KGB'S ATTEMPT AT POLITICAL FORGERY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000706950001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 27, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706950001-7
WASHINGTON POST
27 December 1985
JACK ANDERSON and DALE VAN ATTA
KGB's Attempts at Political Forgery
Forgery is a favorite Soviet weapon in the Cold
War but has never been an important part of
the U.S. disinformation arsenal. "There isn't
that kind of concept in the U.S. government," said
Herbert Romerstein, a U.S. Information Agency
expert on Soviet disinformation. In the Soviet
Union, on the other hand, political forgeries are a
tradition dating back to czarist times.
"We don't win in a war of lies," Romerstein said.
"We can win in a war of truth against lies. But our
credibility is much too important to jeopardize. The
Soviets don't worry about this, because truth or
falsity is not relevant to their thinking of how to
influence people. It is to ours."
For all its experience, though, the KGB
frequently turns out pretty crude takes that are
easy for Western intelligence to expose. From
Romerstein and other sources, we've learned how
to spot Soviet forgeries. Here are the clues:
^ Anonymous mailings. The KGB usually sends its
"leaks" to the news media in plain brown wrappers
with no return address, making it difficult to verify
the document's authenticity. That often works with
gullible or anti-American publications.
Realizing that the communist press has little
credibility, the KGB tries to plant its forgeries in
noncommunist publications. Even a tiny item will
do: it can then be picked up and amplified as "a
well-known tact" by the pro-Soviet press. After
sufticient repetition, it is broadcast by the Soviet
propaganda network, usually with the standard
introduction, "As the whole world knows ... "
^ Outdated or inaccurate bureaucratic titles and
forms. The KGB has as much trouble as Americans
do trying to keep up with the ever-changing style of
U.S. government paperwork. Even nongovernment
jargon can foil KGB forgers. Last year, for example,
spurious threats to African and Asian athletes at
the Los Angeles Olympics were signed "Ku Klux
Klan." The Soviets didn't know that authentic Klan
groups have distinctive titles such as "Invisible
Empire of the Ku Klux Klan." After this was
pointed out in press accounts, the Soviet news
service Tass promptly reported that the letters had
been signed "Invisible Empire."
^ Unidiomatic English and misspellings. British
traitor H.A.R. (Kim) Philby was able to proofread
the major KGB forgeries to make sure that at least
American usages were authentic. Now, there
seems to be no one to correct the stilted,
schoolbook English or giveaway spellings.
Unusual names also trip up the KGB. A 1982
memo supposedly written by Commerce Secretary
Malcolm Baldrige spelled his name "Baldridge."
Occasionally, the KGB will slip by using
translations of Soviet terms that have no U.S.
meaning. One supposedly internal U.S. government
memo referred to the CIA not as "the Company," as
some Americans do, but as "Competent Bodies,"
which is the Soviet term for their secret services.
Romerstein said this type of forgery is unique to
the KGB. "I've never seen a forged Andropov
letter," he said. "I've never seen a forged
Chernenko letter. I've never seen a forged
Gorbachev letter. But I have seen forged Reagan
letters, and I've seen forged Ford and Carter
letters. Nobody else does it."
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/21: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706950001-7