CAN HE RECOVER?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000705980002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 9, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Can He Recover?
After the Tower report 's indictment. Reagan calls in an old hand
The big question raised by
the Tower commission can-
not be found anywhere in its
report-not in the damning
findings. not in the eight ap-
pendixes. not in the convolut-
ed diagrams. not in the
numbingly detailed chronology of mis-
deeds and folly. At least not in so many
words. But it shadows and haunts almost
every line on the 288 blue-bound pages:
Can Reagan recover?
Not just from the backlash of a mis-
conceived and bungled policy of trading
arms for hostages. though that backlash
could damage all U.S. foreign relations.
Not just from suspicions of illegality in
aiding the Nicaraguan contras, though
those suspicions threaten to undermine
one of the President's most cherished
goals. Not even just from further revela-
tions of incompetence. cover-up or worse
that may come out of probes by congres-
sional committees and Special Prosecutor
Lawrence Walsh building on the Tower
findings. painful and protracted as that
process will be.
Rather. the real question for Ronald
Reagan and his new chief of staff Howard
Baker, the veteran conciliator he sum-
moned to help salvage his foundering Ad-
ministration. is whether they can some-
how redraw the sorry picture of the lack
of presidential leadership that emerges
from the report. It is a portrait all the
more devastating for having been
sketched with tight-lipped reluctance by
three elder statesmen struggling to be
both objective and polite. Reagan stands
exposed as a President willfully ignorant
of what his aides were doing. myopically
unaware of the glaring contradictions be-
tween his public and secret policies. com-
placently dependent on advisers who nev-
er once, from start to finish. presented
him with any systematic analysis of aims.
means. risks and alternatives. And. in the
end. as a President unable to recall when.
how or even whether he had reached the
key decision that started the whole arms-
to-Iran affair. Reagan's final word on
whether he had given advance approval
for Israeli sales of U.S.-made weapons in
1985, delivered in a letter to the commis-
sion after he had first told it that he had
and then that he had not: "I'm afraid that
I let myself be influenced by others' recol-
lections. not my own ... the simple truth
is. 'I don't remember-period.' "
What is perhaps most distressing about
this portrait is its familiarity. The picture of
an inattentive, out-of-touch President may
have been limned before. but never so au-
thoritatively. The President who told the
Tower commission, formally known as the
President's Special Review Board, that he
"had not been advised at any time ... how
the plan would be implemented" is the
same Reagan who has consistently fum-
bled names and numbers in press confer-
ences and campaign speeches over the
years. The President who did not under-
stand that arms-for-hostages swaps. in the
commission's words. "ran directly counter
to the Administration's own policies on ter-
rorism" is the'same Reagan who has never
admitted, probably even to himself, that
his tax and spending programs were bound
to result in gargantuan budget deficits. The
President who apparently did not even try
to control the activities of Oliver North,
John Poindexter and the rest of the hos-
tage-trading crew (for example. he com-
plained to the Tower commission that no
one ever told him North was providing in-
telligence data as well as arms to Iran) is
the same Reagan who has let divisive dis-
putes between the Pentagon and State De-
partment paralyze arms-control policy for
six years. The defects of what the commis-
sioners euphemistically called Reagan's
"management style." and what some for-
mer associates more bluntly term mental
laziness, were largely offset during his suc-
cessful first term by the advice of an excep-
tionally talented group of aides. But since
re-election the President has been sur-
rounded by advisers whose own deficien-
cies, as the commission makes clear, disas-
trously dovetail with those of their boss.
So. can Reagan recover'? Can he es-
tablish control over a fractured
and demoralized Administration,
set an agenda that would give the
nation and world a renewed sense of lead-
ership and prevent the last 23 months of
his term from becoming a limping and
possibly dangerous procession into the
twilight? Perhaps. But it will involve con-
veying to the American people that he
now, finally, understands what went
wrong and what mistakes he made. and
providing convincing assurances that
they won't happen again. The real neces-
sity is that Reagan become again the ac-
tive, engaged President he was at times.
though only at times, during the first
term. That will require that he change the
habits of a lifetime-no easy task for a
man just turned 76-and surround him-
self once more with aides who will chal-
lenge him, rather than merely people he
feels comfortable with. And even if he
does. Washington teems with skeptics
who think it may be too late. Says Newt
Gingrich. a conservative Republican
Congressman from Georgia: "He will
never again be the Reagan that he was be-
fore he blew it. He is not going to regain
our trust and our faith easily."
