THE SHULTZ--WEINBERGER FEUD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000706630016-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: April 14, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-009658000706630016-6 STAT
nlz tED
By Pl ip 7aubm !
foreign policy. Within recent weeks, for exam-
ple, the two men have disagreed publicly over
Administration should respond to the
th
e
how
shooting last month of an Army officer by a
HUr1DER ROLLED ACROSS Soviet soldier in East Germany. The State De-
the flight deck of the French partment has said that the United States would
aircraft carrier Clemenceau seek an apology from the Russians and com-
in the eastern Mediterra- pensation for the officer's family, but plans
nean. One by one, 14 Super while, the Department has announced
skyward jet fighters roared for a meeting between American and Russian
skyward and then banked to- commanders in Europe, aimed at avoiding
ward Lebanon. Their mis- such incidents in the future. Weinberger, on
sion: to retaliate for the truck the other hand, has insisted that the meeting of
bombings of the French and the commanders should not take place before
American military headquar- the Russians offer an apology.
ters in Beirut that had killed the the face of it, the two men might have
59 French paratroopers and been expected to get along better. Neither had
241 American servicemen. extensive foreign-policy experience before
Until that day - Nov. 17, moving into his current job, and neither was
1983 - the raid had been con- identified with particular national-se-
l
Y
ceived and planned as a joint suong
French-American effort to attack targets near curity positions. Yet they have bickered bit-
dMMINW.
the Lebanese town of Baalbek, a stronghold of terly - a remarkable display for men who are,
pro-Iranian Shiite Moslem militiamen be. as a former Shultz associate puts it, "pretty
to buttoned-down fellows."
have the Central Intelli?en ce A 1'
A White House official tells, for example, of
have been involved in the bombings. President one White Rouse meeting in 1983 when Shultz,
Reagan had authorized Navy fighter planes at- frustrated by Weinberger's reluctance to
tached to the Sixth Fleet to join the air strike, a apply more military pressure against Syria,
decision that has remained one n the better- said, "If you're not willing to use force, maybe
kept secrets of the Reagan Administration. It
we should cut your budget." Weinberger, ac-
was the first time an American President had
cording to one of his aides, seemed intention-
approved a counterterrorist. attack. - - ally to taunt Shultz about the failure of the 1983
But the French rench carried out the strike alone. ent between Israel and Lebanon that
The American planes never took off. The exact Shultz ha personally negotiated.
reasons remain classified, but this much is car- The sources of the conflict between the two
taro: A mission championed by Secretary of men are partly institutional: The State Depart-
State George P. Shultz, viewed warily by Sec-
ment's mission is to seek diplomatic accommo-
retary of Defense Caspar W_ Weinberger and appli-
dation, sometimes through the force selective
abroad. The
cause approved by the President was aborted be,.
cation of American military
cause the final go-ahead order was not issued Defense Department, directly responsible for
in time by the Defense Department. defending the nation's security against hostile
According to Michael I. Burch, a Pentagon ors, is often more conservative about im-
spokesman, Weinberger was not personally re- P~? relations with the Soviet Union and
sp e for that decision. Some White House proving less willing to commit American forces to com-
officialscials say otherwise, insisting that Weinber- bat. During the Ford Administration, for ex
ger tacitly agreed to have the mission ample, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
scrubbed. But at the very least, the incident and Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger
serves as a dramatic example of the battles organizational
that have raged over foreign policy during the frequently clash ~ along these favoring detnnt with
last two years, in no small part because Shultz lines, with Kissinger
of Moscow while Schlesinger warned that a sur-
and Weinberger have disagreed on a variety improvement in relations would not alter
major issues. The clash between Shultz and face Soviet belligerence . In fact, there
Weinberger," says a former senior Adminis- ingrained who believe that vigorous policy
here official, "and the inability to go any- dare experts
ysagreement between the two departments is
t
whereto get disputes settled, produced paraly- both inevitable and healthy.
sis in many areas.,. But far more than is generally recognized,
When the conflict goes public, as it often has, and to a far greater degree than in the past, the
it creates an impression abroad of confusion differences between Shultz and Weinberger re-
and uncertainty in the making of American flect very different backgrounds and tempera-
ments and a longstanding professional rivalry.
