AN INTERVIEW WITH THE CIA DIRECTOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000706970009-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: December 22, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/13: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706970009-7
ARTS
ON NOR TIME
22 December 1986
t
An kiterview with the CIA Director
Telling his side ofthe story, Casey maintains that "the NSC was operating this thing"
In the inner sanctum of his office in Langley, Va., CIA Di-
rector William Casey was interviewed last Friday by TIME
Assistant Mana
in
Editor H
M
ll
d C
d
g
g
enry
u
er an
orrespon
ent
Bruce van Voorst. Under the ground rules, he refused to dis-
cuss sources or methods of covert operations. Repeatedly dis-
claiming CIA involvement or even knowledge about much of
what went on, he defended what he insists was the agency's
narrow role in helping the National Security Council.
Q. Why dont you tell all at this point?
A. I told all to the committees.
Q. Why can't that be made public?
A. As I understand it, the problem is
they don't want it made public. I told
it all. And I want to tell it all.
Q. Do you know it all?
A. I told all I know. I don't know all. I
think I know the dealing on the Amer-
ican side, and I talked about it. The
dealing that took place in Europe is
very shadowy. Sure, we pick up infor-
mation. I know a great deal about the
arms dealers around the world. I don't
know all about this operation though.
knew they were getting contributions. That was widely
known. What those contributions were, where they came
from, we didn't have any information.
Q. You're sure that not a nickel of that diverted money that
Ed Meese Is talking about ever readied the contras?
A. Not a nickel of the money that we had reached
them. The money that reached them was provided before
Congress tied our hands. The money that came to us is strict-
ly accounted for and was applied to the weapons. What hap-
pened to the other money-the Attorney General hasn't
made known what he knows about this diversion.
Q. Did you believe that someone was making a profit on the
Q. What are the key things that you
don't know?
A. I don't know everything that oc-
curred on the Iranian side among
and between the people who were
working with the Iranians. I don't
know everything the NSC did. The
NSC was operating this thing; we
were in a support mode.
arms sales?
A. Well, yeah, sure I assumed some-
body was making a profit. We didn't
know what the profit was or where it
went or who had it.
Q. You must have the contras pene-
trated from A to Z, and you were
still not able to track the futdhig?
A. We don't think the contras knew
much about the funding. We think
that all was done at a higher level.
Q. You were alerted by Roy
Furmaiik?
A. [He] called me up on Oct. 7 and
told me that he wanted to come in,
and told me that this money had
come, some of the money had come
from-had been invested by Canadi-
ans in the handling of these weapons.
of funds to the contras? 'I don't know anythktg about diversion of funds"
A. I don't know anything about diversion of funds. What
you've got to understand is we were barred from being in-
volved with the contras, and we kept away from that.
Q. Didn't the CIA keep tabs on the financing of the contras?
A. We know in general what the contras are doing, what
their movements were, but we didn't know and they weren't
telling us about their funding and their procurement.
Q. Did you notice an increase in weapons they were getting?
A. We noticed they were getting weapons. They weren't tell-
ing us.
Q. Do you have any evidence that the money from the Iran
arms sales reached the contras?
A. No. They were buying and they were paying. We didn't
know where it came from. They were out raising money. We
A. No, I knew nothing of any
diversions.
A. I told [John] Poindexter I had learned that people had put
money up to finance this. and they were not getting paid and
were very upset about that and were trying to figure out how
to get their money back.
Q. Was Poindexter surprised?
A. Yes, he was. He said he was surprised. He was concerned
about it. I advised him that I thought he ought to get pre-
pared to pull the whole story together and make a public
statement of some kind. He said he didn't want to do that un-
til-because it was an ongoing operation. They were hoping
to get some hostages out.
Q. Did he explain further details on the fading?
A. No. I had a very short meeting with him.
Continued
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/13: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706970009-7
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/13: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706970009-7
Q. Did you think at this point that the operation might hart
or embarrass the President?
A. Not specifically, but I think it was in our minds. We were
concerned about the security of the operation. [Poindexter]
was concerned about it falling apart and about not being able
to follow through and get those other two hostages out and
lose the opportunity to develop a relationship with Iran.
