STUMBLING BLOCKS TO MAKING LONG-RANGE FOREIGN POLICY IN THE US

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807190014-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: January 31, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807190014-5
- ? - / CI IRI STIAN' SCIENCF r^ONITOP
__ January 1985
Stumbling blocks to ma
By Charles Waterman
Special to The Christian Science Monitor
foreign poli~y in the US ,.
The United States sports the world's most efficient
systems for instant international crisis management: so-
phisticated intelligence sensors; instant communications;
mobile forces; and innate organizational ability to make
an informed, immediate response to many challenges.
But the same cannot be said of its long-range planning
capacities.
Failures over time of US initiatives in Vietnam, Pales-
ANALYSIS
tine, Lebanon, and potentially,
Nicaragua highlight a seeming
obliviousness to longer-range im-
plications of its actions.
As stated by Robert Hunter of Georgetown's Center
for Strategic and International Studies: "Planning has
indeed long been the bete noire of US foreign policy -
always recognized as valuable, always attempted, never
particularly successful beyond the enunciation of general
goals in documents like national security decision
directives."
The roots of the problem are threefold: a habit of
forming most policies only in response to crisis situa-
tions; institutional weaknesses; and the unusual influ-
ence in a melting pot democracy of erratic domestic po-
litical pressures.
All too often a crisis motivates the US to adopt a strat-
egy that turns out to have unintended future repercus-
sions. The rules of engagement for US forces in Lebanon
led, for instance, to an identification of US power with
the Christian parties in that country's civil war.
Once tentatively chosen, predictions of a strategy's
long-term impact by individuals not committed to it is
rare or tends to go unheeded. And the entire range of op-
tions are evolved as specific solutions for the immediate
crisis. Attention to future effects is distinctly secondary.
The difficulty is also institutional. Offices charged
with long-range planning are often swept up into more re-
warding day-to-day operations or become irrelevant and
staffed by officers with little clout. Rare indeed is the bu-
reau that can sustain a strategic viewpoint and retain its
effectiveness over time.
Strategic thinking and current management rarely
mix well. Any worthwhile planning office views the
world differently from those charged with day-to-day
management. Built-in conflicts over hallowed policies en-
sue. Almost always outranked and outmanned, policy
planning offices usually lose such conflicts.
Yet, decisions made today do form policy. To keep
policy planners out of the loop in current activity is to
doom them to irrelevance.
Thinking ahead is downright risky to one's career if
proven wrong. It also is far less rewarded than frenetic
involvement in compelling issues of immediate concern.
Senior officials don't have to address next year's issues
today. But they must address today's issues today.
This policy blind spot is paralleled for different rea-
sons in the intelligence bureaus. There are, to be sure, es.
timates of future trends issued by various agencies sin-
gly and collectively. But many officials criticize these
documents as unduly cautious in predicting radical de-
partures from easily identifiable current trends.
Intelligence has been used as a scapegoat for policy
failures base on fault
assessments. Failure to predict
ra
1] 11 11 1 I'll 111!~, P man revolution , or instance, was a in art re-
s onsi e or in:! ective po ides m at country ether
just i i or not, a cumulative effect o suc mger-
nnint inQ ,c fn .,w. _ .
-o-- --- ---p. . 11,ul y, Long-
ranue forecasting oes not flours in s c a .
A ft
man o the a on me nce Council has said:
"Most irate 'pence analyses are conservative Because of
this, the are usuall correct. But when wron , the rami-
fications are spectacular Policy of ci s an inte Aence
analvcfc ~~, 1.7 ~~ i L ,
enced by domestic political considerations is consider-
la L"Llu_
able. The need for an immediate foreign policy "victory "
can be compelling indeed. But should this need influence
intelligence judgments, it can be dangerous. Perhaps
more insidious and common, a politically unpleasant
analysis can be simply ignored by policy personnel.
Moreover, the interests of ethnic groups may or may
not be identical with those of the US generally - al-
though they will always sincerely purport to be. Congres-
sional responsiveness to Israeli and Greek lobbies exem-
plify this. Few other nations are as intensely affected by
this phenomenon as the US. And its net impact is to in-
ject a "wild card" element into the planning process.
Some observers have suggested an interagency policy
planning council as a partial remedy. Dr. Hunter recom-
mends a senior planning council, composed of career offi-
cials of deputy secretary rank and housed in the White
House. He suggests that officials be immune from termi-
nation, transfer, or automatic irrelevancy with each
change of administration. This, of course, may be impos-
sible in the politically charged atmosphere associated
with most presidential changes.
Such an institutional change would work only if top
US leaders changed their outlook on the worth of strate-
gic planning. Typical comments of those currently in-
volved in policy planning offices - "I'm too busy on im-
mediate issues to theorize;" "Promotions go to those who
run things, not to those who plan" - are symptomatic of
the leadership's preoccupations with day to day events.
A strong strategic planning organization would
quickly arouse opposition. Entrenched interests would
feel their policies threatened by the organization's man-
date for free-thinking and independent access to senior
policymakers. The office could be branded as biased. But
many who have long since thrown up their hands at the
practicality of effective strategic planning would applaud
such an effort.
The writer was a government official for two dec-
ades before becoming a consultant on international
affairs.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807190014-5