"There is a personal edge to the disputes be-
Philip Taubman is a Washington correspo-ul-
tween George and
enLforThe Times. _
NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
14 April, 1985
Continued
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Cap that is much sharper Sumlar disputes led to a
than previous feuds," says a still-unresolved impasse over
veteran national security offi- how to deal with the Nicara-
cial. "These guys have been guan Sandinistas, with Shultz
rivals for 15 years." The favoring diplomatic initia-
competition dates back to tives and Weinberger advo-
1970, when Shultz was direct cating an increase in United
tor of the Office of Manage- States pressure on the ce-
ment and Budget in the Nixon
Administration and Weinber-
ger was his top deputy. Later,
both men worked for Bechtel,
a giant construction company
in San Francisco, with Wein-
berger again in a lesser posi-
putes, coupled with a lack of often mediated differences
clear direction from the between Secretaries of State
The Shultz-Weinberger dis- tional security adviser has
gime. Their disagreements
also contributed to a break-
down of American diplomatic
efforts in the Middle East.
Just how large a role per-
sonal antagonism plays in the
Shultz-Weinberger struggles
lion. is difficult to determine pre-
At times, Weinberger has cisely, but dozens of inter-
clearly chafed at the dispari- views with their past and
ty. Joseph Laitin, who I present associates and with
worked in the budget office in Administration officials who
the early 1970's, recalls, "Cap have seen them together sug-
became so frustrated with his gent that it is a significant
lack of clear authority that he factor. Both men declined to
finally insisted that George be interviewed about their
sign a memorandum desig- relationship or even to dis-
nating him as the acting di- cuss larger policy questions
rector when George was out for an article about their rela-
of town." tionship.
Now, in its latest incarna- Late last year, when Shultz
tion, the Shultz-Weinberger and Weinberger publicly
relationship provides a vivid aired their different views
example - perhaps the clear- about the proper use of Amer-
est in recent history - of the ican military force, the White
interaction of personal fact House showed signs of impa-
tors with Goverment policy tience. In past Administra-
making. lions, the President's na-
White House, have produced
and continue to produce -
stalemates over key foreign-
policy and defense issues. For
example, Weinberger and
Shultz and their aides fought
endlessly during Reagan's
first term over what position
on arms control to take to the
bargaining table in Geneva.
When the arms talks resumed
last month, American nego-
tiators were given unusually
broad instructions by Presi-
dent Reagan, in part because
Shultz and Weinberger re-
mained divided over what
sort of deal to offer the Rus-
sians. -
and Defense, and the current
adviser, Robert C. McFar-
lane, has recently sought to
exert a modifying influence.
In fact, Shultz and Weinber-
ger have muted some of their
disputes in recent weeks. But
there is little optimism in the
Administration that McFar-
lane can do anything more
than paper over the differ-
ences.
T HE RELATIONSHIP
between Shultz and
Weinberger is com-
plex and subtle, born of dif-
ferent backgrounds and per-
sonalities. Shultz, who is 64, is
by nature and training a pro-
fessor, mediator and private
man. He prefers conciliation
to confrontation. Often im-
passive - a colleague de-
scribes him as "sphinxlike"
- Shultz is a man of enor-
mous self-assurance. Wein-
berger, who is 67, is a litiga-
tor, a politician, altogether
more of a public personality.
He seems to thrive on con-
frontation and, like his idol
Winston Churchill, can be to-
tally unyielding in defense of
principles he considers im-
portant, such as sustained
growth in the defense budget.
does not radiate a sense of
being at peace with himself
and his position.
