AN AMERICAN DILEMMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807400009-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: December 13, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807400009-7
ARTICLE APP NEW YORK TIMES
ON PAGE - 13 December 1985
IN THE NATION I Tom Wicker
An American Dilemma
G eorge Shultz told a London
audience the other day that
Western nations should use
whatever means necessary, including
covert military aid, to support anti-
Communist forces in such places as
Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia and
Nicaragua. But conspicuously miss-
ing from the Secretary of State's list
was the Philippines.
Owing to important military bases
there, vital U.S. interests are more
certainly at stake in the Philippines
than any of the other places Mr.
Shultz mentioned. It was only four
years ago, moreover, that Vice Presi-
dent George Bush journeyed to the
Philippines to offer in an effusive
inaugural toast the Reagan Adminis-
tration's commitment to President
Ferdinand Marcos.
We love your adherence to demo-
cratic principles and to the demo-
cratic process," Mr. Bush gushed.
But no one doubts that Mr. Mar-
cos's "pro-American" Government is
now under severe challenge from ? a
Communist insurgency - so much so
that President Reagan recently dis-
patched his close friend, Senator Paul
Laxalt, to Manila to warn Mr. Marcos
that he was losing the battle, mili-
tarily and politically.
So why wasn't the Philippines on
Mr. Shultz's list?
Because, it's reasonable to specu-
late, the Communist insurgency is not
the only or even necessarily the most
immediate of Mr. Marcos's prob-
lems; and because it can't be clear,
even to the Reagan Administration,
that backing him to the hilt is neces-
sarily the best bet to stop a Commu-
nist takeover.
Accumulating charges of repres-
sion and corruption, and the assassi-
nation of a major political rival,
Benign Aquino, have shaken Mr.
Marcos's hold on power and his stand-
ing among non-Communist Filipinos;
now Gen. Fabian Ver and other mili-
tary men whose responsibility for the
killing had been strongly suggested
by an investigating commission have
been cleared by one of Mr. Marcos's
courts, prompting complaint even
from Washington.
Mr. Marcos has been forced to call
a special election for Feb. 7 - al-
though it's by no means sure that he
aims to go through with it or to abide
by the results, if unfavorable to him.
He'll be opposed by Corazon Aquino,
Benigno's widow, a powerful emo-
tional symbol to anti-Marcos Fili-
pinos, and her running mate, Salva-
dor Laurel, the leader of a well-organ-
ized opposition party - a strong
ticket in a clean election, democrati-
cally oriented and pro-U.S.
Here is a genuine American dilem-
ma. Military men generally consider
the U.S. bases in the Philippines highly
important; and although it's not clear
to what extent, if any, the self-labeled
Communist insurgents are linked to
Moscow, preservation of the bases un-
doubtedly requires preservation of a
pro-U.S. government.
If Mrs. Aquino could win, that
might bring new life to a democratic
tradition most Americans would like
to think their earlier stewardship ef-
fectively planted in the Philippines;
and even conservatives might agree
that that would offer more hope of ef-
fective resistance to the Communist
insurgency than a continuation of Mr.
Marcos's repressive, corrupt regime.
U.S. military and other aid almost
surely would be more generously
proffered by a Congress long suspi-
cious of the Marcos Government's
Why isn't the
Philippines
on Shultz's
list of forces
fighting Reds?
will and ability to clean itself up and
put down the rebellion.
On the other hand, the corrupt,
strong-arm Marcos regime, long the
recipient of undeviating U.S. support,
might survive the February election
by fair means or foul, only to crumble
under the Communists' growing
strength. Even if it didn't, Mr. Mar-
cos hardly offers Filipinos the kind of
democratic future Mr. Shultz extolled
for Angolans, Afghans, Nicaraguans,
etc.
On the other hand, any suggestion
of U.S. support for Mrs. Aquino cer-
tainly would be denounced by the
agile and vitriolic Mr. Marcos as
unacceptable Yankee intervention in
Philippine affairs; and might even
give him an excuse to call off the elec-
tion and return the nation to martial
law. What effect any of that might
have on the military bases is hard to
estimate.
Mr. Shultz's case for intervention-
ism is by no means proved; whether,
for instance, "covert" aid for the An-
golan rebels improves or worsens the
American position in southern Africa
remains to be seen. And the complex
case of the Philippines suggests again
that mere anti-Communism is not al-
ways a sufficient base for intelligent
policy. ^
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000807400009-7