The appointment of Howard Baker
could turn out to be an important first
step. To be sure, Reagan took it well past
the eleventh hour. He had been under
pressure from old friends. Republican al-
lies and his wife to fire Donald Regan as
chief of staff ever since the Iran-contra af-
fair broke. Still. Reagan clung to his abra-
sive, autocratic chief of staff until after the
Tower report came out. By comparison
with the unsparing criticism directed at
almost everyone else. Regan actually got
off rather lightly: the commission found
no evidence that he had played any signif-
icant part in planning or carrying out the
Iran initiative or covering it up afterward.
But Regan was blamed for failing to make
sure that an "orderly process" was fol-
lowed in formulating that policy. and in
particular for the "chaos that descended
upon the White House" once the arms
sales became public. Even then, he was
virtually chased from office by the mo-
mentum of events: he quit only minutes
before Baker's appointment.
The way in which Regan's successor
was selected gives scant reason to believe
that the President is about to change his
ways. He made little effort to weigh Bak-
er's strengths and weaknesses: once again
he accepted passively the recommenda-
tion of some close advisers. But the choice
itself was perhaps the best that could have
been made. Reagan's close friend Paul
Laxalt explained why he had strongly
recommended Baker. The chief of staff,
he said. should be "someone with credibil-
ity on Capitol Hill. credibility with the
press. credibility with party people. More
important. he should be a believer in the
Reagan program and able to carry it out.
I'm talking about a Washington political
heavvweight." Most of that fits Baker. a
patient coalition builder who acquired
enough political heft during his 18 years
in the Senate to have had a long-shot
chance at the presidency. He was. in fact.
briefly a rival of Reagan's for the 1980
nomination. and was preparing a run for
the 1988 prize when he agreed to fold his
campaign and serve the man he had
hoped to succeed. Some noted cheekily
that, given Reagan's "management
style." this was Baker's chance to be act-
ing President for 23 months.)
As Senate majority leader during
Reagan's first term. the diminutive Ten-
nessean pushed Reagan's tax and spend-
ing cuts through the upper chamber with
tact and skill. earning the respect even of
the President's opponents. Though he is
too moderate and conciliatory to please
Reagan's hard-right fans for long, the
choice of Baker drew wide initial praise.
Democratic Senator James Sasser. Ba_k-
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er's onetime colleague from Tennessee,
praised the new chief of staffs "pragma-
tism and reasonableness" and called the
selection of Baker a "stroke of genius."
Baker has some drawbacks. though.
He is not a particularly good manager and
will need strong assistants to run the White
House staff. Whether he can find them is
questionable: he quit the 1980 campaign
early partly because he could not put to-
gether a powerful team. On the other hand.
he is well qualified to advise Reagan on
how to cope with congressional investiga-
tions into a White House scandal. As a
member of the Senate Watergate commit-
tee in 1973. Baker coined the question
about Richard Nixon that came to domi-
nate that probe: "What did the President
know and when did he know it?"
How much further is this President
prepared to go in shouldering
blame and cleaning house' A vi-
tal clue will come in the televised
speech to the nation that he is preparing
to deliver at midweek. It shapes up as
probably the most important speech of his
presidency. At week's end. though. it was
still undecided what Reagan would say.
Virtually every one of the President's cur-
rent advisers is arguing that Reagan
should forthrightly accept the blame for
Iranscam that the Tower commission
pinned squarely on him, confess blunders
on his own part as well as by his staff. and
follow up quickly by submitting to the
battering of the press at a news confer-
ence. Says one aide: "First. he has to goon
television and admit that he blew it. that if
he had it to do over, he certainly wouldn't
do it again. Second. he's got to take his
lumps at a press conference." There is.