After graduating from
Princeton in 1942 and serving
in the marine Corps in the Pa-
cific theater, Shultz received
a Ph.D. in industrial econom-
ics at the Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology and
served on the faculty there
from 1946 to 1957. He moved
Graduate School of Business
in 1957 and served as dean of
the school from 1962 to 1968.
In 1969, President Nixon, who
had heard about Shultz from
W EINBERGER,
lean and compact,
with dark hair and
gray sideburns, attended
Harvard, where he was presi-
dent of The Crimson in 1937;
he completed Harvard Law
School in 1941 before joining
the Army. Like Shultz, he
served in the Pacific. Born
and raised in San Francisco,
Weinberger returned there
after the war as a lawyer with
Heller, Ehrman, White &
McAuliffe. He soon became
active in Republican politics,
and was elected to the State
Assembly in 1952. He served
there until 1958, when he
failed to win the Republican
nomination for state attorney
general. In 1968, Weinberger
returned to Sacramento as
the state's director of finance
under Gov. Ronald Reagan.
Friends say that Weinber-
his economic advisers, ap- I, ger has long enjoyed the at
pointed him secretary of tention and social life that go
Labor. with public service. Accord-
According to friends. Shultz ing to a friend who has known
likes nothing more than read-
ing and writing - he has co-
authored four books on eco-
nomic issues - and spending
time with his wife Helena
him for more than 30 years,
"Cap's always wanted a cer-
tain amount of the lime-
light." Weinberger wrote oc-
casional book reviews,
and their five children. Bar- mostly about historical and
rel-chested and balding, he biographical works, for The
enjoys golf and tennis. And he San Francisco Chronicle.
much prefers a quiet evening After losing the primary for
at home in Bethesda, Md., to attorney general, he became
diplomatic receptions or the host of "Profile, Bay
Georgetown dinners. The Area," a weekly talk show
Shultzes, says Joan Braden, a broadcast live by San Fran-
leading Washington hostess, cisco's public television sta-
"don't have big parties.
Maybe four or six people, and
George cooks steaks in the
backyard."
Shultz is not shy about
speaking out on issues he con-
siders important, but - un-
like some of his predecessors
- he appears content to stay
out of the news and has little
taste for informal exchanges
with the press. Some of his
travels abroad have produced
so few headlines that corre-
spondents flying with him
have dubbed his Air Force jet
a stealth aircraft.
lion, KQED.
Robert C. Harris, a former
law partner in San Francisco,
popu-
recalls: "Cap was very
lar. Be was the life of the
party." And today, according
to Michael Burch, the De-
fense Department spokes-
man, his boss is "out almost
every evening." But for all
his socializing, Weinberger
never drinks alcoholic bever-
ages, and he frequently finds
time to jog before going to
work.
Weinberger and his wife,
Jane, have two grown chil-
dren. At their summer house
in Somesville, Me., on Mount
Desert Island, he steams
around Somes Sound in a
large motorboat that belches
black smoke. Says a neigh-
bor, "You always know
where Cap is by the smoke."
Continued
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Both Shultz and Weinber-
ger are members of San
Francisco's Bohemian Club
and attend its annual sum-
mer encampment in nor them
California. Once ensconced at
one of the dozens of camps lo-
cated within the guarded per-
imeter of the 2,700-acre grove
jalong the Russian River,
members and guests are
urged to shed their profes-
sional concerns and join
choral groups, attend nature
lectures, perform in pageants
and otherwise relax. Wein-
berger is affiliated with the
We of Aves, a camp known
for the quality of its singing.
Shultz is a member of the
Mandalay camp, which is
considered the most presti-
gious in the grove - its mem-
bers include Henry A. Kissin-
ger and Gerald R. Ford.
S HULTZ AND WEIN-
berger first crossed ca-
reers when they joined
the Nixon Administration in
190 - Weinberger as chair-
man of the Federal Trade
Commission, Shultz as Secre-
tary of Labor. After a year,
they both moved to the Office
of Management and Budget.
