companies such as Dialog Inc.
and Mead Data Central's Nexis, provide data
from such fields as biotechnology, electrical en-
gineering, materials science and high energy
particle physics, as well as access to useful com-
puter software.
An Air Force study on the issue, scheduled for
release next month, is expected to identify for-
eign data-base access as a significant defense
concern.
At this time, such Soviet bloc data-base re-
trieval violates no laws, which has prompted the
national security community to consider coun-
termeasures.
One approach is to create a new classification
of technical data to put it beyond the reach of
ordinary data-base access. The National Tele-
communications Information Systems Security
Committee (NTISSIC), an interagency group
chaired by Latham, is expected to recommend
the creation of a category of data-called "sen-
sitive"-for federal agencies to implement.
These data, defined as potentially related to na-
tional security, would require a special password
or other method for data-base access.
"The practical option is to consider classifica-
tion of the data base," said the Defense Depart-
ment's Bryen..
Another approach is to regulate the export of
technical data in much the same way that tech-
nical products are regulated. Part 379 of the Ex-
port Administration Act could allow the govern-
ment to license the export' of certain kinds of
technical information, like computer software.
"The idea is to sharpen that up," said Bryen,
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and possibly require foreigners to have a license
to use U.S. data bases.
Such actions would raise important legal ques-
tions.
While data bases may contain information in
the public domain, the ability to use software to
search through and organize that data in certain
ways "could create information that could rise to
the stature of proprietary or 'controlled' infor-
mation," said Donald Weadon, a Washington at-
torney specializing in export control law.
"These technical improvements are creating a
tension between what has been U.S. policy pro-
moting the free flow of scientific information and
the need for sensible controls on the export and
dissemination of proprietary technology infor-
mation with national security implications," he
said.
"I'm not aware of this initiative," said Roger
Summit, president of Dialog Inc., a major com-
mercial data-base supplier with more than 250
data bases and 80,000 customers, many from
overseas. "I don't know under what authority it
would be implemented."
"Our clients are confidential, and that is an
important policy," said Gerald Yung, general
counsel to Mead Data Central, the company that
runs the Nexis data base. "We would be sensitive
to national security requests; there may be con-
cerns on national security questions-but we
know of no such inquiries or concerns on that
. at this point."
"We recognize that there are legitimate na-
tional security concerns," Kenneth B. Allen, vice
president, government relations, for the Infor-
mation Industries Association, a trade organiza-
tion representing leading commercial data-base
suppliers. "But we think it is dangerous for the
government to censor or restrict the flow of in-
formation. The association is just now starting to
grapple with that issue. We're just looking at the
opening salvos here."
The Reagan administration has already taken
steps to deny foreign nationals access to high-
technology data. The Pentagon recently ruled
that Soviet scientists should not be allowed to
use supercomputers in this country.
"The presumption is that [access to a] super-
computer is the same as if you exported the su-
percomputer," said Bryen. "Any computer that
can't be exported, they shouldn't have access
to."
Consequently, Bryen argues, foreign access to
data bases stored on powerful computers is tan-
tamount to exporting the power of that computer
without an export license.
"What you have to do is make access to data
bases a licensable action," he said. But there are
legal questions to be resolved before that is pos-
sible.
For example, "access to information may not
necessarily be licensable at all" under current
law, Bryen said, even though it is an option that
should be considered.
Another approach is to use technology to mon-
itor data-base access by putting in a computer
program that tracks who is seeking access to
particular information. For example, a research-
er doing a data-base search using such keywords
as "defense electronics" and "phased-array ra-
dar" might trigger software designed to monitor
such inquiries.
"I'm very concerned about what people are
doing-and not just the Soviets," said Latham,
the assistant defense secretary. "If that means
putting a monitor on Nexis-type systems, then
I'm for it. The question is, how do you do that
technically without unnecessary interference?"
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000705920001-1