HOW TO CONTROL THE DAMAGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807710003-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 28, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807710003-9
ELMO ZUMWALT/WORTH BAGLEY
w
WASHINGTON TIMES
28 November 1986
How to control ale damage
control
Committee of the Nation
President Ronald Rea-
gan's traditional luck
failed triply in the crisis
over the supply of arms
to Iran. First, the disclo-
sure of this covert pro-
gram would have caused problems
at any time. Second. publication of
that information just as the Senate
has fallen to the control of the Demo-
crats guarantees these problems
will be maxi,ized - and to the
president's disadvantage. Third.
Atty. Gen. Edwin Meese's investiga-
tion, which has turned up the follow-
ing: (1) an overcharge to Iran on the
weapons shipped by Israel and (2)
the diversion of the extra funds to
bank accounts of the Nicaraguan
"contras," has added a new bomb-
shell.
Until that last discovery, a pres-
idential apology to the American
people would have defanged con-
gressional investigations and put the
problem behind President Reagan.
But the president has decided that
his decision to give arms to Iran as
part of the program to gain access to
less hostile members of the
Khomeini regime was not a mistake.
That judgment has now become
clouded by the "overcharge" issue
where an apology and quick action
is clearly needed. What course
should President Reagan steer to
avoid the rocks and shoals?
The president took quick action
when he initiated the Meese investi-
gation, removed Vice Adm. John
Poindexter as national security ad-
viser and Lt. Col. Oliver North as
deputy director of the National Se-
curity Council and established a
Commission to improve National Se-
curity Council procedures. Clearly,
the next step must be to get his team,
as reconstituted, to play together.
This means that Secretary of State
George Shultz, whose integrity and
ability have given him an indepen-
dent base of support, must be per-
suaded not to resign. Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Adm. William Crowe must be up-
dated on the administration's actions
and persuaded to work with Mr.
Shultz. White House Chief of Staff
Donald Regan and the new national
security assistant, to restore U.S.
prestige and a perception of coher-
ence in foreign policy.
The president should appoint
these five officials and CIA Director
William Casey to form a six-man Ex-
Security Council to close ranks with
him in a joint attempt to mitigate the
ensuing political-.-carnage from
attacks_bicongressional csirrimit-__
tees. The resident should. reaffirm-
George Shultz as the "vicar" of_ for-
e i poTicyby' designating him
chairman of the special Executive
Committee. Under his chairmanship
thee could be sure of the
fullest possible disclosure of infor-
mation to the commission investigat-
ing the NSC and to the Congress,
disclosure consistent with national
security, and that a coherent story
will be presented to the public.
But while circling the wagons for
defense, the president needs to en-
join the Executive Committee to
come forward with a program to re-
store the perception to the world that
the U.S. has a clear and consistent
policy on dealing with terrorism.
The president has learned that the
political pressures on negotiations
for the release of American hos-
tages, whether stirred up by
Americans in captivity in Lebanon
or their families in the U.S., are a
gentle breeze in comparison to the
windstorm of protest generated by
any perceived intents to pay ransom
for hostages. He has also learned
from the "overcharge" issue that
this democratic country politically
will not support any extra-legal mea-
sures no matter how justified by se-
curity considerations.
Out of this program to regain the
initiative, the following public sig-
nals need to be sent through every
possible channel.
? It continues to be U.S. policy to
punish terrorists and to refuse to pay
ransom or blackmail.
? All U.S. allies are to be encour-
aged to do the same.
? Collective efforts to improve the
efficiency of Free World defense
against and punishment of terrorists
are to be accelerated - including
efforts to isolate Syria, Libya and
Iran, governments that foster terror.
? CIA and other covert organiza-
tions are to beef up the resources
brow ht to bear against the faceless
terrorist organizations who kidnap
and murd er.
?Congress is to be requested to
change the law to permit retribution
to be carried out inside foreign coun-
tries against individual terrorists
when murders or kidnappings have
been documented.
? Notwithstanding the above, the
U.S. is open to discussion with those
regimes desiring to change their
policies and seek rapprochement
with the U.S.
? In the future the president will
insure that he and the congressional
intelligence committees are kept in-
formed about all covert activity of
the type that the "overcharge" re-
presents and that however regret-
tably, our national security will have
to stand or fall based on how well
those committees keep the neces-
sary secrets.
Vigorous promulgation of the
foregoing program would not only
demonstrate a cohesive and coordi-
nated Reagan administration, it
would be supported by the American
people and would also help to restore
the prestige of the president and the
United States.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807710003-9