NO CHECKS OR BALANCES TO CONTRA POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000706060001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 14, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000706060001-5
r LOS ANGELES TIMES
E
O
14 March 1986
ON N PAGE
No Checks or Balances to Contra Policy
By TERRY LYNN KARL aid KENNETH $ SHARPS
The White House campaign to support
the Nicaraguan contras not only promotes
dubious poky; it also corrupts the consti-
tutional rules for the making of foreign
Policy.
After five years of backing by the United
States, there is no evidence that the contras
are an effective foreign-policy tool. An
inept force that is unable to dislodge the
Stas, the contras have systematic-
ally abused human rights and in-
creased regional tendons. Contin-
ued military aid, despite the explicit
opposition of eight major Latin
countries, blocks a diplomatic solu-
tion to the conflict in Central
America. Administration policy
assures that even veteran neistia-
tar Philip C. Habib can do little
more than serve as a cosmetic
device that is aimed at squeezing
contra money from Congress.
Just as important as the policy
abroad is the largely unnoticed
constitutional struggle at home.
The Administration's McCarthyite
rhetoric-colored by Secretary of
State George P. Shultz's casting
of the coming congressional vote as
a choice between "good guys"
and "bad guys," and the President's
dire warnings of a Central America
that is "covered in a on of red"-is
merely the latest salvo in a presi-
dential offensive against Congress'
budget and war-making powers.
If Congress acquiesces to the
President's request for $100 million
in aid to the contras, it will reward a
mode of policy formulation based
on illegal acts and a circumvention
of congressional checks and balan-
ces, thereby ensuring that these
tactics will be used in the future.
The Administration's flagrant
violation of the law in its Central
America policy can be amply
documented. The War Powers Act
of 1973 (which was passed in part
The Boland Amendment, adopted in
December, 1982, prohibited the use of funds
"for the purpose of overthrowing the
government of Nicaragua." For 2% years,
until the amendment lapsed, the Adminis-
tration continued to finance the contra
army while its leaders openly declared
their intent to overthrow the Sandinistes.
The 1900 Intelligence Oversight Act
obligates the Central Intelligence Agency
such as court judges, ... police and state
security officials."
In addition to violating the law the
Administration consistently circumvented
congressional spending restrictions. It
built bases in Honduras, using funds that
were earmarked for military maneuvers.
The CIA charged expenses, such as the
minAicaragua's harbors, to its other
accounts. An airfield for the contras also.
"We been out winning the hearts and minds of the
Jose got the hearts, and I got the heads."
in response to the illegal bombing of
Cambodia) stipulates that Congress must
be fully informed within 48 hours when
U.S. forces are introduced into potential-
ly hostile areas. Yet by early 1985 the
American military had flown reconnais-
aance missions over Nicaraguan air space
and Salvadoran battlefields, participated
in naval-interdiction activities in the
Gulf of Fonseca, was stationed in brigade
headquarters in zones of conflict in El Sal-
vador, and had come under fire in at least
eight separate incidents. Congress was
never informed about any of these actions.
people.
was built illegally in Honduras,
using funds earmarked for Defense
Department military exercises.
The Pentagon also donated aircraft
to transport supplies to contra
bases and tranderred ships, planes
and guns to the CIA for use in
Nicaragua with little or no charge.
When Congress cut aid to the
contras in late 1984, the White
House then permitted a member of
the National Security Council to
help organize private funding fox
the rebels.
Vietnam and Watergate brought
home the dangers of an imperial
presidency-a Chief Executive who
evades the authority of Congress
and the courts, views himself above
the law in foreign-policy matters,
and uses secrecy and distortion to
deceive other branches of govern-
ment and the public in order to
accomplish his policy objectives
Those difficult episodes in our his-
tory resulted in legislation such as
the War Powers Act of 1973 to
protect the democratic process
from abuses of power.
Administration policy toward-
Nicaragua and the rest of Central
America threatens to undo demo-
cratic safeguards at home by un-
dermining these careful mecha-
nisms of accountability. After
systematically excluding Congress
from the takeoff of an illegal and
misguided contra policy, it now
wants to strong-arm Congress into
to provide full and current reports of its
activities to Congress. But the CIA failed to
inform the intelligence-oversiggFimmit-
tees of the mining of Nicaragua's harbors
until a full six weeks after the initial
detonation-even though such activities
constitute an international act of war.
In a 1981 executive order President
Reagan prohibited the involvement of any
U.S. agency in assassinations. However,
the order was violated by the CIA's
operations manual for Nicaraguan coo ntrr-,
which gave instructions "to neutralize
carefully selected and planned targets,
co-piloting its mission to disaster.
Congress' response should be clear and
unequivocal. Both the contra policy and
the imperial presidency are unacceptable.
Its lawmakers should not support law
breakers.
Terry Lynn Karl, a professor of political
science at Harvard University, and Kenneth
E. Sharpe, a professor of political science
at Swarthmore College, are both contributors
to the forthcoming book, "Confronting
Revolution: Security Through Diplomacy
in CentralAmerioa" (Pantheon).
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000706060001-5