however, one adviser whose word weighs
heavily with the President who partly dis-
agrees: Nancy Reagan. The First Lady
has dropped her once adamant opposition
to subjecting her husband to the strain
and possible humiliation of a press confer-
ence. But she still thinks Reagan can get
by with suggesting that he was misled by
poor advisers. and firing a few staffers in
addition to Regan. No one is yet sure
whether Reagan can be induced to con-
fess. first of all to himself. any fundamen-
tal error. To take the most important ex-
ample. the President has consistently and
vehemently denied that the U.S. was
swapping arms for hostages. though the
voluminous record assembled by the
Tower commission leaves no question
that that is what happened. At the tele-
vised briefing introducing the findings,
Chairman John Tower. the former Re-
publican Senator from Texas. asserted
flatly that however the Iran initiative be-
gan. -it very quickly became an arms-for-
hostages deal." Commission Member Ed-
mund Muskie. a former Secretary of State.
asserted that the President personally
..was driven by that compassion for the
hostages from beginning to end." But it is
far from clear whether Reagan has yet
admitted that even in his own mind.
Speaking generally of a confession of er-
ror. one White House aide says. "It won't
work, in fact it would backfire, if Reagan
says it and doesn't believe it."
Another question is how far the purge
triggered by the Tower commission report
will go. Said White House Spokesman
Marlin Fitzwater: "The President is right-
fully angry at the mismanagement that
has occurred. and he is determined to
make changes." Most of Don Regan's as-
sistants. often derided as the "mice." will
shortly follow their chief out the White
House door. The Cabinet is a tougher
problem. The present members most crit-
icized by the Tower panel are the least
likely to go: Secretary of State George
Shultz. Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger and Attorney General Edwin
Meese.
The Tower commission blamed
Shultz and Weinberger, the two most
prominent opponents of the Iranian arms
sales, for in effect closing their eyes to
what was happening. The commission
also scored Reagan and his aides for nev-
er bothering to consider whether their ac-
tions complied with the law:
as the chief legal adviser to the
President. Meese must bear
blame for that. But Shultz says
he will not resign, and replac-
ing him would cause more tur-
moil in foreign policy. Wein-
berger and Meese are old
friends of Reagan's from Cali-
fornia days. Replacing lower-
ranking Cabinet members un-
connected to Iranscam would
prove nothing. though it
might serve to energize an
Administration that suffers
from intellectual lameness.
Rea an may also have to
took for a new CIA chief. He
has nominated Deputy Direc-
tor Robert Gates to succeed
the ailing William Casey.
Though the Tower commis-
sion oun that Gates had
Played only a minor role in
the sale of arms to Iran it
raise suspicions that he
might have been involved in
the secret, and possibly illegal.
provision of military assis-
tance to the contras.
Before the report was is-
sued- nose counters projected
an I l-to-4 Senate Intelligence
Committee majority for rec-
ommending Gates' confirma-
tion. Now the count is thought
to be 8 to 7-and nobody is
-sure which side would wind
up with the eight. The com-
mittee will question Gates
aitain in closed session this
week, but is likely to put of a
vote. possibly until all nn-
xressional investigations of
the Iran-contra affair are con-
cluded. That would be a "solu-
tion" satisfactory to nobody:
Gates would be running the
CIA as acting director. proba-
bly for many months, but with
a clou-d-Fanging over- Sim. -
i e rea cha enge for the
Reagan presidency is whether
it can now get energetically
involved again with other is-
sues. Reagan's aides are coun-
seling him to revive the strate-
gy that proved so effective
during the first term: pick two
or three major proposals and
push them for all they are
worth. Domestically, they are urging him
to hit the road, selling his package of
"competitiveness" proposals-aimed at
pepping up American industry and edu-
cation to meet foreign trade competi-
tion-in schools and factories across the
country.
In foreign policy, the top priority
should be finally concluding a deal with
the Soviets to reduce the number of nucle-
ar weapons. a goal that Howard Baker
strongly endorses. That is both Reagan's
greatest challenge and foremost opportu-
nity: Mikhail Gorbachev seems clearly to
want an arms-control pact, and soon. To
get one. some advisers are urging the
President to overcome his reluctance to
crack heads and insist on getting the Pen-
tagon and Foggy Bottom into harmony.
