COURT GIVES CIA BROAD SECRECY RIGHTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000706290009-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: May 3, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706290009-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706290009-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706290009-2
W( PAG
3 "ay 1985
Court Gives CIA Broad Secrecy Rights
In a decision that could facilitate closer ties between
academic scientists and the intelligence community, the
Supreme Court decided on 16 April that the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) may keep secret the names and
institutional affiliations of virtually all of its intelligence
sources. As a result, academic scientists can perform
research for the agency without fear that their work will
ever become public knowledge.
In a prepared statement, the CIA said that the decision
sends "a powerful message to current and prospective
intelligence sources that the agency can, indeed, fulfill their
expectations of confidentiality." More immediately, it al-
lows the agency to withhold the names of nearly 200
scientists who participated in the 1950's and early 1960's in
a project known as MKULTRA, one of the CIA's most
bizarre research endeavors.
Known only to a handful of federal officials, the MKUL-
TRA program was supposed to discover "chemical, biolog-
ical, and radiological materials capable of employment in
clandestine operations to control human behavior," as the
CIA explained in internal documents. "For example, we
intend to investigate the development of a chemical materi-
al which causes a reversible non-toxic aberrant mental
state, the specific nature of which can be reasonably well-
predicted for each individual. This material could potential-
ly aid in discrediting individuals, eliciting information,
implanting suggestion and other forms of mental control."
The avowed purpose was to gain "a thorough knowledge of
the enemy's theoretical potential, thus enabling us to
defend ourselves against a foe who might not be as
restrained in the use of these techniques as we are."
By most public accounts, the program was less than a
sterling success. Grants were made to a variety of universi-
ties* and individual scientists through foundations that
served to conceal the CIA's involvement. According to a
government affidavit, the fruits of the research were used
in 109 "intelligence collection operations" from 1953 to
1966 alone. Ultimately, however, several persons died as a
result of unwitting exposure to experimental mind-altering
drugs, and others were apparently injured. Most files
relating to the project were ordered destroyed by CIA
officials, and although there has been considerable public
speculation about the scientists involved, their names have
never been officially released.
Seven years ago, Ralph Nader's Public Citizen Litigation
Group requested the names under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, arguing that most of the work was unclassified,
that a list of the participants was unclassified,. and that
many of those on it were unaware that their funds had
come from the CIA. Obviously, the agency had made few
pledges of confidentiality. Public Citizen wanted the infor-
mation so that it could publish a detailed report on the
research, and contact all of the unwitting participants.
*According to court documents and a 1979 book on the program by John
Marks. entitled The Search for the "Manchurian Candidate," the research
was conducted in part by investigators at Columbia, Cornell, Emory ,
George Washington. Georgetown, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, MIT, Montana
State, Princeton, Queens College, Rutgers. Stanford, and Texas Chri stian,
as well as the universities of Delaware, Denver, Florida, Illinois, Indiana,
Maryland, Minnesota, Ohio State, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Richmond,
Rochester, Texas, and Wisconsin.
CIA officials argued, however, that any court-ordered
disclosure might inhibit future intelligence gathering, and
disrupt ongoing relationships with some of the same re-
searchers and institutions. "In the case of one researcher,"
said M. Corley Wonus, a former director of the agency's
Office of Technical Service, "his operational activity was
of such a sensitive nature that the mere disclosure of his
name in the context of the MKULTRA projects will have
severe consequences for the diplomatic relations of the
United States."
In other instances, disclosure might harm the partici-
pants' professional standing, an agency official said in an
affidavit, noting for example that "in 1977 a Professor
Michael Selzer lost his position and tenure with Brooklyn
College as a direct result of allegations by associates and
relatives that he had been involved with the CIA." The
official added that "simply put, not all professions regard
affiliation by their members with the CIA as desirable or
acceptable." In addition, the agency argued that secrecy
was needed in order to obtain intelligence from unwitting
sources in the future, such as "a foreign official who
regularly discusses official business problems and con-
cerns . . . with an old and trusted confident who repeats
such information to the CIA."
In a sweeping decision, seven members of the Supreme
Court accepted these arguments wholeheartedly, ruling that
"even a small chance that some court will order disclosure of
a source's identity could well impair intelligence gathering
and cause sources to 'close up like a clam.' " Even public
sources of intelligence-such as newspapers and maga-
zines-can be kept secret, the Court said, on the grounds that
knowledge of their use could tip off an adversary to the
agency's overall goals. At one point, the Court went so far as
to suggest that "the mere explanation of why information
must be withheld can convey valuable information to a
foreign intelligence agency."
Paul Levy, an attorney with Public Citizen, says that the
ruling is likely to all but eliminate the release of information
about the agency's activities, including those that are
generally considered unethical. Justices Thurgood Mar-
shall and William Brennan, in a partial dissent to the
majority opinion, also decried the fact that the ruling gives
the agency "boundless" authority to keep information
from the public, whether or not the information is classi-
fied, whether or not its disclosure will harm national
security, and whether or not the source sought a specific
promise of confidentiality. The decision seriously mangles
"a carefully crafted statutory scheme," the dissenters
wrote, and thwarts "congressional efforts to balance the
public's interest in information and the Government's need
for secrecy."
CIA spokesperson Patti Volz notes that the agency can
no longer completely conceal its involvement in academic
research, as it did in MKULTRA. Under the terms of a
1981 order signed by President Reagan, the agency is
required to inform officials at all academic institutions
where it sponsors research. Although it is not specifically
required by the order, Volz adds, the agency will in the
future also disclose its involvement to the researchers
themselves. -R. JEFFREY SMITH
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706290009-2