PULLING THE PLUG ON THE SANDINISTAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000707040007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 2, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000707040007-0
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE__/__,.
WASHINGTON TIMES
2 January 1985
,WILCOMB E. WASHBURN
Pulling the plug
on the Sandinistas
What can the Reagan
administration do
between now and
March (when Congress
reconsiders aid to the Contras) to
salvage its limping anti-Sandinista
policy?
- It can announce its intention of
withdrawing diplomatic recogni-
tion from the Sandinista govern-
ment unless and until that
government agrees to carry out all
the promises it made to the Organ-
ization of American States in 1979
to provide democratic freedoms to
the Nicaraguan people.
Threatened withdrawal of diplo-
matic recognition is not a warlike
act. It is, rather, an expression of
disapproval of the character of a
regime conveying a message simi-
lar to that recently expressed by
the president in regard to South
Africa.
- Threatened withdrawal of diplo-
matic recognition of Nicaragua's
government is, moreover, condi-
tional merely upon the Sandinistas
complying with their own promise
solemnly given to the OAS in
exchange for the de-legitimization
of the Somoza government of Nica-
ragua by the member states of the
OAS, including the United States.
The proposed policy would thus
echo the Sandinistas' own moral
position.
On what ground could the
president's opponents attack this
proposed initiative?
On the ground that, once
installed, a Marxist-Leninist
regime - unlike a right-wing dicta-
torship - is sacrosanct? On the
ground that the recent elections in
Nicaragua accurately reflected the
will of the Nicaraguan people? On
the ground that the OAS action of
1979 was an illegitimate act and
cannot be repeated?
There is no solid moral or legal
ground on which to oppose such a
policy. Opponents of the policy
would be forced to assert - in the
face of evidence to the contrary -
that the Sandinista regime is the
legitimate democratic representa-
tive of the Nicaraguan people.
Alternatively, opponents would
be forced to assert that the intro-
duction of democracy so vocifer-
ously demanded in South Africa
and Chile, for example, should not
be sought in a Marxist-Leninist
state.
The announcement of the policy
proposed would not foreclose any
option now available to the admin-
istration, including unilateral use
of force. It would, however, provide
a moral and legal basis for the appli-
cation of sanctions that (opponents
have argued) have in the past been
taken in technical violation of laws
and treaties.
Will the opponents of the pro-
posed policy challenge the prop-
osition that the Nicaraguan people
have a right to determine - and to
continue to determine in free elec-
tions - who their leaders shall be?
Do the opponents of the proposed
policy question the right of the
Nicaraguan people to "alter or to
abolish" their government "and to
institute new government" when
they feel their government
"becomes destructive" of the prin-
ciple that "governments are insti-
tuted among men deriving their
just powers from the consent of the
governed"?
If they do, such critics are chal-
STAT
lenging the very words of our own
Declaration of Independence and
the very basis on which Americans,
with the aid of France and Spain,
were able to establish their own
democracy.
For too long, con ressional crit-
icshhve been allowed to snipe at
administration policy in Nicaragua
on group s Mat "covert" aid to the
opponents o t e present regime
violated law that the mining o
Nicaraguan harbors to interdict th
rowan s ipments of Soviet-bloc
arms violated international law, and
that U.S. sponsorship of a Psycho-
logical warfare manual for rebel
use constituted support of interna-
tional terrorism.
As a result, the administration
finds itself dragged into the World,
Court as an aggressor nation finds
its covert aid to the anti-Sandinistas
cut off (even while its covert aid to
Afghan rebels is aPoroved by Con-
gress), and even its policy of su -
ortin t e elected governmen
neighboring Salvador called in
question.
The proposed policy declaration;
would force the opponents of the
president's policy to debate the
morality of our position in Central
America on more favorable
grounds. At the same time, it would
constitute a psychological warning
to the Sandinistas, and a legal basis
in which subsequent acts of sup-
port to Nicaraguan opponents of
the regime could be based.
Perhaps, by March, support for a
democratic Nicaragua will
emerge.
Wilcomb E. Washburn is director
of the Office of American Studies of
the Smithsonian Institution. The
views expressed in this article are
his own.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/20: CIA-RDP90-00965R000707040007-0