Q. Did Poindexter reveal other funding methods Involved?
A. I'm not supposed to talk about a lot of this. I'm getting into
some classified areas, and I'm only prepared to give you gen-
eral statements.
Q. How is it possible that there was so much going on that
the agency did not know about?
A. I think we knew in a general way that money was being
raised and probably could have put a report together on it if
we wanted to. but we didn't. We were not running the opera-
tion. We were supporting that. That was done by a few fel-
lows in the NSC. It was their operation: they were in charge of
the operation.
Q. Are you trying to distance the agency from the NSC?
A. I don't think I am. I'm telling you
what the agency did and what its role
was. And there was distance between
us and the NSC.
Q. On the basis of your intelligence,
were you convinced that it was rea-
sonable to reach out to these peo-
ple in Iran?
A. I don't know whether you can call
them moderates, but there are people
who want to deal differently. There
are people who want to resume some
kind of relationship with the U.S.
Q. Why did that entail the delivery of weapons?
A. That was the method of opening up the relationship, to get
them talking. The Iranians were probably buying billions of
dollars' worth of weapons. This was $ 12 million.
Q. That was the only delivery, indirectly or directly?
A. That's all we were involved in.
Q. Which shipments are you taking about?
A. I'm talking about three shipments. To put that in perspec-
tive, we had some very rough estimates that the Iranians and
the Iraqis had purchased around S20 billion in arms between
them during the course of that horrible war they're having. I
think in the past year we estimated between $3 billion and $4
billion. So $1 2 million is not much of a drop in
the bucket.
Q. In retrospect, wasn't it poor intelligence judgment to
have taken this initiative with such people?
A. I think there's an argument about that. A lot of people
doubt that it was a good idea. But I think it was a reasonable
gamble. and I think the record shows that. We did get some
hostages out. We did develop a relationship that may carry
on or may not carry on.
Q. If It was legal, couldn't you just find It almost directly?
A. It was a clandestine operation. It was supposed to be se-
cret. If this had been public, it really wouldn't have worked.
Q. Was the NSC put in charge in order to avoid congressio-
naloversight?
A. No. I don't think so. There was a decision to keep it quiet
and not to disclose it to the Congress. The reason the NSC was
put in charge of it is that it started between the NSC adviser
and the adviser to the Israeli Prime Minister.
Q. Was It a mistake not to involve a few key congressional
leaders?
A. Of course. In retrospect, a lot of things seem to be mistakes.
and probably in retrospect it was a mistake to keep key con-
gressional leaders out. But that was a judgment that was made
at the very top of this country. The judgment was made pri-
marily by the NsC adviser and, I guess, the President.
Q. Did the NSC clearly explain to the President what was go-
ing on?
A. I think the President knew what was going on. sure. Clearly
when he signed the finding, and probably before.
id In retrospect,
1 1 ?
seem 1 1
Q. Did the President know about the
methods being used to finance the
contras?
Q. He presumably knew a lot about
the Israeli arms deliveries to Iran,
Were all the shipments authorized?
A. I don't know much about the Israeli
arms to Iran.
Q. Didn't anybody point out the con-
tradiction of pnablicly following a policy of not dealing with
terrorists while holding secret negotiations with them?
A. Yeah. We're not stupid. There's a contradiction. and we
recognized it. You frequently do limited things to achieve a
specific result that may be inconsistent with your general poli-
cy. That's not that unusual.
Q. Do you feel you've served the President well?
A. Yes. I think we've done a great job. I really do. On the Ira-
nian thing we have done what we were supposed to do. We
have done it well. and we've accounted for everything. The
CIA role was to provide support to an activity under the di-
rection of the NSC.All the activities were entirely properly
conducted and fully authorized. We received $12 million to
pay for the Defense Department weapons shipped to [ran. It
has been meticulously accounted for. We facilitated the
movement of these weapons in three separate flights. and
none of the S 12 million reaching us has been diverted for any
other purposes. Now you can raise questions about what we
should have known and so on. but what weve known we ve
handled properly. A lot of people are trying to put responsi-
bilities on us that we didn't have.
Q. Some people are suggesting you should resign.
A. I suppose that everybody's trying to put the blame some-
where else.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/13: CIA-RDP90-00965R000706970009-7