Reagan's most recent decision has been in
favor of Pentagon hawks who are out to
kill any chance of arms control. The Pres-
ident has decided at least tentatively to
adopt a" broad" interpretation of the 1972
antiballistic-missile treaty that would per-
mit wide-scale testing of his Strategic De-
fense Initiative in space. Not only will this
position anger the Soviets but it may be
impossible to sell to America's
European allies. Other foreign
policy problems are crowding
in. and will be exacerbated by
the fallout from the Tower
commission report. The most
immediate and, for Reagan,
disastrous effect may be the
collapse of the contra cam-
paign. The contras are central
to the so-called Reagan doc-
trine of helping rebels wage
guerrilla war against Marxist
governments in widely scat-
tered areas of the globe: Af-
ghanistan. Angola, Kampu-
chea. But the contras cannot
carry on their rebellion with-
out continued U.S. assistance.
The Tower report shows the
extent to which North. Poin-
dexter and the CIA went. in
circumventing the law, to slip
arms to them during a period
when Congress had forbidden
any direct or indirect U.S.
military assistance.
At the State Department.
officials are privately predict-
ing that Elliott Abrams, the
intensely committed Assistant
Secretary of State who has
served as the point man in the
contra crusade, will be gone by
summer. The report shows
that his involvement in Ollie
North's private contra-supply
network was far greater than
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he had previously testified.
Says one source close to
Abrams: "There is no way El-
liott can survive this." The
contra-ai&-program will have
similar problems surviving.
even though it makes little
sense to tie its fate to the Ira-
nian scandal.
Despite the illogic of cut-
ting off the contras as a reac-
tion to the excesses of their
Administration backers. State
Department officials see no
way that, in light of the Tower
findings, Reagan can win the
additional S 105 million he is
requesting for the cause. Some
have already begun referring
to the anti-Sandinista rebels
in the past tense. Says one offi-
cial long involved in the con-
tra war: "We had been devis-
ing a strategy to somehow save this thirig,
but after this report, it's all over. We need
to start thinking about evacuating the
contras, figuring out what to do with them
now that they won't be fighting a war."
Reagan is unlikely ever to admit that.
Some close aides see only two alternatives
to continued help for the contras: an out-
right U.S. invasion of Nicaragua or an un-
satisfactory political settlement with the
Sandinistas. They sometimes talk as if
they do not know which would be worse.
The Tower commission could not ex-
amine contra aid in anything like the detail
of its findings on the Iran arms sales. But at
public hearings probably beginning next
month, special Senate and House investi-
gating committees will focus on developing
that story further. Last week the commit-
tees, with the approval of Independent
Counsel Walsh, announced that they will
grant limited immunity from prosecution
to secure the testimony of three witnesses:
Fawn Hall, Oliver North's secretary; Rob-
ert Dutton, an associate of retired Major
General Richard Secord, who was deeply
involved in both the Iran and contra opera-
tions; and Edward de Garey, a Pennsylva-
nia businessman connected to an apparent
front company that paid pilots flying arms
to the contras.
A ny possible indictments will be up
to Walsh. The independent coun-
sel has hired 19 attorneys and
opened two offices. But his inquiry
is likely to be slowed by challenges that
North and others have filed as to the con-
stitutionality of the law under which he
was appointed. Even if the courts reject
those challenges, potential witnesses may
refuse to testify until the constitutional
problem is cleared up. In any case, the
sheer scope of the inquiry Walsh intends to
conduct could take as long as two years.
So there is rich potential for future
shocks, possibly continuing until the very
end of the Reagan Administration. But
with the Tower report, the essentials of
the bizarre story are resoundingly con-
firmed. Although the report contained no
sensational new revelations, no "smoking
gun," in Watergate parlance, the Admin-
istration might have been better off if it
had. That at least would have been a dis-
traction from having the sad tale laid out
from beginning to end in Olympian, judi-
cious language, by respected statesmen
hand-picked by the President.
It will now be up to Ronald Reagan to
answer one question the commission did
pose in so many words. In its single liter-
ary flourish, the report prefaced its chro-
nology of the Iran and contra operations
with an apt quotation from the 2nd centu-
ry Roman poet Juvenal: Quis custodiet ip-
sos custodes? Who will guard the guards
themselves? Under the American system,
the answer can only be the President-an
active, engaged President, rather than the
befuddled and intellectually lazy figure
so damningly portrayed in the Tower
report. -By George AO vdL
Rbparted by David BedMwtfh, Barret Sea, t
andSbcbe Tabott/W,sM,gtan
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