According to Joseph Laitin
and other former associates
at the budget office, there
was tension between the two
men almost from the start.
Shultz seemed to favor the as-
sociate director, Arnold R.
Weber, now the president of
Northwestern University,
over Weinberger, who was
nominally the No.2 official.
"it was obvious to everyone
that Weber, not Weinberger,
was the chief deputy," Laitin
says.
Weinberger, who had spent
a year running the trade com-
a mission, clearly was unhappy
as a deputy, particularly one
Another colleague from sin, business school. A year
those days says that Shultz later, Weinberger, who by
would sometimes convene then was Secretary of Health,
meetings by telling assem- Education and Welfare, fol-
bled officials, many anxious lowed Shultz to California and
about possible cuts in their to Bechtel.
department budgets, that he once again Weinberger
was "turning you over to Cap, found himself below Shultz on
whose mercies are tender." the pecking order. At Bech-
According to a former offi- tel, the disparity in stature
cial, the statement invariably and power was, if anything,
produced laughter from greater than it had been in
everyone but Weinberger. Washington. Shultz ascended
Cap didn't appreciate being to become the No. 2 executive
used as a foil," he says. of the Bechtel Group Inc., the
Weinberger was appointed corporation's holding compa-
director of the budget office ny, while Weinberger was
in 1972 after Shultz was general counsel of one of the
named Secretary of the divisions - a senior position,
Treasury. Several weeks to be sure, but one that left
after the change became ef- rum a rung or two below
fective, Shultz schedule4 a
press conference to disclose
the details of the new budget.
According to Laitin, "Cap
that when he pointed out to
Shultz that the press might in-
terpret the news conference
Shultz quickly agreed to hold
a joint briefing. "George said
he never intended to (embar-
rass Cap," Laitin says, "and
I think he was sincere." Still,
the press conference was held
Most people who worked
fice, as well as those who
have been associates since ,
describe him as a thoughtful,
self-assured executive who
does not use Machiavellian
maneuvers to outflank com-
petitors. "I don't think
George has the slightest un-
derstanding how Cap bristled
under him," a former budget
office colleague says. But de-
spite his scholarly demeanor,
Shultz is reputed to be a tena-
cious and skilled administra-
tor who knows how to accu-
mulate and use power. Even
his friends do not dispute
Martin's description of him
as a "ring-wise" bureaucrat.
In 1972, Shultz blocked
White House efforts to use the
Internal Revenue Service to
harass people on Richard
Nixon's "enemies list." When
Shultz told friends at the
time that he, too, was agree-
able to being Secretary of
State. Some Presidential
aides, however, recall that
President Reagan was under
the impression Shultz wanted
to stay at Bechtel. According
to these aides, Weinberger
did not challenge that impres-
sion and sometimes even
reinforced it.
WHEN SHULTZ
replaced 82, the Haig c-
1952, there was ac-
tually an improvement in
relations between the Secre-
tary of State and the Secre-
tary of Defense. Haig's
combative style and Weinber-
ger's insistent involvement in
According to a story widely i foreign policy had produced
circulated in Washington, intense irritation on both
Shultz invited Weinberger to sides. But Shultz and Wein-
work at Bechtel. But Stephen berger soon found their own
D. Bechtel Jr., the company grounds for disagreement.
chairman, insists, I was re- The divisions, for the most
sponsible, and I don't think part, were not produced by
George was involved at all." the sort of ideological dis-
Like others at the corpora- putes or fundamentally dif-
tion, Bechtel says that Shultz ferent views about interns-
and Weinberger did not clash.
One reason: The chairman
moved quickly to settle dis-
tional relations that have
often driven fights between
top national security offi-
agreements between execu- cials. Though Shultz had had
fives. "Disputes don't fester some experience with over-
here for long," a company ex- seas economic problems in
ecutive says. Moreover,
Weinberger did not report di-
rectly to Shultz, and their
duties lay in different
spheres.
