VOTING FOR BLOODSHED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807400004-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 15, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807400004-2
ART!CLZ AF?" NEW YORK TIMES
ON PACE R 15 April 1986
IN THE NATION I Tom Wicker
Voting for Bloodshed
M embers of the House who are
unwilling to face "soft on
Communism" charges in
next fall's election apparently will
give the Administration a victory this
week on the issue of military aid to
the "contras" in Nicaragua. But
those who cast an important vote for
such a sorry reason may hear some
tough questions from concerned
voters.
What, for example, will be the real
effect sending more weapons to a
stateless army or anized b the en-
tra Intelligence Agency to carry on
an insurgency against a Government
even the Reagan Administration
recognizes?
In The Washington Post for April
13, Henry Kissinger details the dubi-
ous answer promoted by those who
favor the aid: the contras need it in
order to keep military pressure on the
Sandinista Government of Nicara-
gua, and only under such pressures
will the Marxist Sandinistas accept a
negotiated settlement in Central
America.
Dr. Kissinger notes correctly that
the Administration's description of
the threat posed by the Sandinistas
"logically implies the need to over-
throw" their regime, but that the aid
proposed for the contras is "clearly
inadequate to this or perhaps any
other goal." And, he adds, President
Reagan's repeated denials that the
use of American troops is even a pos-
sibility also "underlines the incom-
patibility of rhetoric and policy."
That points, Dr. Kissinger thinks,
to "a combination of negotiation and
pressure designed to deprive the San-
dinista regime of the capability to
subvert or to undermine its neigh-
bors." In fact, "contra pressures sup-
ply the indispensable incentive" for
the Sandinistas to enter negotiations.
For that happy eventuality, Dr.
Kissinger provides a seven-point pro-
gram, including Sandinista agree-
ment to end their "special relation-
ship" with Cuba and the Soviet Union,
and to renounce loans and credits
from the East bloc in return for help
from the West. The Nicaraguan Gov-
ernment would agree to send home its
Cuban, Soviet, Libyan "and other
radical advisers," and begin a "pro-
cess of reconciliation" with the insur-
gents. With the other Central Amer-
ican governments, it would cut the
size of its armed forces to the levels of
1979, when the Sandinistas took
power.
In other words, "contra pressures
supply the indispensable incentive"
for the Sandinistas to abandon what
they consider their revolution, accept
Washington's demands, and give up
power. Dr. Kissinger does not explain
- not even he could - the practical
difference, for the Sandinistas, be-
tween such a negotiated settlement
and the military overthrow of their
Government.
If the Sandinistas did accept Dr.
Kissinger's terms, what would be-
come of the contra leaders whose
pressures are so indispensable?
Would they return to their plowshares
and Coca-Cola plants like good demo-
crats, or would they expect to take
over the government in Managua?
Would the Ortega brothers welcome,
Arturo Cruz back to the regime he
once served but now has taken up
arms to oppose? Would a process of
reconciliation place officers of the
Somoza National Guard, now fighting
with the contras, in command of the
reduced armed forces?
In the real world, of course, the
Sandinistas are no more likely than
Kissinger's
case for
aid to the
'contras' in
Nicaragua
any other government to negotiate
their own overthrow and replace-'
ment And to the extent that some-
issues might be negotiable with -hem'
- for example, the depa:?ture of
Cuban, Soviet and other 'radical ad
visers" - it's not at al! _lear tha, the
best way to get there from here is
through military pressures b : the-
contras.
It's just as logical that a stepped-up
contra war would give Managua rea-
son to believe it needs those advisers.
and other forms of East bloc help,
more than ever. And if the terms ad-'
vanced by Dr. Kissinger are all they
have to look forward to, aren't they
likely to react with increased mili-
tary efforts of their own?
The hard truth is that there's only"
one way to install in Nicaragua theJ
kind of government wanted by the Ad=
ministration and Henry Kissinger;'
that's to throw the Sandinistas out..'
Mr. Reagan doesn't have the political.
support at home or abroad to do it di
rectly; and nobody thinks $100 million'
will enable the contras to do it indi-,
rectly. Members of Congress who
vote to send them that money are vot-'
ing, therefore, to increase bloodshed-
and destruction in Central America:
not to settle its problems.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807400004-2