CHEMICAL ARMS TALKS NEARING WITH U.S. FAR BEHIND SOVIETS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000706130011-6
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 13, 2011
Sequence Number: 
11
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 4, 1986
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00965R000706130011-6.pdf112.63 KB
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STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/13: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706130011-6 ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE I-19 - WASHINGTON TIMES 4 February 1986 Chemical arms talks nearing with U.S. far behind Soviets By Martin Sieff THE WASHINGTON TIMES The United States is approaching its latest round of chemical weapons control talks - approved by Pres- ident Reagan and Soviet leader Mi- khail Gorbachev at their Geneva summit - with the knowledge that the Russians are so far ahead in this field the Americans may never catch up. Since President Richard Nixon ended the U.S. chemical weapons program in November 1969, the So- viets have had the field to them- selves. They have made the most of this advantage. Congress has approved a restart of U.S. chemical weapons produc- tion after Oct. 1, 1986, but only bi- nary systems, which consist of two separated non-lethal substances that do not become lethal until mixed. Production would be contingent on the president certifying to Con- gress that a plan exists to deploy the weapons in Europe in an emergency, that a verifiable chemical weapons agreement with the Soviet Union doesn't exist and that production is necessary for national security. Pro- duction could begin 60 days after such certification is provided. The binary system is consider- ably safer to handle than the Soviet nerve gases. Nevertheless, every time deployment of chemical agents has been raised with America's NATO allies, particularly West Ger- many, the reaction has been neg- ative. Tbday, at least 100,000 elite Soviet chemical corps troops are believed deployed among Warsaw Pact forces. In August 1984, a National Academy of Sciences study for the U.S. Army estimated that 35 percent of all conventional - non-nuclear - munitions in the Soviet Army were chemical or biological toxin. Every regular Soviet soldier is is- sued a respirator and chemical pro- tection suit; all modern Soviet armored force vehicles are designed to operate in a chemically contami- nated environment. The Soviet lead in production of chemical weapons may never be erased. A full 14 Soviet chemical, biological and toxin agent factories turn out 10,000 tons of lethal sub- stances a year, according to conser- vative estimates. By contrast, the United States has manufactured no chemical weapons since 1969 and has destroyed all its biological toxin weapons. For at least a decade, the Soviets have been developing so-called "third generation" germ warfare weapons based on recombinant DNA techniques. Said the au- thoritative British volume, "Russian Military Power," "It must be as- sumed that in any major conflict the Soviet ground forces will use chemical weapons as a matter of course:' Military analysts believe the Sovi- ets have developed a "no-warning blitzkrieg" strategy that would give the Third Shock Army in East Ger- many the option of launching a sud- den strike against the West without a giveaway major mobilization. A surprise attack deep into West Germany would place Soviet forces in urban centers and inhibit NATO from counterattacking with nuclear weapons. Central to this strategy is the massive employment of chemical and bacteriological weap- ons to terrify and paralyze the NATO armies. The architect of this strategy is Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the con- troversial, brilliant former chief of staff, who Mr. Gorbachev reinstated as commander of the Soviet Union's largest troop concentration in the Western theater. Marshal Ogarkov's "can win" con- cepts emphasize high-speed offen- sives through battlefields contami- nated with nuclear, biological and chemical agents. The key weapon in such an onslaught would be the leg- endary and still overwhelming BM-21 Multiple Rocket Launcher, the Stalin Organ. Twenty launchers in a battery can fire 480 rockets in 30 seconds to blanket at least 20 square kilometers. The Stalin Organ was used with devastating effect at Stalingrad in 1942. In addition, the Soviets have at least 2,000 tactical missiles deployed in the Western theater, including FROGS and SCUDs capable of car- rying chemical or biological pay- loads. The key chemical weapon in the Soviet arsenal remains soman, a "sticky" nerve gas. It is the most le- thal agent developed by the Nazis during World War II. In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Soviet tanks the Israelis captured from Egypt carried detoxifying systems for soman con- tamination. The United States has never de- ployed soman. Its post-World War II chemical arsenal, long since scrapped, was built on sarin nerve gas. Some think this indicates the Soviets plan to use soman on an unrestricted scale in combat. The Soviets have also developed lethal biological mycotoxins which they have "field tested" in Laos, Cambodia and Afghanistan during the past decade. The State Department reported that, up to May 1979, some 800 to 1,000 Hmong tribesmen had been killed by "Yellow Rain" in chemical, biological warfare operations by the Communists in Laos. This was a clerical error. The actual figure - indicated by the research of Col. Charles W. Lewis, chief of dermatol- ogy at the Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio, Texas, pointed to 15,000 to 20,000 gas deaths. After treating Iranian victims of Iraqi mustard and mycotoxin gas in the Gulf War, Dr. Gernot Pauser of the University of Vienna Hospital concluded: "If there were this kind of attack in Europe, we would have no chance at all to survive." The gases used by the Iraqis were supplied by the Soviet Union. In World War II, Hitler was de- terred from using his nerve gas on the D-Day bridgeheads only because he wrongly believed that the Allies had equally devastating stocks with which to retaliate. It is unlikely the Soviets are equally uninformed. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/13: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706130011-6