Both men acted as key ad-
visers to Ronald Reagan dur-
ing his 1980 campaign and the
transition period following
his election. But Weinberger,
of Rea 's giber.
all
an
t
his Treasury post, neither
man had been closely associ-
ated with foreign affairs be-
fore taking their current jobs.
They were both considered to
be moderate Republicans;
neither had articulated or
promoted a particular world
view. They were regarded,
not as broad conceptual
g
er
a ve
natorial staff and a longtime and team players, men who
player in California Republi- could make large govern-
can politics, was personally ment bureaucracies work and
much closer to the new Presi- would carry out the policies
dent and his kitchen cabinet. set by the President.
Two of those early advisers Their disputes, for exam-
say that Weinberger made pie, have few of the ideologi-
clear his desire to be Secre. cal overtones that character-
tary of State, but Alexander ized the battles during the
M. Haig Jr. got the job. Carter Administration be-
tween Cyrus Vance, the Sec-
retary of State, and Zbigniew
Brzezinski, the national se-
curity adviser. "The deepest
who had to compete for power
with subordinates. Joseph
Martin Jr., a San Francisco
attorney and longtime friend,
recalls that Weinberger com-
plained that he didn't even
have the authority to hire.
"Shultz kept Cap under his
thumb at O.M.B.," Martin
says.
Shultz left Washington two
years later, he went to work
at Bechtel and taught part
time at the Stanford Univer-
Continued
thinkers, but as pragmatists
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differences between Vance
and me were philosophical,"
Brzezinski wrote in his book
about the Carter years,
..power and principle." Basi-
cally, Brzezinski advocated a
more assertive, confronta-
tional approach to deal with
the Soviet Union; Iran, after
the overthrow of the Shah,
and other hostile nations.
Yet some ideQlogical differ-
ences have seeped into the
Shultz-Weinberger relation-
ship as Weinberger has
adopted the hard-line, anti-
Soviet position of many in the
Administration. In this, he
has also been heavily influ-
enced by the anti-Soviet
views of his key aides, includ-
ing Richard N. Perle, the
Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for International Se-
curity Policy. Shultz, while
hardly a pushover on Soviet
issues, favors a more flexible
approach designed to reduce
superpower tensions.
Perle has clashed repeat-
edly with Richard R. Burt,
the Assistant Secretary of
State for European Affairs.
Known in Washington short-
hand as the "two Richards,"
Perle and Burt are, in effect,
the frontline troops in a run-
ning dispute over arms con-
trol between the State De-
partment and the Pentagon.
The intensity of their battle -
the two men are barely on
speaking terms - in some
ways reflects the relationship
between their bosses.
Institutional factors make
some conflict between the
Secretaries of State and De-
fense and their aides inevita-
ble. Richard F. Fenno Jr, a
professor of political science
at the University of Roches-
ter and president of the
"Within limits it's a healthy between them fairly crack-
thing. Governing involves the
reconciliation and integration
of interests. Both the State
Department and Defense De-
partment have concerns
which should be represented
and it's perfectly natural for
their heads to have somewhat
different views."
The differences between
Shultz and Weinberger, how-
ever, have not always fallen
within reasonable limits.
Their first major clash was
over an embargo on overseas
sales of certain kinds of oil
and gas equipment, a move
intended to slow down con-
struction of a natural-gas
pipeline from the Soviet
Union to Europe. Weinberger
fought to maintain the em-
bargo; Shultz opposed the
embargo as harmful to Wash-
ington's relations with its
European allies, and eventu-
ally it was dropped.
As a means of forcing the
Sandinistas to stop sending
military supplies to the guer-
rillas in El Salvador, Wein-
berger favored increasing
pressure on Managua -
boosting American support
for the Nicaraguan rebels
and conducting large-scale
United States military
maneuvers in nearby Hon-
duras. Shultz, while not op-
posed to military pressure,
advocated a diplomatic ap-
proach as well, including di-
rect negotiations between
Washington and Managua.
