SCENARIOS FOR A SOVIET ATTACK ON IRAN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00965R000706940018-0
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 15, 2011
Sequence Number:
18
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 19, 1987
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
File:
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Body:
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/15: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706940018-0
~cASf'I~~GToN ACS:
19 January 1987
JACK ANDERSON and DALE VAN ATTA
Scenarios for a Soviet Attack on Iran
President Reagan's defenders have invoked
the specter of a Soviet invasion of Iran as
justification for the backdoor arms deal with
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's henchmen. This
would give the Soviet Union a stranglehold on the
Persian Gulf, source of half the western world's oil.
Critics of the secret arms deal have scoffed. But
Pentagon strategists have been warning for years
of a possible Soviet invasion during the chaos
expected to follow Khomeini's death. As early as
1982. Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
focused his secret "Defense Guidance" on the
assumption of such a Soviet attack.
Our associate Donald Goldberg has obtained
some of the secret strategic planning papers,
prepared annually to cover the following five years.
The armed services use these guides to allocate
their people and materiel around the world.
The Pentagon's concern over a Soviet invasion of
Iran is nothing new. As we first reported in 1981,
the Soviets staged a mock invasion of their
neighbor in the fall of 1980, testing their command,
control and communications system near the
Iranian border.
The timing of the exercise suggested that it may
have been merely a show of strength intended to
dissuade President Jimmy Carter from a second
military attempt to rescue the American hostages
in Tehran.
By 1984, when the Defense Guidance for
1985-89 was prepared, a Soviet invasion of Iran
was the most important "illustrative planning
scenario ... upon which to base force development
planning for the 1993 time frame and to assess
risks in programmed forces." The scenarios
"realistically portray enemy capabilities as indicated
by current in a licence estimates." but were not
intended as "a prediction of future events,"
The chilling scenario used in that document
supposes that 24 Soviet divisions would invade
about two months after the central authority in
Tehran begins to break down, presumably following
Khomeini's death or some disruption of equal
magnitude. Full-scale-but not nuclear-
engagement between Soviet and U.S. forces would
begin 30 to 40 days after the invasion.
Meanwhile, according to the war-game scenario,
NATO and Warsaw Pact troops begin fighting in
central Europe, starting with a Soviet bloc attack
by 90 divisions. Simultaneously, North Korea
attacks South Korea, requiring a swift U.S. infusion
of reinforcements.
The 1984-88 Defense Guidance, written a year
earlier, uses roughly the same sequence of events,
though it includes a warning that the scenario
should not be regarded as "approved war plans."
However, the invasion scenario is intended to be
the basis on which the armed services allocate their
resources.
Interestingly, the main scenarios set out in the
Defense Guidances do not include an escalation of
superpower hostilities to the point of nuclear
exchange. But a contingency plan does consider the,.,
delivery of 19 nuclear bombs by Air Force B52s
against Soviet troops invading Iran. This "limited
strategic option" suggests that somehow nuclear
warfare could be confined to Iran.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/15: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706940018-0