DEBATE REKINDLES ON FAILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807600032-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: April 25, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807600032-9
ARTICLE AF-LBARED
ON 'FAGS
THE WASHINGTON POST
25 April 1982
dope of 1Hostage'l1ission Unfolds
President. Carter's intelligence
chief says'.?a':new inquiry; should be::
made, into the failed L-aaian ho,tage
rescue =mission -.attempted' two years
ago today Y:. ,.
Retired Navy...,Adca. Stansfield
Turner, director,of?t a Cential In
telligence Agency. d=ing the .Carter
presidency: called the, raid a "searing..
national expeiience" that has- not__
been completely :.p-embed: 'for the-
lessons it holds for the nation t . ;
Gen- C.. Jones, chairman ofd'
,the Joint Chiefs' of : Staff! arid:: h6 -
principal' architect 'of the rescue mis-
lion, which ended in flaming disaster
on the Iranian desert, said yesterday
that -such' an investigation . would
serge no : useful purpose because-;
tlere is little about the. raid.that has.
not already been explored.
This article was reported 'and
written by' staff writers: Scott:: Arrn
strong,' George C., Wilson and.-Bob
Woodward. ; - .
This " difference of opinion over
whether $ . new .review is in. 6rder-'
comes at"a time when other senior'-
officials involved with the -Aprit'25;
1980, midnight attempt to extract:53_
hostages from:Tehran are confirming,
that the operation' was much bigger:.
told to date. :.... _ .,- ,.~
A series of interviews conducted
sharp "difference" in ' perspective
lower level planners' and Carz
dministration officials who knew:
ter a
i
what American ;troopers and. war=';
ere prep,
_" -. -
planes ..
gencyplansincluded: rushing- in a
.if.the initial assault force of 100 men.y
under Col.': Charles A:':, (Chargin'".'
Charlie) Beckwith got , trapped in
Tehran or the nearby airport des-
tined to be the ._ takeoff.. point for
.their long-distance escape from Iran.
Military leaders insisted they were
counting heavily on speed, : surprise
and_:'stealth and believed it 'might.
even be. possible to pull off the. res-
cue without. firing a shot- at anybody..
Carter and his top aides were willing
to- accept . limited.. casualtiesand
some officials believed there. would
inevitably, be deaths, perhaps hun-
dreds if the firepower -available.to
Beckwith was called in..-,,'.
. Noting such conflicting viewpoints
:
and arguing that the raid has too
many. policy implications, to. ignore
any longer, Turner said:
"It is. now time to appoint, a small
group to examine how the operation .
was planned and executed.. The pur-
pose would not be to look backward
and cast-blame but to look forward
and learn the lessons that surety lie
buried in" the complicated mission. .
"Some of the questions that
should be addressed would be: What ,
does the experience tell us about
national decision making? About our-
ization"
military capabilities, organ
and motivation? About the problems -
of totally secret. military operations.",
Contended Jones in .,a separate'
interview:
"We're not going to have another
`situation just like the Iranian 'situ
ation. They never repeat themselves.'
Let's look at the fundamental prob
l6ms like 'organiii8taon =rather than
taking an isolated case. We don't
need to go back and look at things ;'
that happened two years ago. Let's
get on with solving those fundamen
tal problems," with reorganizing the
''Joint Chiefs of Staff, a priority high
,:.on Jones' list
auuuf DeLfe On wuay to 6U11 Off
rescue, successfully. He noted that a
:panithf officers under retired Adm.
James L. Holloway III has already
delved into the Iranian rescue mis-
sion and issued a critical report.
Turner and 'some other former
senior administration ? officials and
military planners are known to think
that the Holloway investigation was
-too limited and: amounted ' to .the
military investigating itself..
That" Carter's:' chief intelligence'
executive, who was in on the top se
cret planning for the raid, is willing.
to urge a new inquiry strongly sug-<
'gests there is still, on the second an-
niversary of the raid, a lot more that
could be told."..
? Interviews with' 'Carter adminis '~
tration officials military leaders and
people `who went on the raid- buts
-tressed`trat wpointi in bringing
these fresh disclosures, some of them,
contradictory, about the most daring
.rescue :ever attempted by, the,Ainer
? Getting into the embassy unde :'.
'tected depended-in part on informa
tionr. secured by. the. CIA from a
handful. of - infiltrated. agents and
.'bribed guards. among. the student
militants, including some. who were
scheduled to be' on duty as guards
the night of the raid.
>Some-Carteradministration offr?-
cfals said the plan called for all the
guards to be killed, while military.
leader's insisted the "Delta" force
under Beckwith was equipped with,
special hand and leg cuffs that 'could
be snapped on the guards in an in-
stant,-and would have been if the,
troopers had sneaked into -the eth
ba'ssy as anticipated. Military leaders;
"doubted the CIA or anyone else. had
managed to'~co-opt.the guards, but
acknowledged they' were 'not'respori -F
,sible for thatpartof th.a?mission:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807600032-9