The result of this divergence,
as many Government aides
acknowledge, has been an
often inconsistent and confus-
ing foreign-policy stance in
that area.
The differences and ten-
led. As the situation in Leba-
non deteriorated, particu-
larly after the Oct. 23 truck
bombing of the United States
and French military head-
quarters, Shultz advocated
military retaliation. Wein-
berger opposed any escala-
tion of force, arguing that it
could lead to a war with
Syria.
In late 1983, the President's
top national security aides -
meeting as the National Se-
curity Planning Group, an in-
formal committee of the Na-
tional Security Council -
held a series of sessions in the
White House Situation Room,
a tightly secured area in the
basement of the Executive
Mansion. The question:
Should the use of force be es-
calated beyond the shelling
by the battleship New Jersey
and other vessels positioned
off the Lebanese coast? Wein-
berger, according to partici-
pants, refused to budge, a
stance that was particularly
irritating to Shultz, trained as
he was in the arts of media-
tion and conciliation.
"George was very frustrated
by Cap's immovability," re-
calls a close aide to Shultz.
Another Administration offi-
cial adds: "George would
leave these meetings as livid
as he ever gets."
During one session, accord-
ing to a participant, Shultz
told Weinberger sarcastical-
ly, "Never let me ask for the
Marines again. If I do, shoot
me." Says a former Adminis-
tration official-"You can't
understand the frustration of dealing
with Cap until you sit down and try to
reach some kind of accommodation.
He keeps saying the same thing over
and over again. It's like water drip-
ping on a stone."
Shultz and McFarlane eventually
succeeded in persuading President
Reagan to approve the joint air strike
with the French. Shultz, according to
his aides, was frustrated and discour-
aged when American participation in
the raid was aborted.
The question of how to respond to
terrorism in Lebanon was raised
again last month when the Adminis-
tration, at Shultz's urging, warned
Iran that Washington would retaliate
if United States hostages held in that
country were executed.
sions between Shultz and
Weinberger came to a boil in
1983 over the question of what
the United States should do in
Lebanon.
Shultz was committed to
the withdrawal of all foreign
forces from Lebanon. Accord-
ing to aides, he felt that the
United States had to see
through its obligations or suf-
fer a serious setback to its
policies in the Middle East
and its prestige worldwide.
Soon he and Weinberger were
tangling. There was no shout-
ing; there were no pyrotech-
nic outbursts, no hurling of in-
sults - that's not the style of
either man - but the tension
American Political Science
Association, sees "a kind of
built-in conflict" between the
.`single-mindedness" of the
Secretary of Defense and the
"general-mindedness" of the
Secretary of State.
Vigorous disagreement and
debate, of course, can be a
valuable asset in the develop-
ment of policy, forcing con-
sideration of unorthodox op-
tions and challenging ac-
cepted positions. Samuel. P.
Huntington, professor of gov-
ernment and director of the
Center for International Af-
fairs at Harvard, comments:
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The public bickering between
Shultz and Weinberger, in the view of
many foreign-policy analysts, has
done little to enhance American pres-
tige or influence abroad. Says Brze-
zinski: "The public venting of dis-
agreements through speeches is dam-
aging to the national interest. It's like
a plane with co-pilots trying to turn in
different directions." Another former
zation puts a premium on the combat- "Shultz has prevailed in the
ants' ability to win the personal sup- sense that the President has
port of the president and his closest endorsed his general agenda
aides for particular policy positions. of resuming the Geneva ne-
Weinberger initially had a major gotiations and looking for
advantage over Shultz in such an at- ways to push forward the
mosphere, since his relationship with peace process in the Middle
President Reagan was of much longer East." On the other hand,
standing. Weinberger had far greater though the President 10 days
access to the President, an open invi- ago made what he called a
tation to visit the Oval Office when- "peace offer" to Nicaragua,
ever necessary. But top people on the after encountering Congres-
White House staff have worked hard sional opposition to aid for the
to redress the balance. anti-Government guerrillas,
According to Michael K. Deaver, the white House seems to
White House deputy chief of staff, he have adopted the tougher line
and the former chief of staff, James espoused by Weinberger. Nei-
A. Baker 3d, were able to increase ther man has put his stamp
Shultz's access to the President and on arms control.
