REAGAN AIDES UPSET BY DISCLOSURE OF WEINBERGER'S LETTER ON ARMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807260006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 17, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807260006-6
ARTICLE APPRED NEW 17 YORK TIMES
ON PAGE November 1985
Reagan Aides Upset by Disclosure
- Of Weinberger's Letter on Arms;
President in Geneva -
Official Sees an Effort
to Sabotage Meeting
By BERNARD WEINRAUB
Special to The New York Times
GENEVA, Nov. 16- President Rea-
gan arrived here today for the Soviet-
American summit meeting amid a dis-
pute over the disclosure of a letter writ-
ten by Defense Secretary Caspar W.
Weinberger urging that no accords be
made on two key arms issues.
En route to Geneva, a White House
official said he was "astonished" and
"perplexed" at the letter, which was
published in The New York Times to-
day. An article about the letter, which
was not made public officially, also ap-
peared in The Washington Post.
The letter was attached to a Defense
Department report to the President on
purported Soviet violations of arms
control agreements. The letter and the
report were obtained by The New York
Times from an Administration source.
The White House official who said
that the letter "astonished" him was
asked whether, in his view, the release
of the letter to the press had been in-
tended to sabotage the summit talks.
"Sure it was," the official said.
Larry Speakes, the White House
spokesman, said: "The President
would have preferred to read it in the
privacy of the Oval Office and not in
The New York Times."
(In Washington, Mr. Weinberger's
spokesman, Robert Sims, said the
Defense Department "had abso-
lutely nothing to do with the release
of the letter." Mr. Sims said that it
was Mr. Weinberger's policy not to
publicly discuss any advice to the
President and that the Secretary was
"outraged at the disclosure and or-
dered an immediate investigation."
[When asked about the comment of
the White House official that the dis-
closure was intended to sabotage the
summit meeting, Mr. Sims said,
"The Secretary would agree that the
public release of his private letter to
the President was not helpful and
feels equally disturbed and con-
cerned."]
Mr Weinberger, who will not be at
Thus, the kernel of the bargaining
can be no eeporeductions ~ennsi e
strategic forces until the United States
abandons all efforts to develop "space
strike weapons." W on,
ry, on their personalities, on their do- there should be dcu ffensive
mestic pressures and on how each will forces now, even as the two sides turn I
react on the spot to the dramatic mo- to the more complicated task of figur-
ment of the talks. ing out how to phase in defenses as of-
Their predecessors, faced with simi- Tenses are phased out.
lar opportunities and dangers, gen-
erally shied away from bold strokes.
The major treaties on limiting offen-
sive arms, reached in 1972 and 1979,
were modest and temporizing. Leaders
at past summit meetings avoided far-
reaching moves when confr:)nted with
the uncertainties and complexities of
arms control and the deadening mutual
suspicions.
For this summit meeting, Adminis- '
tration officials said they expected
more of the same. But none of them
seemed confident they knew what Mr.
Reagan was thinking, or what he would
do, or even if the President himself
knew in his own mind at this point. How
important will reaching agreement be
to him in Geneva? Does he believe that
he must make significant progress
there to have any hope of completing
an arms treaty before his term ex-
pires?
Administration officials were also
none too sure that they understood how
Mr. Gorbachev would play his cards, or
whether his hands were even more
bound by the committee structure of
the ruling Politburo than Mr. Reagan's
are by presiding over a democracy.
These officials said they assumed
Mr. Gorbachev did not want a summit
meeting failure. But Is stopping Mr.
Reagan's plans for space-based missile
defenses important enough to him that
he will risk a failure? Would such a
move be a bluff or genuine?
Proposals and Strategies
In the briefing book being made
ready for Mr. Reagan, there are sec-
tions on the proposals, on the relative
bargaining chips and positions, and on
strategies. In the minds and briefcases
of some of his advisers are also ideas
on possible terms of agreement.
Moscow advanced a new proposal in
October, and Washington countered
with one in early November. The net ef-
fect of the moves was to set up the ideas
of 50 percent reductions in strategic or
intercontinental-range missiles and
bombers, plus a separate agreement on
medium-range forces in Europe, also
with cuts in the 50 percent range.
There was no discernible movement
on space-based defenses, which Mr.
Gorbachev sees as meaning a new and
more dangerous arms race and which
Mr. Reagan believes is the moral and
necessary oath to the future.
Won't Get Into Details
Officials on both sides neither antici-
pate, nor want, their leader to get intc
the details. Administration officials
differ on whether Mr. Reagan should
even try to compromise on gen-
ities.
Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weis-
berger and his aides argue that tc
agree on general principles or guide-
lines without getting into the detail. ,
would seriously prejudice subsequent
negotiation on the all-important de-
tails. To them, this would be buying a
moment of glory in Geneva at a high
cost later. Their idea of talking while
agreeing to nothing is more or less the
Administration's public stance.
Privately and very quietly, the Sec-
retary of State, George P. Shultz; Paul
H. Nitze, the senior arms control advis-
er, and Robert C. McFarlane, the na-'
tional security adviser, are said to be
thinking about possible agreement on
guidelines for the arms negotiators.
Only Mr. Nitze has been talking about
this publicly.
They are said to believe that Mr.
Reagan could nail down some key prin-
ciples on offensive cuts. For this, he
would have to lower his rhetorical
sights on antimissile defenses, talk
only about research and agree to ne-
gotiate on what constitutes acceptable I
research. Such negotiation would be a'
long and drawn-out process, during
'which time the Russians could be;
pressed for separate agreements on of-
fense.
Guidelines Are Outlined i
The guidelines, which would have the
effect of stating areas of broad agree-
ment, are said to look like this:
Cut all strategi., missiles and bomb.
ers by 50 percent. This would leave
vague just what is "strategic." Wash-
ington could say it meant only intercon-
tinental forces. Moscow could say it
still included American forces in and
around Europe that could launch a nu-
clear strike against the Soviet Union. It
is expected Moscow will eventually
concede this point anyway, but ask for
something in return.
cSet a common ceiling of 6,000 nu-
clear weapons. Washington could con-
tinue to say this included only missile
warheads and long-range air-launched
cruise missiles. Moscow could say it in-
cluded bombs and airborne short-range
attack missiles as well.
(Establish a limit of 3,000 on land-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807260006-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807260006-6 A
based missile warheads. Moscow is
proposing 3,600. Even some figure in
between would require Moscow to
make deep cuts in its heavy SS-18 and
SS-19 missiles. Cuts in these heavy mis-
siles has been the Administration's
overriding goal, and it would be Mos-
cow's most important concession thus
The groundwork has been laid for creased millitary spending.
Pentagon officials maintain that
even "scientific research" as con-
strued by Moscow would prohibit the
Strategic Defense Initiative, popularly
known as "Stars Wars," so there would
be no sense in trying to fudge over the
differences.
far. tagon advice and not budge on space-
9Agree to pursue a separate pact on based defenses and not try for agreed
medium-range forces, looking toward guidelines, would Mr. Gorbachev gc
50 percent cuts on both sides. Moscow along more or less quietly? The answer
is prepared to do this, although its ini- that Mr. Reagan is getting from most
tial position was that this had to be set of his advisers is "yes," according tc
tled along with strategic offenses any officials involved.
defenses. This would still leave in abev are said to be telling him that
ance the key Soviet demand of inch Ihey a leader to
not in a g
ing French and British forces. iec ~k t ""irh at
declare the summit meeting to ix: a
9State that both sides should strictly great disappointment or failure. Their
adhere to the Antiballistic Missile view is that Mr. Gorbachev is preoccu-
Treaty of 1972, reaffirm that the treaty pied with the consolidation of his power
permits research, and then negotiate and with economics. They judge that he
on where and how to draw the line be. does not want to return home to ques-
tween permissible research and tioning about his ability to manage
banned development and testing. relations with the United States peace-
Groundwork Is Laid fully and then face demands for in-
interpretation of the treaty's obliga? t s mi t even strengthen his hand at
tions." home.
The formal Soviet position in the
Geneva arms-control talks, which are And over all, it is difficult to find any
now in recess, still calls for a ban on a13 Administration official who expresses
space-strike weapons, including re- optimism _ even those few who hold
search on them. Public statements by out the hope of agreement at the sum-
Mr. Gorbachev and others have drawn mit meeting on guidelines or even on
a distinction between permissible fan- principles. Their sense is that even as-
damental or scientific research and at suming some kind of breakthrough at
other activities that would be banned. Geneva, the bargaining will continue
To open up prospects for a deal, he long and hard for several more years,
would have to make the latter official. at best.
reaffirmed, will continue to be con- threaten to portray the summit meet-
ducted in accordance with a restrictive in as a failure- Perhaps, they suggest,
Reagan's research program for mis- ialls are
sile defense, officially called the known to argue that Mr. Gorbachev
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807260006-6