even managed to arrange for the Even on some issues where
Shultzes to dine occasionally with the the Shultz view seems to be in
Reagans. Other White House aides the ascendancy, the Presi-
say that Baker and Deaver felt that dent has failed to endorse spe-
Weinberger was damaging the Presi- cific steps to implement those
dent politically because of his intrac- policies in deference to Wein-
table policy positions and his stub- berger's opposition. For ex-
born dealings with Congress over the ample, the American negotia-
defense budget. tors were dispatched to
During the last year, Shultz by all Geneva without instructions
accounts has developed a good work- as to precisely what reduc-
ing and personal relationship with lions in arms in the would be ac-
lar Reagan. He has two regu- clear arsenal u
lar meetings with the President each ceptable to Washington as
week, on Wednesdays and on Fridays. part of an anus-control
The Secretary of State is also more agreement.
comfortable in his job: He is in McFarlane is generally
greater command of foreign-policy credited with engineering a
facts and ideas, and he has sorted out
the state Department bureaucracy.
Moreover, Shultz has been able to
develop those all-important alliances
within the Administration, and the re-
cent change in command in the White
House staff was a lucky break. Shultz
and Donald T. Regan, the new chief,
are old friends. When Shultz arrived
in Washington in 1982, he and his
wife stayed with the Regans
until they found a place of
national security official suggests their own. On most issues,
that such feuding can only embolden Shultz has found another ally
the nation's enemies. It must drive in McFarlane, the national
fear into the hearts of terrorists," he security adviser, who, ac-
says dryly, "to hear Shultz and Wein- cording to some of his aides,
berger arguing in public about how to is often frustrated by Wein-
use force.' berger's intransigence.
The White House clearly has the The Shultz-Weinberger
power to put an end to the Shultz- struggle has proceeded on
Weinberger disputes - and the policy two levels. They have fought
stalemates they have caused - but about the overall direction of
President Reagan's leadership style the nation's foreign policy.
does not generally include knocking They have fought over spe-
heads to settle differences. He prefers cific steps to implement poli-
to set the overall objectives and tone
of the Administration and leave the I ties. Today, according to a
details to others. That kind of organ- senior White House official,
reduction in some of the out-
ward signs of turmoil. And he
has sought to defuse disputes
at an early stage by some-
times joining Shultz and
Weinberger at their weekly
breakfast meetings.
Another example of McFar-
lane's peacekeeping mission,
according to a senior Admin-
istration official, was his
decision to involve President
Reagan at an early stage of
the discussions leading up to
Shultz's January meeting
with Soviet Foreign Minister
Andrei A. Gromyko. McFar-
lane's goal, the official says,
was to make sure that every-
one in the Administration
would understand that the
President really wanted
arms talks to resume. And. in
fact, harmony was achieved.
But as a senior official points
out, the agenda of those talks
dealt primarily with proce-
dural matters, not the sub-
stantive arms-control issues
that must be worked out be-
fore any final agreements
can be reached.
Few authorities believe
that recent confusions in
United States foreign policy
can be resolved until the
Shultz-Weinberger war is
ended. But in spite of the ef-
forts by McFarlane and
others in the Administration,
the prospects for such a reso-'
lution are slim. "Everyone
over here wants them to work
together instead of arguing,"
says a White House aide, "but
we know it won't be easy." ^
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706630016-6